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This thesis deals with the interaction between financial markets and monetary policy from 
three different perspectives. First, I study the perspective of equity investors and their 
reaction to the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcements, when they 
disagree on Nominal Interest Rate level decisions. My evidence shows that investor 
expectations formulated prior to FOMC announcements have a significant impact on equity 
prices, particularly when these expectations are not aligned with the FOMC committee 
decisions. My results reconcile past findings on the monetary policy surprise literature and 
more recent empirical findings on the effect of FOMC announcements on equity markets. 
Moreover, as I find no effect on equity returns when the FOMC committee decision is 
anticipated by the market, a practical implication of my study is that monetary policy 
authorities should take into account market expectations when formulating disclosure 
policy in order to improve alignment with financial market expectations and smooth out 
their economic consequences. 
Second, I provide evidence of the effects of the European Central Bank (ECB) monetary 
policy shocks on the real economy, specifically on industrial production and inflation. This 
analysis investigates how the ECB monetary policy shocks impact industrial production 
(output) and inflation (prices) following the established narrative methodology of Romer 
& Romer (2004). Past standard statistical approaches have yielded very limited results in 
terms of magnitude. The narrative methodology, conversely, has yielded significant effects 
of monetary shocks on prices and output. Most of these studies analysed the effect of 
monetary policy in the United States and only a recent portion of the literature has extended 
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the analysis to other countries (United Kingdom and Canada). This chapter contributes to 
the extant literature in extending the narrative methodology to the Eurozone and adapting 
it to include the unconventional monetary policies put in place by the Governing Council 
of the ECB in the past decade. To do so, I gather a novel dataset of macroeconomic 
forecasts and construct a new measure of monetary policy shocks. Industrial production 
responds to unpredictable monetary policy shocks with a decline of over 0.5%. On the 
contrary, inflation responds weakly to monetary shocks, with a very modest and unstable 
decrease of 0.05%. Furthermore, I provide empirical evidence of the heterogeneous 
responses of inflation and output among Eurozone countries. These last results are 
particularly relevant to policy makers of the ECB Governing Council, given that their 
policy decisions should have a homogenous effect on the Eurozone economy.  
Third, I investigate whether financial market stability is a concern for monetary policy 
makers in the case of the European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of England (BOE). 
Whether financial market stability should be a concern of monetary policy makers is an 
unresolved and long debated question, which has resurfaced after the 2008 financial crisis. 
In this chapter, I propose a forward-looking Augmented Taylor (1993) Rule to investigate 
the conduct of monetary policy and apply this idea to the 2003–2018 time period for both 
the ECB and the BOE. I show that a forward-looking Augmented Taylor Rule explains the 
deviation of observed rates consistent with its implied rates. By including a measure of 
Financial Market Stability Slack, I also show that the evolving preferences of monetary 
policy makers have taken into account the financial markets turmoil, particularly in the 
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The actions taken by central banks and other authorities to stabilize a panic 
in the short run can work against stability in the long run,  
 if investors and firms infer from those actions that they will never bear the 
















This thesis aims to explore the interaction between central bank monetary policy and the 
financial market, as two distinct although coexisting and influential entities. The 
developments in monetary policy institutions’ communication and operating paths have 
highlighted the delicate balance between these two entities. The maintenance of this 
balance is vital to preserve the stability of financial markets and to enhance the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. The interaction between these two entities manifests 
itself in the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The financial market is an essential 
component of this mechanism, and therefore unavoidably influenced by it.  The aftermath 
of the 2008 financial crisis has also highlighted the influence that the financial market and 
its precarious stability might have on the decision making process of policy makers. 
Monetary policy is a powerful tool that might have unexpected or unwanted consequences, 
which make the understanding of its transmission mechanisms essential in order to 
successfully conduct it. Mishkin (1995) in his “Symposium on the Monetary Transmission 
Mechanism” explores the main types of monetary transmission mechanisms found in the 
early literature, two of which are directly connected to equity prices.  
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First, he defines the “Asset Price Effects” channel, by invoking the Tobin’s q theory of 
investments (Tobin, 1969) that provides a mechanism by means of which monetary policy 
can affect the economy through its effects on the valuation of equities. The mechanism is 
provided by the link between the Tobin’s q and investment spending: lower equity prices 
will lead to a lower q and ultimately a lower investment spending. 
Second, he discusses the credit channel, also discussed by Bernanke & Gertler (1995), that 
emphasized how asymmetric information and costly enforcement of contracts creates 
agency problems in financial markets. Two channels of monetary transmission arise as a 
result of agency issues in credit markets: the bank lending channel and the balance-sheet 
channel. The balance-sheet channel is directly connected to the purpose of this thesis, as 
ultimately affects businesses’ equity valuations.1 The balance-sheet channel arises from the 
effects that monetary policy (expansionary or contractionary) has on the net worth of 
business firms, the influence on their cash flow and ultimately on equity valuations. The 
common denominator between the asset price effects and the balance-sheet channel is the 
lowering of the firms’ net worth and the resulting in a lower investment spending and 
conclusively in a lower aggregate demand. 
As described above the balance-sheet channel and Tobin’s q are offering an analogous 
explanation to the monetary policy effects on equity prices. The balance-sheet channel 








lead to a lower investment spending, but also to a weaker financial position that will affect 
their external finance premiums and the overall terms of credit that they face. 
Mishkin (1995) also shows that an extreme form of the credit channel could lead to  
monetary policy effects on the economy via a financial crisis (Mishkin, 1995). Mishkin 
(1996) defines a financial crisis as a disruptive event that sharply increases the asymmetric 
information problems so that financial markets are no longer able to efficiently channel 
funds to the most productive investment opportunities. Mishkin (1996) outlines five factors 
that can potentially promote a financial crisis: (a) an increase in interest rates, (b) a decline 
in stock markets, (c) an unanticipated decline in the price level, (d) an increase in the 
uncertainty level and (e) bank panic.  
These mechanisms and the financial literature in general, agree on the fact that a 
contractionary monetary policy, will lead to a decrease in equity prices. This fact is known 
to academics as much as to financial market practitioners, who in recent years have 
allocated a substantial amount of time and resources in forecasting, analysing and hedging 
the decision of monetary policy makers around the world. However, as monetary policy 
institutions progressed in their communication policies, we can observe that financial 
market actors have been adjusting their aptitude and approach in interpreting the signals of 
central banks. 
The Federal Reserve (FED), through its Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), before 
1994 did not schedule the monetary policy meetings, leaving financial market actors to 
“discover” the changes in the Federal Funds Rate. Only after 1994 did, the FED begin to 
pre-schedule FOMC meetings, and give appropriate notice of them, when the 
announcement included a change in the interest rate level. Several other improvements 
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were also made in communication policy. In 2000, the FOMC started to give appropriate 
notice of the announcement, not only when an interest rate change was voted but also when 
the level of the interest rate remained constant. The majority of FOMC announcements are 
pre-scheduled, specifically 8 announcements per year, although on rarer occasions the 
FOMC has given information on the state of monetary policy during unscheduled meetings, 
normally held in the form of conference calls. 
The first chapter of this thesis analyses the expectations of financial market participants 
formulated prior to the FOMC announcements, and how these expectations affect equity 
returns. My research extends Kuttner’s (2001) pioneer methodology to investigate whether 
the expectations of investors and the possible disagreement with the FOMC 
announcements are a possible explanation for the observed equity excess returns at the 
FOMC announcement day. To analyse these expectations, I compute the daily probabilities 
assigned by the market to an interest rate change across the whole trading week before the 
meeting. I depart from Kuttner’s (2001) original approach that focuses only on the day 
before the announcements and instead consider the whole trading week before the 
announcement day. Different from earlier studies, I propose a new approach to classify the 
FOMC announcements based on the expectations of investors regarding the outcome of 
the meetings. My empirical analysis takes then a standard event-study approach, while 
controlling directly for information that jointly affects monetary policy and equity prices. 
Further, I investigate whether the reaction is in line with asset pricing theory (e.g. the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM) so that predictions are related to the systematic risk 
exposure of stock portfolios.  
5 
 
Two different strands of the literature attribute different explanations to the equity excess 
returns associated with macroeconomic and monetary policy announcements. Monetary 
economists attribute this excess return on the surprise component of interest rate changes 
(Cochrane & Piazzesi, 2002; Ehrmann & Fratzscher, 2004; Rigobon & Sack, 2004; 
Bernanke & Kuttner, 2005; Kontonikas, MacDonald & Saggu, 2013; Gertler & Karadi, 
2015; Fausch & Sigonius, 2018), whereas the more recent literature on the “announcement 
effect” attributes the excess return to the substantial risk compensation on equity markets 
during short announcement windows (Savor & Wilson, 2013; Lucca & Moench, 2015; Ai 
& Bansal, 2018; Wachter & Zhu, 2018).  
My study suggests an alternative explanation, which could help to reconcile the results of 
the two strands of the literature by acknowledging both the relevance of the announcement 
effect and the interest rate surprise and by adding one factor: the expectations of investors 
regarding the content of the announcement. My results provide novel empirical evidence 
that the FOMC announcements, where market actors disagree with the committee 
decisions, are followed by an average equity impact of 40 basis points (bps), depending on 
the content of the announcement. Additionally, when investigating the hypothesis on stock 
portfolios sorted with respect to their market beta exposures, the impact on the equity 
ranges from 110 bps for high-beta stock portfolios to 30 bps for a low-beta portfolios. This 
last result is in line with past findings from Savor & Wilson (2013, 2014) and Wachter & 
Zhu (2018) who find that, despite its poor performance in explaining the cross-section of 
equity returns, the CAPM is overall a good fit to explain equity returns at the time of 
macroeconomic announcements.  
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My research also provides fresh evidence on a specific case of monetary policy 
announcements, which is generally included but often overlooked in the literature. This 
specific case is when the level of the Federal Fund Target rate is left unchanged by the 
FOMC. The Neutral Monetary Policy (NMP) analysis includes all these FOMC 
announcements and the reasons to analyse it separately rely on the potential additional 
uncertainty that these announcements carry. Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) explored the 
hypothesis that the market reacted to the actions or inactions of the FOMC2 and found that 
the “direction” of the movement (interest rate hike or cut) is not an important determinant 
of the market reaction, whereas a “no change”, combined with an interest rate surprise, is 
associated with a positive and statistically significant reaction. 
In my analysis, I report that disagreement is associated with a slightly higher (about 50 
bps) equity premium around NMP FOMC announcements. This result can be ascribed to 
two possible explanations. First, confirming an additional layer of uncertainty surrounding 
these announcements and, second, the “timing” around these announcements made in my 
sample period. The additional layer of uncertainty can arise from two sources. First, the 
NMP FOMC announcements leave investors with the open question on when a central 
bank will take action on the interest rates, and, second, if investors disagree with neutrality, 
it doesn’t provide a clear message on the state of the economy.  
The “timing” of the NMP FOMC announcements is related to the fact that these 




2 See (Bernanke & Kuttner, 2005, section E, p. 1233). 
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stocks are known to react more strongly to monetary policy statements and surprises 
(Barsistha & Kurov, 2008; Kurov, 2010; 2012; Kontonikas, MacDonald, & Saggu, 2013). 
The main contribution of my first chapter is to provide new empirical evidence that the 
additional equity return associated with FOMC announcements is, in fact, driven by the 
expectations of investors, which I identified prior to the FOMC announcement and realised 
on the announcement day. In particular, when these expectations diverge from the FOMC 
decision, and disagreement is observed between investors and monetary policy makers, I 
find a strong reaction on the equity market. My contribution to the literature follows three 
different paths. Investors formulate expectations on monetary policy innovation relatively 
in advance of the scheduled FOMC meeting date, my research highlights this point and 
provides empirical evidence of investors expectations the 5 trading days window before 
the FOMC announcement. Second, the NMP analysis corroborates my first hypothesis and 
documents an additional layer of uncertainty that reaches the financial markets when no 
change in the current monetary policy occurs. Last, I show that equity returns respond 
rationally when financial markets disagree with central bank monetary policy, as CAPM 
theory would predict. 
The seminal work of Kuttner (2001) and then Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) has initiated a 
strand of the literature which identifies unpredictable monetary policy changes with 
financial market-based measures. A different body of the literature has focused on 
identifying unpredictable monetary shocks, by analysing the information set of monetary 
policy makers, and further assessing their impact on macroeconomic variables. The 
causality patterns between monetary policy and macroeconomic variables make 
researchers work “econometrically challenging” for two main reasons: endogenous 
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movements and anticipatory effects. Past studies have used different vector autoregressive 
(VAR) approaches to overcome the endogeneity issue of monetary policy and 
macroeconomic variables (Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans, 1996; 1999; Uhlig, 2005). 
These studies find very little effect of monetary policy on macroeconomic variables. 
Conversely, Romer & Romer (2004) present evidence of significant effects of monetary 
policy shocks on macroeconomic variables in the United States (US). Their approach, 
different from past studies, estimates that monetary shocks are orthogonal, with respect to 
the information set available to policy makers at the decision time, and so they are able to 
solve the issues of both endogeneity and anticipatory movements. 
To estimate orthogonal monetary policy shocks, Romer & Romer (2004) implement an 
identification strategy first proposed by Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (1999) and 
define the intended changes in interest rate as “the sum” of a systematic and an 
unpredictable component. The systematic component is redefined by Romer & Romer 
(2004) as the information set available to policy makers at the meeting date. The 
information set of policy makers is composed by a set of forecasted and ex-post 
macroeconomic variables, which are available to policy makers at the meeting date. In 
particular the forecasted variables are inflation and GDP and the ex-post variables, included 
to control for the current state of the economy, are the unemployment rate and the interest 
rate level. The later studies of Cloyne & Hürtgen (2016) and Champagne & Sekkel (2018) 
found similar evidence in the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada (CA). 
My second chapter takes stock of that literature and develops a monetary policy shocks 
series for the European Central Bank (ECB) and investigates its effects on Eurozone 
inflation and industrial production. To develop the monetary policy shocks series, I follow 
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closely the methodology of Romer & Romer (2004) and the identification strategy first 
proposed by Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (1996). I partially depart from Romer & 
Romer (2004) and I add an additional control variable to take into account the 
unconventional monetary policy measures put in place by the ECB.  
In addition, I estimate the impulse responses of inflation and industrial production by 
following two different methodologies: a classical baseline VAR approach, to make my 
results as comparable as possible with empirical studies on other countries, and linear 
projections á la Jordà (2005). Consistent with the existing literature, I find that output is 
more responsive to monetary policy shocks, having a decline of over -0.5% and starting its 
downward path 10 months after the shocks. Conversely, the response of inflation to 
monetary policy shocks is very weak and unstable. My results on output are in line with 
past findings that used data of central banks in the UK, US and CA. Moreover, similar to 
past studies, I document a rise in prices and output, often define in the literature as “the 
price puzzle” (Sims, 1992), when estimating the impact of contractionary shocks with the 
official interest rates as a measure of shocks instead of my measure of monetary policy 
shocks. 
I also investigate the response of inflation and industrial production of single Eurozone 
countries. Unlike earlier studies in the UK and CA, the ECB monetary shocks affect, in 
fact, a number of deeply diverse countries. The inflation headline observed by the ECB 
Governing Council, the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), is a cross-country 
weighted average of the HICP indexes across the monetary union, and therefore 
representative of the countries included in it. However, the 2011 sovereign debt crisis 
highlighted significant differences among the Eurozone countries, which have profound 
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effects on their economic performances. My research has gathered data for Germany, 
France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece to analyse individual country responses of 
inflation and output. 
The response of industrial production is quite homogenous, following the negative trend 
observed for the Eurozone as whole. In particular, the negative trend of output starts within 
10 months and peaks after 24, with the peaks ranging from -0.50% to -1%. What is 
noticeably different among the countries is in the initial path of output. The response of 
inflation is weaker compared to the response of industrial production, in line with past 
results, although diverse among the included countries. A constant declining path is 
observed only in the case of Germany and France, whereas other countries display a rather 
volatile path, with the isolated case of Greece that shows inflation rising after the shock.  
My second chapter thus contributes to the literature in four different ways. First, I provide 
a new series of monetary shocks for the ECB computed following Romer & Romer (2004) 
and by gathering a new dataset of forecasts for the ECB. Second, I provide empirical 
evidence of the effects of monetary shocks on output and prices on the Eurozone.  
Third, earlier results (Romer & Romer, 2004; Cloyne & Hürtgen, 2016; Champagne & 
Sekkel, 2018) found that the narrative methodology resolves the issue of the “price puzzle”. 
My analysis provides evidence that this result holds also in the case of the Eurozone and 
that the narrative methodology, compared to a traditional recursive VAR with the change 
in the nominal interest rate as a measure of shock, resolves the price puzzle issue.  Last, 
but not least, and unlike previous studies on the ECB, I provide evidence of the 
heterogeneous responses of output and prices among the Eurozone countries. 
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In the two first chapters of this thesis, I have primarily focused on the unintended effects 
of monetary policy on financial markets and the real economy. Conversely, the intended 
effects or goals of monetary policy are stated clearly in the mandates of central banks. In 
fulfilling their mandates, monetary policy makers have a large amount of information to 
process and to analyse. Friedman & Kuttner (2010) rightly note that most of the literature 
has debated how central banks should optimally set interest rates, while much less attention 
has been directed to the more important question on how they actually do set them. The 
second question remains therefore open, although, in the past two decades, most of the 
world central banks have committed to the inflation targeting (IT) framework. My third 
chapter aims to tackle this question and investigate the determinants of interest rates setting 
within the well-known Taylor (1993) Rule framework. The chapter presents fresh evidence 
that an Augmented Taylor (1993) Rule, which includes measures of financial markets’ 
stability, better explains the conduct of monetary policy for the ECB and Bank of England 
(BOE), across the 2003–2018 sample period. It is worth pointing out that similar studies 
have been carried out in the context of the FED (Oet & Lyytinen, 2017) and the ECB 
(Gorter, Jacobs, & De Haan, 2008), although not in the context of the BOE and not making 
a direct comparison between these two influential institutions (the ECB and BOE). 
I also differentiate between a “simple-feedback” and a “forward-looking” monetary policy 
rule. Following the theoretical critique of Svensson (2003, 2010, 2019), I provide empirical 
evidence that a forward-looking monetary policy rule is more suited to set interest rates, 
given the fact that monetary policy affects the economy with a lag.  
The Taylor (1993) Rule has been unofficially used by many institutions around the world. 
Moreover, its formula links directly the level of inflation and output growth to the optimal 
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level of the official interest rates. The Taylor (1993) Rule has been therefore particularly 
relevant in discussions around the IT framework. Including some of its alternative versions, 
the Taylor (1993) Rule has been quite successful in explaining the monetary policy conduct 
of the Eurozone.  Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1998) interpret the short-term interest rate 
dynamics in two groups of countries, G3 (Germany, Japan, US) and E3 (UK, France, Italy), 
by including a “smoothing factor” in the formula. Gerlach & Schnabel (2000) provide 
empirical evidence that the short-term interest rate of the Eurozone in the 1990s can be 
well explained by a Taylor (1993) Rule with a coefficient of 0.5 on the output gap and 1.5 
on inflation. Following Svensson’s (2003) critique, Gorter, Jacobs & De Haan (2008) 
estimated a forward-looking Taylor Rule for the ECB, providing empirical evidence that 
for the pre-crisis period 1997–2006 a forward-looking Taylor Rule better explains the 
monetary policy conduct of the ECB.  
Oet & Lyytinen (2017) show that a Tri-Mandate Taylor-type Rule better explains the 
conduct of monetary policy in the US. More specifically, they include financial stability in 
the form of a “financial stability slack” variable to investigate whether financial stability 
has entered the discussions of the FOMC committee. The dispute on whether financial 
stability should be included in the mandate of central banks started with the discussion of 
Bernanke & Gertler (1999), who asserted that financial stability shouldn’t enter the 
discussion of central bankers. Kuttner (2011) revised this prescription and pointed out that 
financial market stability should be pursued in order to support price stability. Bernanke 
(2011) further revised the doctrine and practice of central banks in light of the 2008 
financial crisis experience. He pointed out the level of consensus on monetary policy and 
on the IT framework that central banks had reached in the two decades prior to the 2008 
13 
 
financial crisis. Bernanke recognised that, although the framework had helped in producing 
a long period of macroeconomic stability, it ultimately was not by itself enough to ensure 
financial stability. 
I also investigate additional factors that are worth exploring to understand in more detail 
the dynamics of financial market stability. In particular, I include in my study an 
“international financial market stability” variable, which is a measure of financial market 
stability slack for the US analogous to Taylor (1999b). A novel result that emerges from 
this analysis is the joint importance of both the domestic and international financial market 
stability in affecting monetary policy makers’ decisions. 
In the case of the ECB, in fact, the US financial market stability is definitely a concern for 
policy makers. This result can be interpreted as the joint effort of monetary policy makers 
in re-establishing trust among investors and towards institutions in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. On the contrary, in the case of the BOE, the variable related to US financial 
market stability never enters with a statistically significant estimate.  
The first contribution of this chapter is to provide empirical evidence that financial markets 
are a concern for policy makers, particularly during economic downturns. This study 
doesn’t aim to assess whether financial stability should be included in the mandate of 
central banks, but whether it has been already included as a consequence of the financial 
crisis events. Similar to the findings of Oet & Lyytinen (2017) in the case of the FED, I 
find that financial market stability is definitely already a source of concern for the ECB 
and BOE policy makers. The second contribution of this chapter is to support empirically 
the criticisms raised by Svensson (2003, 2010, 2019) and find evidence that a forward-
looking monetary policy is better, given that monetary policy affects the economy with a 
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lag. Last, I provide a comparison of the conduct of the monetary policy of two influential 
institutions: although there is significant evidence on the FED and on the ECB, much less 











What Happens When Equity Investors 
Disagree with the FOMC? 
2.1 Introduction  
 
 
…. The effect of monetary policy on the economy today depends not only, or even 
primarily, on the FOMC’s current target for the federal funds rate or the quantity of 
assets on its balance sheet, but rather on how the public expects the Federal Reserve to 
set the paths of these variables in the future. 
 
(Remarks by Janet Yellen, Vice-Chair of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, November 13, 2012) 
 
As stated by Janet Yellen, the level of alignment of market expectations regarding future 
monetary policy decisions with the actual FOMC decisions reflects the effectiveness of 
monetary policy practices. As financial markets are a fundamental part of the monetary 
policy channel, they are inevitably influenced by it. This chapter addresses the following 
question: does disagreement of investors towards monetary policy announcements affect 
the dynamics of equity markets?  To investigate this question, I develop a simple 
framework to analyse the expectations of investors in regard to upcoming FOMC 
announcements and how these expectations are reflected in equity returns. 
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The methodology employed is inspired by the pioneer research of Kuttner (2001) and 
Kuttner & Bernanke (2005). Kuttner (2001) analysed the interest rate changes deliberated 
by the FOMC to disentangle an expected from an unexpected component using the Federal 
Funds Futures and the Effective Federal Funds Rate.3 Owens & Webb (2001) employ the 
assumptions of Kuttner (2001) to reconstruct the expected interest rate after the FOMC 
announcement,4 which in simple words is the sum of the current level of the Federal Funds 
Target rate and the change (or no change) expected by investors. They further propose a 
method to covert the changes expected by investors into probabilities.  
Combining these two approaches, I compute the probabilities assigned by investors to 
interest rate changes.  These probabilities are singularly computed each day, for the whole 
week before the FOMC announcements. This time period, the week before, is also defined 
as the “blackout period”, during which policy makers are forbidden from disclosing official 
information on the upcoming FOMC announcement. Investors should be therefore 
developing their expectations free from the influence of other monetary policy updates 
from institutional sources. This method, partially departs from Kuttner (2001) and 
Bernanke & Kuttner (2005), who consider the unexpected component of an interest rate 




3 Kuttner (2001) proposed two ways to disentangle the expected from the unexpected component of interest 
rate changes. A first methodology proposed the difference between the Federal Funds Futures and the average 
of the Effective Federal Funds rate throughout the month (see equation (5) in Kuttner, 2001). A second 
formula, also employed by Bernanke & Kuttner (2005), computes the change in the Federal Funds Futures 
around the FOMC announcement date. 
4 By “expected interest rate after the FOMC announcement” I intend the Federal Fund Target rate level that 
investors expect to be declared by the FOMC and that will be therefore the new (regardless whether it remains 
unchanged) reference level of the Federal Fund Target rate. 
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I define the “disagreement” of market actors towards the FOMC announcement when their 
expectations (in form of probabilities) deviate from the FOMC decisions. Specifically, I 
postulate, that for each FOMC announcement, investors expect a change in the Federal 
Fund Target rate when the probability of an interest rate change is higher than 50% on the 
majority of days. Finally, “disagreement” is identified by combining the probabilities with 
the FOMC announcement content. If the probabilities yield an expected change in the 
Federal Fund Target rate and the change doesn’t occur, “disagreement” is observed (this 
also applies vice versa).  
“Disagreement” then takes the form of a dummy variable that has value 1, for every FOMC 
announcement where I detect disagreement and zero otherwise. The analysis is then run 
with a standard event-study approach, while controlling for variables that might jointly 
affect equity returns around the FOMC announcements days. My findings report that 
disagreement is associated with a statistically significant 40 basis points (bps) averagely 
across my whole sample period (2000–2016). My results are in line in magnitude with the 
pre-announcement drift of Lucca & Moench (2015). To give a reasonable basis to my 
findings, that position themselves between the literature of monetary economists 
(Cochrane & Piazzesi, 2002; Ehrmann & Fratzscher, 2004; Rigobon & Sack, 2004; 
Bernanke & Kuttner, 2005; Kontonikas, MacDonald & Saggu, 2013; Fausch & Sigonius, 
2018) and the more recent literature on FOMC and macroeconomic announcements (Savor 
& Wilson, 2013; Lucca & Moench, 2015; Ai & Bansal, 2018; Wachter & Zhu, 2018), I 
analyse the time series of equity returns on FOMC announcement days. 
To analyse the time series of equity returns on FOMC announcement days, I follow the 
empirical analysis of Lucca & Moench (2015) and find several interesting results: first, my 
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disagreement variable remains a positive and statistically significant explanation for the 
equity excess return across the analysis. Second, FOMC returns still present an asymmetric 
response with respect to the unemployment rate, as found by Boyd, Hu & Jagannathan 
(2005). Third, the “Kuttner Surprise”5 still represents a plausible explanation for a portion 
of the equity returns (in contrast with the results of Lucca & Moench, 2015). Last, FOMC 
equity returns are partially state dependent and influenced by the business cycle. 
Particularly when investors disagree with the decision of the FOMC, the equity impact is 
strong and negative during recession times. This last result is in line with the findings of 
Barsistha & Kurov (2008), Kurov (2010; 2012) and Kontonikas, MacDonald & Saggu 
(2013), who report a significantly different response of the market to monetary policy 
statements and monetary policy surprises during and just after recession events. 
To further corroborate these findings, I investigate a specific setting, generally overlooked 
in the literature, the Neutral Monetary Policy (NMP) analysis. The NMP analysis includes 
all the FOMC announcements where no interest rate change occurs. The NMP analysis is 
a natural environment to investigate two fundamental aspects of my research questions: the 
power of expectations and the announcement effect. Since no interest rate change is 
announced, the economic condition remains unchanged. However, investors might 
disagree with this decision and, further, an unchanged interest rate level also implies 
important information on the state of the economy. When I replicated my analysis, 




5 The “Kuttner Surprise” is the monetary policy surprise computed as in Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke & 
Kuttner (2005) and represents the unexpected component of a Federal Fund Target rate change. 
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FOMC meetings when no interest rate change was voted had an even stronger impact of 
about 50 bps. I provide two potential explanations for this additional equity premium: the 
first explanation looks at the interpretation that investors will give to NMP and is closely 
related to the information transmission theory of Tetlock (2011). As NMP FOMC 
announcements don’t come with a “clear decision”, but only with the disclosure of the 
economic outlook according to the FOMC, they might bring additional uncertainty to the 
market that results in an additional equity premium. This uncertainty will be even greater 
when investors disagree with the FOMC decisions and are left to wonder “when the 
inevitable will happen”. 
This additional level of uncertainty in “disagreement” with NMP FOMC announcements 
could be interpreted as follows. If investors were expecting a rise in interest rates, NMP 
could be perceived both as a sign that the economy is not sufficiently strong to absorb it 
and as worsening debt conditions for companies being delayed in time.  Conversely, 
assuming markets expecting a loosening of monetary policy and a subsequent NMP takes 
place, the equity market reaction will be positive as investors will forecast a state of the 
economy that could overcome the ups and downs without central bank interest rate 
interventions. Moreover, disagreement around NMP leaves the debate on when the FOMC 
will change the level of interest rates open for discussion. 
A second explanation is given by the “timing” and state dependence of NMP FOMC 
announcements. The NMP FOMC announcements have mainly happened after periods of 
20 
 
crisis 6  and severe bear market conditions. As reported by Kurov (2010), investors’ 
sentiment around monetary policy announcements has a strong impact on the stock market, 
particularly in bear market conditions, implying that perhaps a proportion of these equity 
premium might be due to the “timing” of the NMP FOMC announcements.  
To analyse this aspect, I have examined the equity returns around NMP FOMC 
announcements and found two particularly interesting results: first returns around NMP 
FOMC announcements are, in line with expectations, strongly state dependent and second 
the magnitude of the “Kuttner Surprise” is doubled around these announcements. These 
two results have implications in two different directions. First, in the FOMC announcement 
literature this aspect should be taken into greater consideration. Lucca & Moench’s (2015) 
findings are based on the pre-announcement stock drift, claiming that the decision of the 
FOMC couldn’t represent a possible explanation for their findings, although perhaps the 
expectations of investors around NMP during the zero-lower bound period could be. The 
greater magnitude of the “Kuttner Surprise”, combined with my disagreement variable, 
could all together be interpreted as the additional uncertainty surrounding these 
announcements, and therefore investors overreacting to it.  
After having established the equity premium associated with disagreement on broad market 
indexes, I follow the literature and investigate whether this response is homogenous across 
stocks. To do so, I first investigate whether the response to disagreement is in line with the 








A recent part of the literature has, in fact, found compelling evidence that the CAPM 
predictions work very well around macroeconomic announcements, compared to 
“ordinary” trading days (Savor & Wilson, 2014; Wachter & Zhu, 2018). In my analysis, I 
investigate the response of disagreement around FOMC announcements on equity 
portfolios sorted on their beta and find a high degree of proportionality in the response. 
Further, following Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) and Lucca & Moench (2015) I extend the 
analysis to the Fama & French 10 Industries Portfolios. This last analysis allows me to both 
confirm the degree of proportionality of the previous analysis, but also to examine the 
response to disagreement across business sectors. 
The response of the business sectors is quite heterogenous and interesting, with the High-
Tech sector showing a strong response of around 70 bps to “disagreement” and the 
Durables, Energy and Wholesale/Retail sectors to “agreement” of 45, 32 and 33 bps, 
respectively. Although these results are slightly in contrast with my previous conclusions, 
they could be ascribed to the different sensitivity of the industries in relation to future 
expected dividends and debt conditions.  
Altogether, the main contribution of this chapter is to provide an additional explanation for 
the excess equity returns associated with the FOMC announcements and reconcile the 
findings between the monetary economists and the macroeconomic announcements 
literature. The chapter also contributes further to the existing literature, in two other ways. 
First, I investigate specifically FOMC announcements where no interest rate change occurs 
and find that an even higher equity return is associated with these announcements, which 
is in line with the macroeconomic announcements’ literature and partially difficult to 
reconcile with standard asset pricing models (Savor & Wilson, 2013; Ai & Bansal, 2018). 
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Secondly, I confirm the past results of Savor & Wilson (2014) and Wachter & Zhu (2018) 
that the CAPM, although failing to explain the cross-section of asset returns on many 
occasions, does a fairly good job in explaining the additional equity returns on FOMC 
announcement days, particularly when these announcements are not associated with a 
change in interest rate.  
2.2 Literature Review 
 
This chapter builds on two different strands of the literature, finding its ground first in the 
long-lasting debate of monetary economists on the effects of monetary policy and monetary 
policy shocks on asset prices and then considers the more recent literature on the 
information effects during macroeconomic and monetary policy announcements. The 
debate on the effect of monetary policy effects on stock market returns applies to the long 
standing research, which mainly aimed to identify the effects of monetary policy decisions 
on financial markets.  Rozeff (1974) first presented evidence of the effect of the money 
growth rate on stock returns. This research also gives evidence that consistent with the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis, monetary policy doesn’t affect stock returns with a lag.  
Monetary policy at the time was mainly exercised by affecting the balance of money. 
Subsequently, other monetary policy tools were added in the analysis of their effects on 
financial markets.  
Hardouvelis (1987) continues the discussion by analysing the response of the term 
structures of interest rates to weekly Federal Reserve announcements of the Bank Reserves. 
He also first introduced the discussion of expected and unexpected changes in borrowed 
and non-borrowed reserves. Thorbecke (1997) addresses the effects of monetary policy on 
stock returns, by employing a series of vector autoregressive (VAR) analyses and 
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indicating that there is a large and statistically significant relationship between negative 
shocks on the Federal Funds rate (or shocks to non-borrowed reserves) and a subsequent 
increase in stock returns. His analysis concludes that assets must pay a positive risk 
premium to compensate investors for their exposure to these shocks. Thorbecke (1997) 
extends the analysis further and provides evidence on the effects of monetary policy on 
small firms.  
The contemporary interest in the effects of monetary policy on the financial markets has 
developed around the identification of monetary policy shocks and expected and 
unexpected changes in monetary policy. Cochrane & Piazzesi (2002) develop a series of 
unexpected monetary policy movements (shocks) with a high-frequency identification, to 
overcome endogeneity issues. Rigobon & Sack (2004), similarly use a high-frequency 
identification for monetary policy shocks and show that the response of asset prices to 
changes in monetary policy can be identified based on the increase in the variance of policy 
shocks that occurs on days of FOMC announcements. Ehrmann & Fratzscher (2004) 
acknowledge the Rigobon & Sack (2004) methodology and the pioneering work of Kuttner 
(2001), by introducing a discussion about the expectations of investors, and the role that 
they can play in the reaction to stock returns. Their methodology also employs market 
expectations to analyse the monetary policy shocks, retrieved from surveys of market 
participants. Further, they continued the discussion begun by Thorbecke (1997) and 
analysed the response of equity returns at a firm level. They first present evidence that 
firms included in the S&P500 respond to monetary policy changes heterogeneously and 




Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) employ the pioneer methodology of Kuttner (2001) to 
investigate the effect of unexpected changes in Federal Funds rate. The methodology of 
Kuttner (2001) successfully disentangles the expected from the unexpected component in 
the interest rate changes and assesses the effects on financial markets. Bernanke & Kuttner 
(2005) employ this methodology and state that their analysis is complicated by the fact that 
the market is unlikely to respond to policy actions that were already anticipated.  More 
recently, Kontonikas, MacDonald & Saggu (2013) employ the Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) 
methodology and find that the stock market reaction is somewhat stronger during a 
recession period. The findings of Kontonikas, MacDonald & Saggu (2013) report an 
important change in the effect of monetary policy in the aftermath of the 2008 financial 
crisis: during economic downturns unexpected interest rates cuts are negatively perceived 
by investors (unlike pre-crisis results) as a signal of worsening economic conditions.  
This chapter builds on this stream of the literature acknowledging the effect of monetary 
policy on financial markets and their fundamental role in the monetary policy transmission 
channel. Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) primarily motivate their study by endorsing the direct 
effect of changes in the Federal Funds Target interest rate on the financial market. This 
chapter builds on this motivation and on their findings to investigate two important 
findings. First, monetary policy changes have important effects on stock returns and, 
second, that the expectations of investors in regard to monetary policy changes modulate 
these effects on stock returns.  
A more recent strand of the literature has focused on the “announcement effect” of 
macroeconomic and monetary policy announcements, which are associated with a 
substantial risk compensation on the equity market. Savor & Wilson (2013) pointed out 
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that average returns and Sharpe ratios are significantly higher on days where important 
macroeconomic news are scheduled. Their primary assumption, also fundamental for the 
purpose of this chapter, is that some economic information is randomly released, whereas 
some important macroeconomic news is released in the form of pre-scheduled 
announcements. Assuming that asset prices respond to the news, the risk associated with 
holding affected equity instruments will be higher around the announcement. Consistent 
with the state dependent results of Kontonikas, MacDonald & Saggu (2013), in periods of 
high uncertainty about the direction of the economy the difference in returns between 
announcement and non–announcement days is at its peak. Their results also reconcile the 
large increase in stock market premium with a relatively small increase in the stock market 
variance.  
Their findings are directly linked to FOMC monetary policy announcements for two main 
reasons: first, FOMC announcements are pre-scheduled and investors are perfectly aware 
of the exact date and time of the information release. Second, FOMC announcements, not 
only update the public on current monetary policy, but also convey important information 
on the future economic outlook. Building on these assumptions and in line with the results 
on macroeconomic announcements Lucca & Moench (2015) found a consistent large pre-
FOMC announcement drift. Their explanation is directly linked to the additional risk 
premium required by investors to bear undiversifiable risk on the announcement day. 
Another possible explanation that they attribute to this additional risk premium is given by 
“unexpected good news”. This explanation has not been investigated further and the 
question of whether expectations should have any involvement in the pre-announcement 
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stock drift remains open. In this chapter, I partly answer this question, as in my analysis 
the pre-announcement stock drift is in some measure included.  
Motivated by this large equity premium associated with announcement days, Ai & Bansal 
(2018) develop a theoretical model that allows macroeconomic announcements to carry 
information about the prospect of future economic growth. They characterise the set of 
intertemporal preferences of the representative consumer under which macroeconomic 
announcements are associated with the realisation of the equity premium. Their 
continuous-time model partially explains the pre-announcement stock drift of Lucca & 
Moench (2015), stating that a pre-announcement drift can arise in environments in which 
information about the announcements is communicated to the market prior to the pre-
scheduled announcement. This statement was, however, contradicted by Lucca & Moench 
(2015), who claimed that other information could not be disclosed to the public by policy 
makers the week before the FOMC announcement (the blackout period). This critical 
aspect is particularly relevant to the purpose of this chapter, as I will investigate the 
expectations of investors during the blackout period. During this specific period only non-
official information should reach investors, who should have, therefore, developed their 
expectations on information that they have collected beforehand.    
Most of these studies focus on the aggregate effect on the market. Concurrently, other 
studies have focused on analysing the effect on stock returns in relation to their systematic 
risk. Savor & Wilson (2014) find evidence that during this announcement period, in 
addition to significantly higher average returns for risky assets, returns patterns are much 
easier to reconcile with standard asset pricing theories. Savor & Wilson (2014) found that 
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beta is a successful measure of systematic risk during macroeconomic announcement days 
compared to non-announcement days.  
Building upon this empirical evidence, Wachter & Zhu (2018) build a frictionless model 
with rational investors that explains these findings. They provide, in fact, two theoretical 
explanations: first is a preference for early resolution of uncertainty and the second is “rare 
events”. The risk that is realised on announcement days concerns the probability of a rare 
event in the economy. 
Both these explanations apply directly to the motivation of this study and the results that 
will be presented. The common ground between the monetary economists’ strand of the 
literature and the announcement effects’ strand is that FOMC announcements are 
associated with a drift in stock prices, to which different explanations can be given. 
Monetary economists attribute this additional return to the unexpected component of 
interest rate changes (Bernanke & Kuttner, 2005). The other strand of the literature 
attributes the additional returns to the premium required by equity investors for bearing 
non-diversifiable risk (Lucca & Moench, 2015) and the risk that is realised on 
announcements days, concerning the probability of a rare negative event in the economy 
(Wachter & Zhu, 2018). This research reconciles these findings and proposes an alternative 
explanation for the observed dynamics of equity returns on the FOMC announcements 
days.  
The common ground found in this chapter is based on assumptions that apply to both 
strands of the literature. The main assumption and motivation of my study are that investors 
develop expectations on the future decision of the FOMC committee. These expectations 
are developed by investors previous to the meeting date and will find further confirmation 
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(or not) when the outcome of the meeting is released. The second assumption is the 
announcement itself resolves the uncertainty on the market (Savor & Wilson, 2013; Ai & 
Bansal, 2018). Third, policy announcements come systematically with central banks 
updates on the economic outlook. The information content of these announcements shapes 
the private sector expectations on the macroeconomy and interest rates, potentially 
affecting the effects of monetary policy itself.   
A smaller part of the literature has acknowledged both the information content of the 
FOMC announcement and the monetary policy changes that come with the outcome of the 
FOMC committee decision. This chapter relates to this side of the literature, in combining 
the aspect of the “pure monetary policy shock” and the “information shock”. Looking at 
the high-frequency identification strategies, Gertler & Karadi (2015) included in their 
identification of the monetary policy effects, the elements of “forward guidance” that come 
with the economic outlook information released along with the FOMC announcements. 
Building on these results and assumptions, Jarocinski & Karadi (2020) provide recent 
evidence on the difference between “information” and “pure policy” shocks in the 
Eurozone. This analysis is based on the assumption that an interest rate hike, and therefore 
a tighter monetary policy, should negatively affect stock prices. Jarocinski & Karadi (2020) 
therefore postulate that a monetary policy shock is defined as a “pure policy” shock when 
it is followed by a decline in stock prices, conversely it is defined as an “information” 
shock when it is followed by a rise in stock prices. 
Overall, the literature has mainly focused on the effects of monetary policy on the equity 
market. Some evidence has been provided on relevant excess returns on the exchange rate 
market. Mueller, Tahbaz-Salehi & Vedolin (2017) report recent evidence of a pre and post–
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announcement effect on the exchange rates premium, partially in contrast with the findings 
of Lucca & Moench (2015), who only find a pre-announcement effect. They apply to the 
strand of the literature that links monetary policy to exchange rates (Eichbaum & Evans, 
1995; Faust & Rogers, 2003; Scholl & Uhlig, 2008; Rogers, Scotti & Wright, 2018). 
2.3 Hypothesis Development  
 
Building upon two different strands of the literature, the motivation of this chapter relies 
on understanding the excess equity return associated with FOMC announcements. The 
seminal papers of Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) have directed the 
literature in understanding whether investors react to the surprise component of a change 
in the Federal Funds rate, rather than to the rate change itself. Their methodology 
effectively disentangles the expected from the unexpected (surprise) component of the 
interest rate changes and further evaluates the effect on stock returns.  
These results feature an important finding: the expectations of investors are developed prior 
to the FOMC announcement. The methodology of Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke & Kuttner 
(2005), compute, in fact, the surprise component on the day prior to the announcement. 
What this methodology doesn’t allow is to distinguish the FOMC announcements with 
respect to the expectations of investors and the outcome of the announcement.  The 
outcome of the FOMC announcement and the announcement effect itself are, in fact, not 
specifically investigated in their seminal research.  
On the other hand, more recent research has specifically focused on the information effect 
of the announcement, acknowledging that macroeconomic announcement days, are overall 
characterised by higher returns and generally lower volatility (Savor & Wilson, 2013; 
Lucca & Moench, 2015; Ai & Bansal, 2018). Their research shows that the average return 
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on the S&P500 on days with macroeconomic announcements is around 11bps, which is 
considerably higher than the 1.3 bps found on non-announcement days (Ai & Bansal, 
2018). 
Both streams of the literature give different explanations for the excess return around 
announcement days and in particular the FOMC announcement. The FOMC announcement 
is, in fact, not only a monetary policy announcement, as it also conveys important 
information on the current state of the economy and the future economic outlook. To 
explain the motivation and the hypothesis of my study I will first recall some stylised facts 
that apply to both streams of the literature: 
1. FOMC announcements are associated with considerably higher stock returns than 
the average trading day. 
2. FOMC announcements convey information on the future conduct of monetary 
policy, as well as on the outlook of the economy. 
3. FOMC announcements are (since 1994) pre-scheduled, and, among the most 
anticipated macroeconomic announcements. 
4. The expectations on the FOMC announcements are developed in advance. 
5. The reaction of investors is state-dependent. 
These “facts” provide the ground for the the main motivation of my study. The main 
hypothesis of my research is, in fact, on whether the reaction of investors to FOMC 
announcements is given by their previous expectations on the conduct of monetary policy 
and further modulated by the announcement that conveys not only information about the 
monetary policy, but also about the current and perspective economy outlook. The 
“disagreement” of investors, defined as the case when the FOMC committee takes a 
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decision regarding the future of monetary policy which is totally in contrast with the 
expectations of investors, might be a plausible explanation for the strong reaction on 
FOMC announcement days. 
In order to shed light on whether the expectations of investors, combined with the outcome 
of FOMC announcements are the trigger of equity excess returns, I postulate the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: The disagreement of investors regarding FOMC announcements affects stock market 
returns. 
2.4 The Federal Reserve Communication Policy 
 
The FOMC is the body of the US Federal Reserve System responsible for taking major 
decisions in regard to monetary policy. The FOMC is composed of 12 members, including 
the 7 members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the president of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and 4 of the remaining 11 Reserve Bank Presidents. 
Policy decisions are taken under a majority rule during FOMC meetings.  
Currently the FOMC holds 8 pre-scheduled meetings per year and less frequently 
unscheduled meetings are held, mostly in the form of conference calls. The FOMC gives 
appropriate detail of the decisions taken during the meetings, in order to enhance the 
accountability and transparency of the institution. Central banks worldwide have dedicated 
a considerable amount of time and effort in enhancing their communication policies over 
the last two decades, for both economic and non-economic reasons (the independence of 
central banks).  
In regard to the FED and the FOMC this process began with the reforms in the early 1990s 
that progressed until the inclusion of the “Guidance” in 2003. Prior to 1994, the FOMC did 
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not disclose policy actions and market participants had to infer them from the size and type 
of open market operations (OMOs). After 1994, the FOMC began to pre-schedule the 
meeting and the first post-meeting statement with a qualitative description of the change 
in policy was published. In August 1994, a rationale for the decision taken was added to 
the statement, and in 1995 it was finalised by including the numerical Federal Funds Target 
rate. The end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000 represented the first steps to enhance the 
transparency of the FOMC deliberations and lay the grounds for the inclusion of the 
“Guidance” in 2003.  
In January 2000 two important steps were accomplished by the FOMC. On a January press 
release7, the FOMC announced that it approved the disclosure modifications discussed in 
the end of 19998, taking effect as of the pre-scheduled FOMC meeting in February 2000. 
The modification in the FOMC disclosure policy included two major points: first, the 
committee determined that a statement will be issued to the public immediately after every 
FOMC meeting (the previous procedure was to release only in the event of a policy action 
or a major change in the committee’s views). Second, the FOMC changed its language to 
describe future developments on the consensus around the newly approved “Balance of 
Risks” and the long-run goals of price stability and sustainable economic growth. The 
sample period that I employ in my study coincides with the approval of the revised 




7 Published the 19th January 2000 for immediate release. The revised disclosure procedures were proposed 
by the "Working Group on the Directive and Disclosure Policy," which was formed in August 1999. 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/general/2000/20000119/default.htm 
8 The FOMC started to publish fueller statements after their meetings in May 1999, however, the language 
and the procedure were not formalized until 2000. 
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2000) and ends in 2016. Even though a number of statement  were published in 1999, I 
started my sample in 2000, following the formalization of the procedure9 and the change 
in the language. 
In 2002, the votes of the FOMC were made explicit, with the dissenters’ names included 
in the statement. The inclusion of the “Guidance” in 2003 represented a further major step 
towards the level of predictability of the interest rates path, as it included clearer 
information on the likely directions of rates over an extended period.  The Fed’s 
communication policy has accomplished major steps in the past two decades. This was also 
made possible by a series of strict rules that the FOMC members had to follow when 
addressing the public and when divulgating information related to monetary policy and 
economic conditions.  
This set of rules is published in the “FOMC Policy on External Communications of 
Committee Participants”10 document and contains information on how FOMC members 
should act in regard to the disclosure of information to the public. A particularly relevant 
rule for the purpose of this research is included in point 7 of the “General Principles” and 
regulates the disclosure of information the week before a pre-scheduled FOMC meeting. 
This period will begin at the start of the second Saturday (midnight) Eastern Time before 
the beginning of the meeting and will end at midnight Eastern Time on the next day after 




9 Ehrmann & Fratzscher (2007) also separate the events of 1999 from 2000, pointing out that January 2000 
also represented a major shift in the disclosure policy, as the statements were no longer focusing on 




refrain from expressing their views about macroeconomic developments or monetary 
policy issues with members of the public, in order to facilitate the effectiveness of the 
Committee’s policy deliberations and the clarity of its communications.11 
As mention, unscheduled conference calls are much less frequent, and they have received 
much less acknowledgment in the literature compared to the pre-scheduled meetings.12 
Conference calls are mostly employed to review ongoing developments of the economic 
situation, however, in some cases they were also employed for changes in the Federal Fund 
Target Rate. Four interest rate cuts occurred during my sample period (2000-2016) out of 
25 conference calls. Specifically, 2 in 2001 and 2 in 2008. The FOMC publishes annually 
a “Federal Open Market Committee Rules and Authorizations”13  document, including 
guidelines for the FOMC organization and code of practice, however, conference calls are 
not explicitly “regulated” in terms of format or content. Conference calls are explicitly 
cited to allow members to participate to an unscheduled meeting in electronic forms, when 
the notice of the meeting was given shortly before it.  
2.5 Methodology 
 
To test my hypothesis, I need to identify investors’ expectations prior to the FOMC 
announcement day and whether these expectations are aligned with the decision announced 




11 The blackout period is explicitly set for pre-scheduled meetings, however, no specific detail is given for 
uncheduled conference calls. 
12In their recent work on stock returns predictability around FOMC announcements, Du, Fung, & Loveland 





FOMC, I define it as “disagreement” (“agreement”) towards the FOMC. The decisions of 
the FOMC that will be considered in this research and to build this methodology are only 
related to the Federal Fund Target rate. My measure of “disagreement” is built in three 
different steps: (1) identify the investors’ expectations prior to the FOMC announcements; 
(2) quantify these expectations in the form of a probability assigned by investors to an 
interest rate change and (3) combine these probabilities with the outcome of the FOMC 
announcement. 
To identify investors’ expectations, I extend the pioneer work of Kuttner (2001) and 
Bernanke & Kuttner (2005). The methodology of Kuttner (2001), largely known in the 
literature as “interest rate surprises” employs the Federal Funds Futures to investigate the 
surprise component of Federal Funds Target rate changes. This measure of surprise is 
further employed to investigate its effect on equity prices on the FOMC announcement 
day. I employ this measure of interest rate surprises to identify the Federal Fund Target 
rate expected by investors after14 the FOMC announcement.  
To compute the expected Federal Fund Target rate after the FOMC announcements I 
follow the methodology proposed by Owens & Webb (2001) to complete the second step 
of my study. Owens & Webb (2001) present a methodology to infer the probability of an 
interest rate change that builds on the forecasting ability of Federal Fund Futures and their 
deviations from the current Federal Fund Target rate. The computational details are further 




14 By “after” I intend once the FOMC has announced its decision regarding the level of the Federal Fund 
Target rate, which normally happens at the press conference held after the FOMC meeting. Details on the 
FOMC communication policy can be found in section 2.4. 
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The probabilities computed in the second step of my study cover the entire week before 
the FOMC announcement day, the “blackout period”. During this period, FOMC members 
refrain from expressing their opinions and therefore investors are left to formulate their 
expectations on the basis of previously acquired information and their own views. Lastly 
these probabilities are combined with the FOMC announcement as explained in detail in 
subsection 2.5.2 to build my disagreement measure. 
2.5.1 Step 1 and 2: Market-Based Probabilities 
 
To infer the expectations of investors on the outcome of the upcoming FOMC meeting I, firstly, 
estimate the Federal Fund Target rate expected by investors after the FOMC meeting. To 
compute this expected interest rate, I firstly compute the difference in the monthly average 
Effective Fed Funds Rate (Rs,t) and the Future Federal Funds rate (fs,t ): 
Δrt
e =  Rs,t  - f s,t             [ 2.1 ] 
Where time t represents the 5 days prior to the FOMC announcement day. 
Equation [2.1] takes its inspiration from the pioneer work of Kuttner (2001).15 To infer  
investors’ expectations, following Owens & Webb (2011), I derive the Federal Fund Target 
rate after the FOMC announcement. 
The expected interest rate, after the FOMC meeting, ( rt
e
 ) can be subsequently computed 
by adding the Δrt








15 See Section 3.2, equation (5) in Kuttner (2001) 
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The expected Federal Fund Target Interest rate, after the FOMC meeting ( rt
e
 ), can be also 
re-written  as the weighted probability p of the current rate rt  plus the average change 
applied by the FOMC committee ( Δrᵀ ) and the probability (1 – p) of the current rate 
remaining unchanged: 
rt
e =  p(rt + Δrᵀ)  +  (1-p) rt         [ 2.3 ] 
Consequently, 
p = |(rᵉt   - rt )| / Δrᵀ          [ 2.4 ] 
where p is essentially computed as the ratio between the Federal Target rate change, in 
absolute value, expected by the market (the numerator of equation [2.4]) and the average 
change applied by the FOMC (Δrᵀ), assumed to be on average 25 bps.
16  This last 
assumption, could be potentially responsible for some misspecification in the 
methodology, as across my sample period the changes applied by the FOMC were not only 
of this magnitude.17 This last assumption was, however, based on widely used industry 




16 The probability “p” is capped and ranges from 0 to 1. This assumption is reasonable to make for two main 
reasons. First, it is common that probabilities range from 0 to 1. Second in the further step of methodology 
(Step 3, combining investors’ expectations with the FOMC announcements) a threshold of 50% will be 
applied to investigate the single days’ probabilities. 
17 The misspecification associated with this assumption (0.25% the standard change applied by the FOMC) 
is, however, limited in terms of observation. The interest rate changes applied by the FOMC, which are 
different from 25 bps in absolute value represent only 10% of my sample. Over a 161 FOMC announcements’ 
sample 27 were of the magnitude of 25 bps, 13 of 50 bps, 3 of 75 bps and 118 of 0 bps (no interest rate 
changes). 
18  An example of these widely used tools is the “Fed Watch Tool” provided by the CME Group 
(www.cmegroup.com/trading/interest-rates/countdown-to-fomc.html), which releases ahead of the FOMC 
the probability of a Federal Fund Target rate change, computed with a similar background methodology as 






To further clarify the first two steps of my methodology and demonstrate what the output 
probability “p” looks like in practice, I show, in Figure 2.1, 4 examples of FOMC 
announcements: two interest rate changes (an interest rate cut in Panel A, and an interest 
rate hike in Panel B) and two FOMC announcements where the level of interest rates 
remained unchanged (Panel C and D). Along with the estimated probabilities (the grey 
line), I plot the expected Federal Target rate after the FOMC announcement (orange line), 





probability-tree-calculator.html. Bloomberg also offers a similar tool under the terminal function “WIRP”. 
Both tools have been recently acknowledged by the FED  in the “FEDS notes” of September 2019, after the 







Panel A shows an interest rate cut of 50 bps unexpected by the market; Panel B, conversely, 
shows an expected interest rate hike of 25 bps. Two important elements arise from 
comparing these two situations: first, investors formulate their expectations relatively in 
advance of the FOMC announcement; second, probabilities are quite heterogeneous even 
in the handful of days before the announcement. The first element allows me to make a 
first direct comparison with the interest rate surprise methodology of Kuttner (2001). By 
observing Panel A, in fact, I could have infer both by including the 5 days before the 
announcement and by including only the day preceding the announcement that investors 
Figure 2.1: Expected FED Funds Target Interest Rate after FOMC announcement 
The figure plots the Federal Funds Target Interest rate, the Expected Federal Funds Target Interest rate 
after the FOMC announcement and the related probabilities of a change in the Federal Funds Target 
Interest rate. There are four cases presented in the figure. Panel A presents the a case in which the market 
didn’t expect a change in Federal Fund Target rate, conversely Panel B presents the case of an expected 
change. Panel C and B both present two cases where the level of the Federal Fund Target rate was left 
unchanged, and investors expect a change and didn’t expect a change respectively. 
Source: Federal Reserve Website, www.federalreserve.gov, Quandl dataset. 
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were not expecting an interest rate cut. Therefore, considering the overall week before the 
announcement, differently from Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke & Kuttner (2005), seemed 
fruitless. Conversely, Panel B showed an expected interest rate hike, which couldn’t have 
been defined or expected if it wasn’t for the 5th, 4th and 3rd day before of the announcement.  
Panel C and D shows two FOMC announcements where the level of the Federal Fund 
Target rate was left unchanged. There is one common element between these two cases, 
investors’ expectations remained constant across the week ahead of the meeting. The 
difference among the two cases, an interest rate changes (Panel A and B) and an unchanged 
interest rates (Panel C and D), could also be perhaps ascribed by the context in which this 
announcements were carried.19  
2.5.2 Step 3: Combining Expectations with the FOMC announcement 
 
Last but not least, to construct my measure of disagreement (“It
D”), I need to combine the 
market expectations, computed in Step 1 and 2 as the probabilities assigned by an investor 
to a Federal Fund Target rate change, with the outcome of the FOMC announcement. To 
put it simply, disagreement is realized when investors expect (don’t expect) an interest rate 
change (the interest rate level to remain unchanged) and the interest rate remained 
unchanged (the interest level is changed). My measure of disagreement (“It
D”) takes the 




19 The context in which FOMC announcements are disclosed will be further discuss in the empirical results 




For each of the days where the probability value is over 50% I assign a value of 1 and 0 
otherwise. If across the 5 considered trading days the majority of the days (3 days out 5) 
investors expect an interest rate change (the probability value is over 50%), I postulate that 
investors expect an interest rate change. In the case in which investors expect (don’t expect) 
and interest rate change and the change doesn’t (does) occur, disagreement is realised and 
my dummy variable (“It
D”) takes value of 1. Conversely, my variable will take the value 
of 0, if investors expect (don’t expect) an interest rate change and the FOMC changes 
(leaves unchanged) the level of the interest rate.  
2.5.3 A Comparison with the “Kuttner (2001) Surprise” 
 
As explained in the two previous sections (2.5.1 and 2.5.2), the methodology of Kuttner 
(2001) represents the ground methodology to infer first the Federal Fund Target rate level 
that investors expect to be declared during the FOMC announcement and second to 
compute the probability associated with expected Federal Fund Target rate. Two natural 
questions can arise from the previous analysis: the first is how my methodology differs 
from Kuttner’s (2001) methodology and, second, what my variable captures that wasn’t 
already captured by the “Kuttner Surprise”20. This discussion clarifies the purpose of 
extending a long-lasting methodology and also describes part of this chapter’s contribution. 
To answer this question, I will refer to both the methodology of Kuttner (2001) and the 
results of Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) that successfully estimated the impact of the “Kuttner 




20 The term “Kuttner Surprise” and “Kuttner (2001) Surprise” are referring to the same methodology and 
will be used interchangeably throughout the document. 
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was to disentangle the expected from the unexpected component of a Federal Fund Target 
rate change across all the “potential interest rate changes”.21 The analysis employed by 
Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) was carried across all the FOMC announcement and identifies 
the response of the equity index to an unexpected component of the Federal Fund Target 
rate.  
The purpose of my methodology is to investigate whether investors disagree (agree) with 
the Federal Target rate declared by the FOMC during the announcement. To do so, instead 
of disentangling the expected from unexpected component of a Federal Fund Target rate 
change, I estimate the Federal Fund Target rate that investors expect to be declared during 
the FOMC announcement. My purpose is to identify specifics FOMC announcements 
where the disagreement is realised and identify the equity index response to it. Identifying 
specific FOMC announcements allows me to contribute two additional elements with 
respect to the “Kuttner Surprise”.  
A second important difference with the “Kuttner Surprise” is the time frame considered in 
the analysis. Kuttner (2001) considers the variation in the Federal Fund Futures the day 
before the FOMC announcements, whereas my methodology to build a comprehensive 
analysis of investors’ expectations includes the overall “blackout period” ahead of the 
FOMC announcement. This difference is heterogeneously relevant across my sample. In 
Figure 2.1 presented in the previous section (2.5.1) this is evident in Panel B, where the 




21 I refer to “potential interest rate changes” because prior to 1994, the interest rate changes were 
unscheduled and investors needed to “infer” the change from interest rate movements. 
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The results of Lucca & Moench (2015) also report that the “Kuttner Surprise” is not a 
valuable explanation for the equity excess return associated with the FOMC 
announcement. The empirical analysis carried by Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) and Lucca 
& Moench (2005) are hard to compare, even though they both report an equity excess 
return associated with FOMC announcements. My methodology proposes a bridge 
between the two and allows me to partially include the analysis of Bernanke & Kuttner 
(2005) when investigating specific FOMC announcements. 
2.6 Empirical Research Design 
 
In this section, I present the data used in my research and the empirical methodology 
followed to test my hypothesis. The data and sample description will first include a 
description of my FOMC announcements sample, second the distribution of my 
disagreement measure across the FOMC announcements and lastly the equity data. The 
empirical methodology will include a description of the model and the settings in which I 
am testing my hypothesis. 
2.6.1 Data and Sample Description 
 
My sample period covers from 2000 to 2016 and includes 161 FOMC announcements. The 
selected time period was chosen based on the FED communication policy developments 
of the last two decades, as discussed in section 2.4.  I retrieve data on the FOMC meeting 
dates and the related committee decisions from the Federal Reserve Website 
(www.federalreserve.gov).  My sample, differently from Lucca & Moench (2015) includes 
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both pre-scheduled meetings and conference calls held by the FOMC.22 Table 2.1 presents 
the FOMC sample employed in my analysis. Column (1) presents the total number of 
announcements made by the FOMC, further split into Pre-Scheduled Announcements 
(column (2)) and Conference Calls (column (3)). Column (4) presents the FOMC 
announcements (including both pre-scheduled meetings and conference calls) where the 
Federal Target rate were maintained constant and column (5) presents the FOMC 
announcements where the FOMC voted a change in the level of the Federal Target rate. 
By observing Table 2.1 a few elements can be immediately spotted: first the pre-scheduled 
meetings are a fixed number (8 meetings per year), whereas conference calls vary across 
the sample and are also much less frequent. Particularly in the first half of the sample, 
conference calls are less than an average frequency. Conference calls are included in my 
analysis23 to account for the fact that during some of these events the Federal Target rate 








22 The emergency meeting held by the FOMC on 17th September in response to the terrorist attacks of the 
11th September 2001 was excluded.  
23 Including conference calls in the analysis is in contrast with the seminal research on FOMC 
announcements of Lucca & Moench (2015) 
24 Out of 25 Conference Calls in 4 occasions an Federal Fund Target rate change was voted. Specifically, 2 
occured in 2001 (03/01/2001 and 18/04/2001) and where of the magnitude of 50 bps. The remaining 2 
occured in 2008 (21/01/2008 and 07/10/2008) and where of the magnitude of 75 and 50 bps, respectively. 
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  ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) 
2000 8 8 0 6 2 
2001 11 8 3 1 10 
2002 8 8 0 7 1 
2003 12 8 4 11 1 
2004 8 8 0 3 5 
2005 8 8 0 0 8 
2006 8 8 0 4 4 
2007 11 8 3 8 3 
2008 14 8 6 7 7 
2009 11 8 3 11 0 
2010 10 8 2 10 0 
2011 10 8 2 10 0 
2012 8 8 0 8 0 
2013 9 8 1 9 0 
2014 9 8 1 9 0 
2015 8 8 0 7 1 
2016 8 8 0 7 1 
Total 161 136 25 118 43 
Note: The table presents the FOMC announcements sample employed in the analysis. Column 
(1) presents the number of all the “FOMC announcements” per year throughout the sample 
periods, inclusive of pre-scheduled and conference calls.  
Columns (2) and (3) split the number of FOMC announcements presented in column (1) between 
“Pre-Scheduled Announcements” and “Conference Calls”. The “Pre-Scheduled 
Announcements” are analogous to the FOMC announcements employed by Lucca & Moench 
(2015). Columns (4) and (5) split the sample of “FOMC Announcements” between 
announcements where the Federal Fund Target Rate remained unchanged (“Announcements 
with NO interest rate changes”) and announcements where the Federal Fund Target Rate was 
changed (“Announcements with Interest Rate Change”) respectively.  
Sources: The Federal Reserve website, www.federalreserve.gov 
 
To construct my measure of disagreement, I employ the Effective Federal Funds rates and 
the Federal Funds Rate Future prices. The Effective Federal Funds rates are obtained from 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (apps.newyorkfed.org) website. The daily data on 
Federal Funds Rate Future prices are from the Quandl Database (www.quandl.com).  After 
computing my disagreement variable I have identified 59 meetings where the investors 
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disagree with the FOMC meeting decisions. Table 2.2 presents the distribution of the 
“disagreement” and “agreement” dummy variables for both the pre-scheduled FOMC 
announcements (Panel A) and the conference calls (Panel B). As mentioned, the 
disagreement dummy variable doesn’t represent the majority of the sample, but it’s 
homogenously distributed across the sample, with the exception of the pre-scheduled 
meetings in 2014 (Panel A). Interestingly, the disagreement dummy variable doesn’t 
represent the majority of “events” despite the fact that conference calls are not pre-
scheduled and might therefore carry an unexpected announcement. 
Table 2.2: Disagreement Dummy Variable Distribution  
Panel A: Pre-Scheduled Meetings Panel B: Conference Calls  
 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 )  ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) 
Years N It
D = 0 It
D = 1 Years N It
D = 0 It
D = 1 
2000 8 7 1 2000 0 0 0 
2001 8 5 3 2001 3 0 3 
2002 8 7 1 2002 0 0 0 
2003 8 7 1 2003 4 4 0 
2004 8 7 1 2004 0 0 0 
2005 8 4 4 2005 0 0 0 
2006 8 7 1 2006 0 0 0 
2007 8 7 1 2007 3 1 2 
2008 8 7 1 2008 6 3 3 
2009 8 7 1 2009 3 2 1 
2010 8 7 1 2010 2 2 0 
2011 8 2 6 2011 2 0 2 
2012 8 6 2 2012 0 0 0 
2013 8 3 5 2013 1 0 1 
2014 8 0 8 2014 1 0 1 
2015 8 4 4 2015 0 0 0 
2016 8 3 5 2016 0 0 0 
Total 136 90 46 Total 25 12 13 
Note: The table presents the distribution of my “disagreement” dummy variable for all the pre-
scheduled meetings and conference calls held by the FOMC from 2000 till 2016. Panel A 
presents the data related to the pre-scheduled meetings, which are 8 per year throughout the 
sample and as established by the FOMC (column (1), “N”). Column (2) and (3) present the 
distribution of my “disagreement” dummy variable (column (3)) by comparing it to the 
agreement dummy variable (column (2)). The “agreement” dummy variable takes the value of 
1 when the disagreement variable takes the value of 0 and vice versa. Panel B presents the data 
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for the conference calls held by the FOMC throughout the sample period 2000–2016 
Differently from the pre-scheduled meetings the number of conference calls per year varies 
across the sample (column (1), “N”). Column (2) and Column (3) presents the distribution of 
the “agreement” and “disagreement” variables respectively. 
Sources: The Federal Reserve website, www.federalreserve.gov, Quandl Dataset. 
 
To analyse the impact on equity returns I compute the daily returns around the FOMC 
announcements included in the analysis, employing the CRSP Value-Weighted Index from 
the Wharton Dataset. For my empirical analysis, the equity returns are computed with the 
CRSP Value-Weighted Index. The data are retrieved from the CRSP dataset on the 
Wharton Dataset. The daily return (Ht)  is computed as: 
Ht = log (Pt / Pt-1)*100        [ 2.5 ] 
Where Pt is the CRSP Value-Weighted Index adjusted closing price at time “t” (the FOMC 
announcement date) and Pt-1 is the CRSP Value-Weighted Index adjusted closing price the 
day before. The summary statistics for the market returns are presented in Table 2.3. The 
summary statistics reported in Table 2.3 presents the average daily returns of the CRSP 
Value–Weighted Index for all the FOMC announcements (“All FOMC”, column (1)), in 
comparison to all the other days included in the sample period (“All NON FOMC”, column 
(4)). In line with findings on macroeconomic announcements (Savor & Wilson, 2013; Ai 
& Bansal, 2018), FOMC announcement days are associated with substantially higher 
returns than non-announcement days. 
 
 
Continued Table 2.2 
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Table 2.3:  Summary Statistics of Equity Returns (CRSP Value-Weighted Index) 
with Respect to FOMC Meeting Days 
 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) 
  All FOMC  FOMC  ItD = 1 FOMC  ItD = 0 All NON FOMC 
N 161 59 102 3998 
µ 0.326 0.424 0.270 0.007 
Σ 2.032 2.079 2.018 1.221 
Median 0.209 0.113 0.307 0.045 
Min -5.818 -2.921 -5.818 -9.005 
Max 5.099 5.045 5.099 11.513 
Sk 0.043 0.991 -0.451 -0.012 
K 3.358 1.843 4.103 8.676 
Note: The table presents the summary statistics for the equity returns around “All FOMC” 
announcements in column (1), the FOMC announcements where disagreement is observed in 
column (2) (“FOMC  ItD = 1”), the FOMC announcements where agreement is observed in 
column (3) ((“FOMC  ItD = 0”) and  the average return for all the other days included in the 
sample period in column (4) (“All NON FOMC”). The summary statistics presented for each 
sample of equity returns are the number of days considered (“N”), the simple average (“µ”), the 
variance (“Σ”), the median (“Median”), the minimum value (“Min”), the maximum value 
(“Max”), the skewness (“Sk”) and the kurtosis (“K”). 
Sources: The Federal Reserve website (www.federalreserve.gov), CRSP Dataset, Wharton 
Database. 
 
The average return on FOMC announcement days is 32 bps, whereas the returns on all the 
other days have an average return closer to zero. Columns (2) and (3) report the summary 
statistics of the equity returns around the FOMC announcements where disagreement is 
observed (“FOMC It
D = 1”) and when agreement is observed (“FOMC It
D = 0”). Notably 
the average return on disagreement day is the highest, with an average return of 43 bps, 
followed by the overall FOMC announcements (“All FOMC”) and the average returns 
when agreement is observed (“FOMC It
D = 0”). Considering the difference in the 
magnitude of average returns between FOMC announcements days and non-announcement 






Table 2.4: Summary Statistics per year (2000–2016)- CRSP Value-Weighted Index 
Panel A: FOMC Announcements    Panel B: Non-Announcements  
 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 )  ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) 
Year N μ Max Min Σ Year N μ Max Min Σ 
2000 8 0.261 2.477 -1.323 1.319 2000 242 -0.058 4.716 -5.939 1.987 
2001 11 0.593 5.046 -2.427 4.871 2001 234 -0.062 4.391 -4.334 1.700 
2002 8 -0.071 1.407 -2.181 1.740 2002 242 -0.093 5.752 -4.171 2.715 
2003 12 0.440 1.516 -1.220 0.925 2003 240 0.082 3.553 -3.508 1.160 
2004 8 0.254 1.290 -1.344 0.578 2004 239 0.035 1.622 -1.634 0.482 
2005 8 -0.171 0.674 -1.011 0.414 2005 236 0.019 1.938 -1.667 0.404 
2006 8 0.168 2.131 -0.639 0.775 2006 234 0.057 2.131 -1.825 0.375 
2007 11 0.607 2.917 -2.524 1.847 2007 231 -0.022 2.922 -3.458 0.981 
2008 14 0.216 5.099 -5.818 7.756 2008 232 -0.151 11.513 -9.005 6.407 
2009 11 0.967 3.300 -1.323 2.178 2009 233 0.089 7.011 -4.861 2.708 
2010 10 0.107 0.796 -0.599 2.217 2010 231 0.042 4.358 -3.866 1.305 
2011 10 0.435 4.740 -2.921 4.818 2011 234 0.001 4.600 -6.667 2.088 
2012 8 0.606 1.802 -0.323 0.813 2012 233 0.027 2.504 -2.475 0.624 
2013 9 0.193 1.657 -1.392 1.185 2013 234 0.081 2.185 -2.503 0.445 
2014 9 0.332 2.027 -1.028 0.955 2014 234 0.035 2.414 -2.296 0.509 
2015 8 0.349 1.460 -1.342 0.939 2015 235 -0.018 3.910 -3.940 0.951 
2016 8 -0.111 1.083 -1.089 0.531 2016 235 0.044 2.450 -3.573 0.684 
Note: The table presents the summary statistics for the equity returns around “FOMC Announcements” days 
(Panel A) and “Non-Announcements” days (Panel B) for each year included in the sample period (2000-
2016). The “FOMC Announcements” days include both pre-scheduled announcements and conference calls. 
The summary statistics provided for each year in both Panel A and B are: the number of considered days 
“N”, the average return “μ”, the maximum return value “max”, the minim return value “min” and the 
variance of the returns “Σ”. 
Sources: The Federal Reserve website, www.federalreserve.gov, CRSP Dataset, Wharton Database. 
 
Consistent with the findings of  Kontonikas, MacDonald & Saggu (2013), the descriptive 
statistics are different in magnitude between pre- and post-crisis. The highest average 
return on FOMC announcement days is observed in 2009 (almost 1%), after a series of 
interest rates cuts, therefore consistent with economic theory and past findings. Similarly, 
during the pre-crisis period in 2005, where interest rates were consistently hiked, the 
FOMC announcement returns are, on average, negative. With the exception of 2005 and 
2016, however FOMC announcement days show a consistently higher average return then 
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all the other. In 2012, among the 8 pre-scheduled meetings the average return was about 
60 bps, which is more in line with the magnitude found by Lucca & Moench (2015) in the 
1994-2011 sample period. Conversely in 2016 the average return among the 8 pre-
scheduled meetings is negative (-11 bps). Kurov, Gilbert, & Wolfe (2020) document a 
decline in the FOMC pre-announcement drift after the seminal paper of Lucca & Moench 
(2015), which is consistent with the summary statistics presented in Table 2.4. 
2.6.2 Empirical Methodology 
 
This section presents my empirical methodology to investigate the effect of my 
“disagreement” variable on equity returns. To investigate empirically my main hypothesis, 
I run the following regression model: 
Ht  =  β0 + β
D It
D  + βx Xt  + εt      [ 2.6 ] 
The dependent variable Ht represents the 1-day return of the CRSP Value-Weighted index 
as computed in equation [2.5]. In the main specification, the explanatory variables are 
presented only by my measure of disagreement ( It
D ), which takes the form of a dummy 
variable and a constant term ( β0 ) that represents the “agreement” variable.  
In additional specifications of the analysis, other control variables are included, to take into 
account information that might jointly affect the stock returns on the FOMC announcement 
days, and are denoted by the vector of controls Xt. The vector of controls includes 
macroeconomic and financial markets’ variables following the literature.  
The macroeconomic variables included are: the unemployment rate change, The National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) variable, the “Tight Cycle” variable, the “Easy 
Cycle”, the 12-months log change in the industrial production index and the 12-months log 
change in the consumer price index (CPI). The financial markets variables are the “Kuttner 
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Surprise”, computed as in Bernanke & Kuttner (2005), and a measure of volatility 
represented by the level of the VIX index at the market close the day before the 
announcement.  
The unemployment rate change is included in the analysis, following the findings of Boyd, 
Hu & Jagannathan (2005), which report a considerable response of the stock market to the 
unemployment rate monthly announcement of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Specifically 
they found that bad news for unemployment normally means good news in the stock 
market. Further, the mandate of the FED explicitly include the objective of full 
employment as the second goal to be achieved after price stability. In the analysis, I include 
the monthly percentage change of the unemployment rate released in the announcement 
immediately preceding the considered FOMC announcement.25 
The remaining listed control variables were included following the empirical analysis of 
Lucca & Moench (2015). The NBER dummy variable is a monthly dummy recession 
variable26 that takes the value of 1 in “recession times” and zero elsewhere. The time series 
is an interpretation of the data provided by the NBER for the US business cycle expansion 
and contractions.27 
 The “Tight Cycle” and “Easy Cycle” dummy variables are two variables that I constructed 




25 Summary statistics for macroeconomic variables, including the unemployment rate change, are included 
in Appendix A, Table A.1. 
26 The NBER dummy variable is available at a monthly frequency, on the Federal Reserve, Bank of St. Louis 
Economic Research dataset (Federal Reserve Economic Data, FRED, fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USREC). 




dummy variable takes the value of 1 during a tight monetary policy period and zero 
elsewhere. The cycle is considered to be “tight” when the Federal Target rate is above 2%. 
Conversely the “Easy Cycle” dummy variable is a variable that takes the value of 1 during 
an easy monetary policy period and zero elsewhere. The period is considered to be “easy” 
when the Federal Target rate is below 2%. I consider the 2% threshold, which is defined 
the equilibrium level for the Federal Target rate by the pioneer work of Taylor (1993).28 
These three variables were included to investigate whether the reaction to disagreement 
around the FOMC announcements is linked to the business and the monetary policy cycle. 
The 12-months log change of the industrial production index and of the CPI were also 
included following Lucca & Moench (2015).29 
The financial markets’ variable included are the “Kuttner Surprise” as a measure of interest 
rate surprise, computed following the pioneer methodology of Kuttner (2001) and further 
employed by Bernanke & Kuttner (2005).30  Lastly, I include a measure of volatility, 
represented by the level of the VIX index the day before the FOMC announcement day. 
All the analyses are conducted following a standard event-study approach and estimated 
with the OLS methodology. My analysis is carried in two specific settings, firstly including 
all the FOMC announcements (comprehensive of both pre-scheduled meetings and 




28 The distribution of the “Tight Cycle” and “Easy Cycle” dummy variables is included in Appendix A, Table 
A.3 and A.4. 
29 The 12-months log change of the Industrial production and CPI are both available on the Federal Reserve, 
Bank of St. Louis Economic Research dataset (Federal Reserve Economic Data, FRED, fred.stlouisfed.org). 
Summary statistics on the 12-months log change of the industrial production and CPI are available in 
Appendix A, Table A.1. 
30 Summary statistics on the “Kuttner Surprises” around FOMC announcements are provided in Appendix 
A, Table A.5. 
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where the FOMC has decided to leave the level of the Federal Target rate unchanged. This 
specific analysis, which I will further define as the “Neutral Monetary Policy (NMP) 
Analysis” is further described and explained in detail in the next subsection. 
After testing empirically my hypothesis on a “general” equity index, I investigate whether 
the results are homogenous across less broader indexes. First, I investigate whether the 
response of disagreement is in line with the CAPM predictions as recent literature has 
found around macroeconomic announcements (Savor & Wilson, 2014; Wachter & Zhu, 
2018). To do so, I employ equity returns of portfolios sorted on the betas31 as the dependent 
variable of equation [2.6]. 
Following the findings of Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) on the Fama & French Industry 
portfolios, I test my main hypothesis on the Fama & French 10 Industry portfolios,32 to 
investigate whether the response of disagreement is homogenous across industries. 
Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) found that the responses of industries was modestly in line 
with the industry betas and therefore perhaps in line with the CAPM predictions.  
More recently, other literature findings have provided empirical evidence that the CAPM 
does a fairly good job in explaining equity excess returns around macroeconomic 




31 The portfolios sorted on the beta are available on the CRSP, Wharton dataset; data on the returns and on 
the average beta are both available. Summary statistics on the portfolios are provided in Appendix A, Table 
A.6. 
32 The Fama & French Industry Portfolios are available from Kenneth French’s webpage 
(mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/). Summary statistics on the 10 Industry Portfolios are 
provided in Appendix A, Table A.7. 
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whether the response of investors to disagreement varies across equity indexes in line with 
the systematic risk that they bear around FOMC announcement days. 
2.6.2.1 When No Action is Still an Action: The Neutral Monetary Policy 
Analysis (NMP) 
 
This section presents a “special case” of my hypothesis of the “Neutral Monetary Policy 
Analysis” (NMP), which consists of all the FOMC announcements where the level of the 
Federal Fund Target rate was left unchanged. As the “information transmission literature” 
predicts, “no news” is still consider a signal to the market. As Tetlock (2011) shows, stale 
information still affects stock prices. But, are NMP FOMC announcements a “no news”? 
As showed by the recent literature on “information shocks” (Gertler & Karadi, 2015; 
Altavilla et al., 2019; Jarocinski & Karadi, 2020), FOMC announcements convey a large 
amount of information on the future economic outlook, which are as influential as the 
information regarding the level of the Federal Fund Target rate. 
My claim is that NMP FOMC announcements carry an additional level of uncertainty with 
respect to the general FOMC announcements, particularly when investors disagree with it, 
due to the asymmetric component of investors’ interpretations. Furthermore, investors’ 
interpretations are not only built once the FOMC has disclosed their decision to leave the 
level of interest rates unchanged and the economic outlook, but also in advance when they 
“weight” the potential outcomes of the announcement. The reasoning behind this is 




As shown in Figure 2.2, at time t-1 investors are aware of the potential outcomes, tight 
monetary policy (1), expansionary monetary policy (-1) and neutrality (0). The likelihood 
of occurrence of three possible FOMC decisions is, however, rationally distributed only on 
two possible combinations: a hike and neutrality, or a cut and neutrality. This assumption 
is based on the fact that the probability of the outcome is based also on the current state of 
t
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* 1 = market agrees, 0= market disagrees
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**0 = market disagrees and expected neutrality, -1= market disagrees and expected a 
cut, 1=market disagrees and expected a hike, x = market agrees, therefore no other 




Expectations with the 
Meeting's Outcome**
Figure 2.2: Monetary Policy Outcome and Market Opinions 
Figure 2.2 displays, the link between FOMC meeting outcomes and investors' opinions 
regarding it. At t-1 investors are aware of the potential outcomes, tight monetary policy (1), 
expansionary monetary policy (-1) and neutrality (0). Between t-1 and t, investors formulate 
their opinions on the possible outcomes. At time t (the meeting date) the outcome is public. 
When combining market opinions with the outcomes there are two additional paths to consider, 
market agreement (1) and market disagreement (0). When the market agrees, we expect the 
reaction of the meeting to be embedded already in stock prices, therefore the node closes (x). 
If the market disagrees, there are two further paths to consider, related to the outcome that the 
market actually expected at t-1. The further market reaction is in fact based on market 
interpretation of the outcome at time t, conditional to expectations formulated at time t-1. 
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the economy. In other words, it is highly unlikely that within the same meeting both an 
interest rate hike and an interest rate cut could be expected. Between time t–1 and t (the 
meeting date), investors formulate their opinions on the possible outcomes. At time t the 
outcome is public.   
When combining market opinions with the outcomes there are two additional paths to 
consider, market agreement (1) and market disagreement (0). When the market agrees, we 
expect the reaction to the announcement to be embedded already in stock prices, therefore 
the node closes (x). If the market agrees with the outcome of the meeting the impact should 
be close to irrelevant, according to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), as the 
expectations of the market should be already embedded in the stock prices.  
If the market disagrees, there are two further paths to consider, conditional to the 
expectations formulated at time t–1.  When the FOMC committee votes an interest rate 
hike and the market disagrees, the alternative is that the market hoped for neutrality. 
Similarly, if an interest rate cut is voted, the alternative is that the market hoped for 
neutrality. When the market disagrees with an interest rate hike, potentially it considers the 
economy not yet enough “strong” to absorb less favourable debt conditions. Similarly, an 
“unwanted” interest rate cut could be interpreted as a current worse economic condition 
than expected. The first case can be positively interpreted as a better current economic 
condition, although worsening in the future. The second case is a worse current economic 
condition but a more positive forward-looking scenario. Regardless of which one is the 
case, both send a signal to the market on the current state of the economy and resolve the 
question: “When is the central bank going to change the level of interest rates?” 
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Conversely, disagreement on neutrality leaves investors with an additional level of 
uncertainty. Investors will, in fact, not only question the current and future state of the 
economy but also debate on when the central bank will change the level of interest rates. 
If the market disagrees with neutrality, two cases have to be considered. If the market was 
expecting an interest rate hike, and the FOMC votes for neutrality, it could be interpreted 
as a bad signal. In other words, the economy is not yet strong enough to absorb an interest 
rate hike, therefore the current situation is worse than expected and a future hike will mean 
even worse conditions for stock prices expected in the future. If the market was expecting 
a cut, but neutrality is voted, it might be considered that the current economy condition is 
better than expected.  
To summarise, my prediction is that around FOMC announcements where the level of the 
Federal Fund Target rate is unchanged the equity response might differ from the other cases 
and be either higher or lower. From a theoretical perspective, as the level of the Federal 
Fund Target rate is unchanged the equity response should be driven by the economic 
outlook disclosed during the FOMC announcement. According to the macroeconomic 
announcements’ literature announcements (Savor & Wilson, 2013; Ai & Bansal, 2018), 
the equity premium should be still higher the on “ordinary” trading days. Bernanke & 
Kuttner (2005) also find that “no rate change” in the interest rate is positively associated 
with equity returns,33 offering as explanation that the failure to move at any specific FOMC 
meeting may be viewed as postponing the inevitable, which is partially in line with the 




33 See Table IV in section D in Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) 
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To investigate this prediction, I estimate the model presented in equation [2.6] only on the 
FOMC announcement where the level of the Federal Fund Target rate remains unchanged, 
although there is an important aspect that needs to be considered in the context of my 
sample period (2000–2016). My sample period encompasses the so-called “zero lower–
bound” period after the financial crisis (2009–2015), on top of the shortest post-crisis 
period (2002–2003). These two periods are also partially included in Lucca & Moench’s 
(2015) sample period, although the don’t attribute to the content of the announcement a 
potential driver of the equity premium. 
Figure 2.3 shows the yearly sum of equity premium realised around FOMC announcement 
days included in my sample period, which both includes pre-scheduled meetings and 
conference calls. This figure shows the overall premium realised around all the FOMC 





34  The entire distribution per year of the NMP FOMC announcements can be found in Table 2.1 (column 
4), and shows that the concentration of NMP FOMC announcements fells in the post crisis periods. In 
particular, out of the 118 NMP FOMC announcements 75 occurred between 2002-2003 (18 of 75) and 




The blue bars represent the cumulated contribution of the NMP returns to the overall 
FOMC cumulated returns. Obviously, the frequency of NMP FOMC announcements 
determines the amount of returns associated with them. Within the post-2008 financial 
crisis period, notably in 2003 (also a post-crisis period) the overall positive cumulated 
returns are entirely made by the NMP FOMC announcement. Only one Target rate change 
was voted in 2003 and resulted in a negative return of 80 bps.  
The proportion of NMP FOMC announcements is an important element to further interpret 
the empirical results related to this section. As previously mentioned and consistent with 
literature findings (Kurov, 2010; 2012) investors’ beliefs around economic uncertainty 
change. Kurov (2010; 2012) claims, in fact, that the reaction to FOMC statements is state 
Figure 2.3: Distribution of the equity return across FOMC announcements 
The graph presents the yearly cumulated returns around the FOMC announcements in my sample 
(2000-2016), including both pre-scheduled meetings and conference calls. The cumulated returns 
are computed with the 1-day return (equation [2.5]) of the CRSP Value-Weighted index. The 
blue bars represent the cumulated returns around FOMC where the level of the Federal Fund 
Target rate was left unchanged, whereas the yellow bars represent the cumulated returns across 
all the FOMC announcements. The data label indicates the overall cumulated returns across all 
the FOMC announcements. The green line describes the average Federal Fund Target rate path 
across my sample period. 
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dependent and linked to forward-looking guidance of the FOMC. Kontonikas, MacDonald 
& Saggu (2013) also claim that the response of the market to FOMC announcements has 
become increasingly asymmetric during the 2008 financial crisis.  
More recently, Sinha (2015) found compelling evidence that around 2012-2013 the FOMC 
statements that extended the zero-lower bound regime were found to increase the ex-ante 
uncertainty for the ten-year Treasury yield at the 30–90 day horizon. The explanation 
provided, in line with my previous statement, focuses on the fact that investors might have 
interpreted this statement as indicating a worse economic situation then expected.  
2.7 Empirical Results 
 
In this section, I present the results of the hypothesis postulated in section 2.3, following 
the empirical methodology outlined in section 2.6.2. First, I present the results related to 
my first main hypothesis, on whether “disagreement” affects equity returns around FOMC 
announcements. Further to this, several other empirical analyses are conducted to provide 
a plausible explanation for the main result and reconcile it with past findings in the 
literature. 
2.7.1 Main Results 
 
Table 2.5 reports the results related to the main specification of the empirical methodology 
presented in section 2.6.2 in equation [2.6]. The results, in line with expectations, report an 
additional equity premium associated with FOMC announcements where “disagreement” 
is realised. Furthermore, the “Constant” in my regression represents all the FOMC 












Obsv (# FOMC meetings) 161 
R2 0.053 
Note: This table presents the results for the dummy regression analysis presented 
in equation [2.6], excluding the vector of controls Xt. The dependent variable is 
represented by the daily returns on the CRSP Value–Weighted Index, computed 
as presented in equation [2.5]. The dummy variable (ItD) is computed following 
the methodology outlined in section 2.5. The constant represents the events where 
investors agree with the decision of the FOMC. The event study encompasses the 
2000–2016 period and includes 161 FOMC meetings. Standard Errors are reported 
in brackets. 
Signif. codes:  ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1. 
Source:  Federal Reserve website, www.federalreserve.gov, Quandl dataset, 
Wharton-CRSP Database, US Labor Statistics websites. 
 
My findings indicate that the FOMC decisions, which show a marked dissimilarity with 
investors’ expectations have a significant (at 5%) and economically important excess 
return of 42 bps on the announcement day.  The remaining events, where investors “agree” 
with the FOMC decisions (represented by the Constant in Table 2.5) are mildly significant 
(at 10%) at represent a smaller excess return of almost 27 bps. All together the results point 
out that, even though FOMC announcement as whole carry an important equity premium 
compared to non announcement days (the average non-announcement equity return is 
around 1bps as reported in Table 2.3), this equity premium differs across events according 
to expectations of investors. 
The return pre-announcement drift of Lucca & Moench (2015) was reported to be around 
50 bps, although the more recent findings of Kurov, Gilbert & Wolfe (2020) demonstrate 
that the equity premium associated with the FOMC has considerably reduced and is closer 
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to 30 bps.35 My findings place themeselves in the middle of these two results but they 
provide an additional explanation to the FOMC equity. 
What my variable captures is the resolution of the uncertainty ahead of the FOMC 
announcements and the realisation of investors’ expectations once the announcement is 
disclosed. Kurov, Gilbert & Wolfe (2020) claim that as investors become more accurate in 
estimating the next move of the FOMC and as the communication policy of central banks 
improves, the equity premium associated with these announcement is reduced. This last 
finding is consistent with the results related to the FOMC announcements where investors 
agree with the FOMC. In line with Kurov, Gilbert & Wolfe (2020) interpretation, FOMC 
announcements where perhaps investors have been more accurate in predicting the FOMC 
actions carried a smaller equity premium compared to the others. 
My result shows that there is still room for improvement as there is still a considerable 
amount of uncertainty surroundings these days, that still “produces” a considerable equity 
premium. Nontheless, these result also highlight the progress of central banks’ 
communication and the reduction of uncertainty, as the announcements where 
disagreement is realised represent only 37% of the sample.   
2.7.2 Persistence 
 
The  analysis presented in the previous section (2.7.1), similar to the analysis provided by 
Lucca & Moench (2015), assumes that the equity returns should not be reversed on 




35 The analysis was also carried out on other broad equity indexes and yielded similar results. The results 
can be found in Appendix A, Table A.8, Panel A. 
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the day before, that partially also includes the pre-announcement FOMC returns. Table 2.6 
summarises the results for equation [2.6], where the dependent variable is represented by 
the daily returns on the CRSP Value Equity Index the day before and the subsequent 3 days 
after the FOMC announcement day. 
The results show that the variable is not statistically significant on the day before and the 
days after the FOMC announcement day, consistent with expectations and the past 
literature (Lucca & Moench, 2015). This result corroborates the findings that the additional 
equity returns on my “disagreement” variable are not reverse in other days around the 
FOMC announcement day. 
Table 2.6: Persistency 
Days Const. It
D Obsv 
-1 0.026 (0.161) -0.108 (0.222) 
161 
0 0.268* (0.141) 0.423** (0.186) 
+1 -0.033 (0.157) -0.005 (0.216) 
+2 -0.091 (0.131) -0.037 (0.180) 
+3 0.041 (0.136) 0.066 (0.186) 
Note: This table reports results for the main specification of my analysis 
(equation [2.6]) for the returns on the CRSP Value-Weighted Index on the 
day prior and on the 3 days after the FOMC meeting dates. The sample 
ranges (2000–2016) are analogous to the main analysis. The day “0” 
represents the FOMC meeting date (the result presented in Table 2.5). The 
regression includes my “disagreement” measure ( ItD ) and a constant term. 
Standard Errors are presented in brackets. 
Signif. codes:  ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1. 
Source:  Federal Reserve website, www.federalreserve.gov, Quandl 
dataset, Wharton - CRSP Database, US Labor Statistics websites. 
 
An important element needs to be acknowledged to correctly interpret this test. The daily 
stock returns are computed as shown in equation [2.5], and therefore partially include the 
pre-FOMC announcement drift in stock returns of Lucca & Moench (2015). The pre- 
announcement stock drift is, in fact, computed including the returns from 2 pm on the day 
before the FOMC announcement day and 2 pm on the announcement day, excluding the 
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outcome of the meeting. My result (denoted in Table 2.6 as day “0”) partially include this 
“pre-drift”, although this is in line with my analysis, as Lucca & Moench (2015) 
acknowledge that this drift can be due to the resolution of uncertainty and the economic 
outlook that will be released on the announcement.  
2.7.3 Time series analysis of the FOMC announcements 
 
The literature provides different explanations for FOMC announcement equity returns, 
such as the surprise component of the interest rate changes (Ehrmann & Fratzscher, 2004; 
Bernanke & Kuttner, 2005; Fausch & Sigonius, 2018), the information content on the 
future economic outlook and realization of uncertainty (Savor & Wilson, 2013; Lucca & 
Moench, 2015, Ai & Bansal, 2018) and to the current state of the economy (Kontonikas, 
MacDonald & Saggu, 2013). In section 2.7.1, I provided empirical evidence that FOMC 
announcements, where disagreement is observed, are responsible for a considerable 
amount of the equity excess return attributed to these events. In this section I also include 
a series of control variables to investigate additional factors that might contribute to the 
result. The control variables included in the analysis (representing the vector of controls Xt 
in equation [2.6]) are constructed as described in detail in section 2.6.2 and include both 
macroeconomic and financial markets variables.  
The macroeconomic variables included are: the unemployment rate change (υΔ ), the NBER 
dummy variable (NBER), the “Tight Cycle” variable (Tight C.), the “Easy Cycle” (Easy 
C.), the 12-months change in the industrial production index (Δ12 Log (IP)) and the 12-
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months change in the CPI index (Δ12 Log (CPI)).36 The financial markets’ variables are 
Kuttner Surprise (Kuttner S.), computed as in Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) and a measure 
of volatility represented by the level of the VIX index at the market close the day before 
the announcement (Vol t-1).
37  
The results are presented in Table 2.7 and also include interaction terms between the above-
mentioned variables and my measure of “disagreement”. My measure of “disagreement” 
remains positive and statistically significant in most cases, with the only exception 
represented by the regression that includes the VIX index (Vol t-1). Nonetheless the 
interaction variables between my “disagreement” variable and the VIX index is positive 
and statistically significant. This result can be ascribed to the additional volatility that 
might be present in the market due to the realised “disagreement” between market actors 
and the FOMC. The effect of volatility and volume will be more closely investigated in 
section 2.8.1.  
The constant represents the “agreement” variable, and therefore the FOMC announcements 
where investors’ expectations are aligned with FOMC decisions. These events represents 




36 The macroeconomic variables were included following the empirical analysis of Lucca & Moench 
(2015).  
37 Lucca & Moench (2015) also include two additional financial market variables. The “SPX surprise” (see 
Lucca & Moench, 2015, section H, p. 355), which is the 2-3 pm FOMC announcement return on the S&P500 
index and the moving average of the pre-FOMC returns over the past 8 meetings. The two variables aren’t 
included in my analysis, for two different reasons. The SPX surprise is computed employing intra-day data, 
which are not currently available to me. The moving average of the pre-FOMC returns variable is in line with 
Lucca & Moench (2015) that includes all the FOMC announcements, although it is unfitted to the purpose 
of my analysis, that aims to investigate specific FOMC announcements which are not necessarily sequential. 
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significant in a handful of cases and consistently smaller in magnitude compared to the 
“disagreement” variable.  
Among the variables included in the analysis, the interaction variable between the 
unemployment change and my measure of disagreement (It
D x υΔ, presented in Panel A, 
column (2)) is positive and statistically significant. The change in the unemployment rate 
is included because generally unemployment rate variations are reported closely to the 
FOMC announcements and it is known both in the industry and in the literature to be one 
of the most influential macroeconomic announcements. Boyd, Hu & Jagannathan (2005) 
analysed the effect of unemployment news, finding a strong positive reaction of stock 
returns on rising unemployment during economic expansion and a negative reaction during 
economic contractions. Unemployment rate announcements are particularly relevant for 
the US economy as the mandate of the FED explicitly includes “full employment” as the 
second goal to be achieved after the inflation target. A rise in unemployment during a 
contractionary state of the economy could potentially lead to an interest rate cut and more 
favourable discount rate conditions in the future. The uncertainty related to a positive 
change in the unemployment rate, which by construction of the variable would have been 
disclosed before the upcoming FOMC announcement, could be consistent with investors 
revising their expectations in light of macroeconomic news.  
The interaction variable between the disagreement measure and the NBER dummy is 
negative and statistically significant. The NBER dummy, the recession variable, takes a 
value of 1 during recession periods and zero elsewhere. The relationship between recession 
and disagreement has a strong negative impact on equity returns. This result is in line with 
the discussion of Kurov (2010: 2012) and Kontonikas, MacDonald & Saggu (2013), who 
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point out that during recession period traders rely on institutions to support the economy 
through financial markets. If investors expect to be supported by institutions and this is not 
the case the economic impact is negative and bigger in magnitude than the equity premium 
associated with the FOMC announcement itself (about 50 bps). 
Another interesting result is related to the Kuttner Surprise, which I expected to be 
correlated with my disagreement measure as the Kuttner (2001) methodology represents 
the first step in building my variable. The Kuttner Surprise is per se statistically 
insiginificant; on the contrary, the interaction variable with my measure of “disagreement” 
is strongly significant and negative. The Kuttner Surprise remains therefore a valuable 
explanation for the equity excess returns associated with the FOMC announcements, 
although limited to the FOMC announcements where investors’ expectations are in 
contrast with the FOMC decisions. 
Overall, the analysis confirms that FOMC announcements where disagreement is observed 
are associated with a positive and significant equity return even when controlling for 
macroeconomic and financial market factors that might jointly affect equity returns around 
the announcement days. To summarise, the other three relevant results, in line with the 
literature, are related to the change in the unemployment rate, recession times and the 
Kuttner Surprise. Disagreement and a change in the unemployment rate are associated with 
a positive impact on equity prices, in line with the findings of Boyd, Hu & Jagannathan 
(2005). A negative news on unemployment during uncertainty is a positive news for stock 
prices, as it might lead to an interest rate cut. Second, during a time of recession, monetary 
policy announcements have a stronger impact on financial markets (Kontonikas, 
MacDonald & Saggu, 2013), particularly because investors expect support from the 
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institutions. Lastly the Kuttner Surprise remains a valuable explanation for the equity 
return associated with the FOMC announcements. A positive surprise (interest rate hike) 
combined with the disagreement of investors in regards to the interest rate hike is 
associated with a negative impact on stock price of almost 40bps. 
Table 2.7: Time Series Analysis of FOMC Meetings’ Returns 
Panel A                 
  ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) ( 8 ) 
ItD 
0.440** 0.493** 0.401** 0.508** 0.487** 0.398* 0.249 0.545 
(0.201) (0.202) (0.203) (0.213) (0.207) (0.226) (0.282) (0.411) 
υΔ 
0.009 -0.053 
      
(0.034) (0.050) 
      
ItD x υΔ 
 
0.119* 
      
 
(0.069) 




    
  
(0.305) (0.360) 
    
ItD x NBER 
   
-1.083* 
    
   
(0.649) 
    
Tight C. 
    
-0.238 -0.419 
  
    
(0.262) (0.317) 
  
ItD x Tight C. 
     
0.575 
  




      
0.238 0.419       
(0.262) (0.317) 
ItD x Easy C. 
       
-0.575        
(0.565) 
Const. 
0.226* 0.192 0.179 0.119 0.291* 0.340** 0.053 -0.071 
(0.146) (0.146) (0.156) (0.160) (0.163) (0.171) (0.235) (0.266) 
Obsv. 161 
R2 0.056 0.104 0.059 0.069 0.058 0.092 0.058 0.092 
Panel B                 
 ( 1 )  ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) ( 8 ) 
ItD 0.428** 0.416** 0.086 -0.644 0.516** 0.430* 0.470** 0.441** 
 (0.198) (0.194) (0.326) (0.530) (0.210) (0.243) (0.193) (0.205) 
Kuttner S. 
-0.079 0.048       
(0.067) (0.080)       
ItD x Kuttner S. 
 -0.386***       
 (0.141)       
Vol t-1 
  0.016 0.003     
  (0.012) (0.014)     
ItD x Vol t-1 
   0.048*     
   (0.027)     
Δ12 Log (CPI) 
    -0.027 -0.041   
    (0.028) (0.035)   
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ItD x Δ12 Log 
(CPI) 
     0.042   
     (0.059)   
Δ12 Log (IP) 
      -0.071 -0.081 
      (0.055) (0.060) 
ItD x Δ12 Log 
(IP) 
       0.064 
       (0.155) 
Const. 
0.212 0.227 -0.157 0.145 0.339** 0.375** 0.269* 0.269* 
(0.144) (0.141) (0.318) (0.360) (0.157) (0.166) (0.139) (0.139) 
Obsv. 161 
R2 0.05 0.077 0.053 0.068 0.058 0.061 0.062 0.064 
Note: The table presents the results of the regressions described in equation [2.6], including the vector 
of controls Xt. The variables included in the analysis are both macroeconomic and financial market 
variables. Panel A presents the analysis that includes: the unemployment rate change (υΔ ), the NBER 
dummy variable (NBER), the “Tight Cycle” variable (Tight C.), the “Easy Cycle” (Easy C.) and 
interaction variables between my measure of disagreement (ItD) and the control variables (ItD x υΔ, ItD x 
NBER, ItD x Tight C. and ItD x Easy C.). Panel B presents the analysis that includes: the Kuttner Surprise 
(Kuttner S.), the volatility level the day before the announcement, represented by the level of the VIX 
index at the market close the day before the announcement (Vol t-1), the 12-months log change in the 
industrial production index (Δ12 Log (IP)) and the 12-months log change in the CPI index (Δ12 Log 
(CPI))38,  and interaction variables between my measure of disagreement (ItD) and the control variables 
(ItD x Kuttner S., ItD x Vol t-1, ItD x Δ12 Log (CPI), ItD x Δ12 Log (IP)). The dependent variable, Ht, is 
represented by the 1-day return of the CRSP Value–Weighted Index computed as presented in equation 
[2.5]. Standard Errors are presented in brackets. The sample period is (2000–2016). 
Signif. codes:  ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 .    
Source: Federal Reserve website, www.federalreserve.gov, Quandl dataset, Wharton-CRSP Database, 
Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis-Economic Research website, fred.stlouisfed.org 
 
2.7.4 The Neutral Monetary Policy (NMP) Analysis 
 
As discussed in subsection 2.6.2.1 there are a number of reason for which exploring 
separately the FOMC announcements where interest rates were left unchanged is in line 
with the purpose of this chapter. In a nutshell, NMP FOMC announcements give me the 




38 The macroeconomic variables were included following the empirical analysis of Lucca & Moench 
(2015).  
Continued Table 2.7 
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changes in interest rates. The response to NMP FOMC announcements should therefore 
revolve around the economic outlook normally disclosed by the FOMC in the form of 
forward-guidance to the public. 
As previously clarified, these announcements, might reflect an additional level of 
uncertainty, experienced by investors, because of their non-decisional aspect. Sinha (2015) 
reports this additional uncertainty during the zero-lower bound period (2012-2013), which 
was reflected in the 10-year short term treasury yield. Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) report a 
positive effect of “no change” in interest rates, explaining that the market was mildly 
responding to “inactions” and interpreting them as “postponing the inevitable”.  
A drawback of this analysis is related to when these FOMC announcements normally take 
place. As previously discussed, the NMP FOMC announcements are mostly concentrated 
right after crisis periods including, therefore, a state dependent element. The results of 
Kurov (2012) and Kontonikas, MacDonald & Saggu (2013) report, in fact, that the 
response to monetary policy statements and monetary policy surprises is strongly affected 
by the business cycle. These last elements of the discussion should therefore be taken into 
consideration when interpreting the results related to this sub-sample of FOMC 
announcements. 
In Table 2.8, I report the results related to NMP FOMC announcements, which display a 
higher magnitude and statistical significance of the equity premium, compared to the main 




39 The analysis was also carried out on other broad equity indexes and yielded similar results. The results 
can be found in Appendix A, Table A.8, Panel B. 
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result is in line with the expectations and confirms a higher degree of uncertainty around 
these announcements. 40  The constant, representing the “agreement” variable remains 
mildly significance and considerably smaller also in this case. 
 










Note: This table presents the results for the dummy regression analysis 
presented in equation [2.6]. The dependent variable is represented by the 
daily returns on the CRSP Value-Weighted Index, computed as presented 
in equation [2.5]. The dummy variable (ItD) is computed following the 
methodology outlined in section 2.5. The event study encompasses the 
2000–2016 period and includes only the FOMC meetings, where no 
interest rate change occurred, the NMP analysis. For completeness, the 
number of meetings where disagreement is observed is reported.  
Standard Errors are presented in brackets. 
Signif. codes:  ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1. 
Source:  Federal Reserve website, www.federalreserve.gov, Quandl 
dataset, Wharton-CRSP Database, US Labor Statistics websites. 
 
To answer the question on whether this uncertainty is merely related to the “timing” and 
therefore state dependent, I replicate the analysis of Table 2.7 and investigate other possible 
explanations for this equity premium around the NMP FOMC announcements. The results 




40 The “Persistency” analysis of section 2.7.2 to assess whether the equity premium associated with 
disagreement around the FOMC announcements was not reversed on subsequent or previous days has been 
also carried out on the NMP FOMC announcements’ subsample and confirms the previous findings. The 
results can be found in Appendix A, Table A.9. 
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At first glance, a particularly important control variable to investigate whether the equity 
premium around NMP FOMC announcements is the NBER recession dummy. The NBER 
recession dummy variable takes the value of 1 during a recession period and zero 
otherwise. The unemployment rate change, the 12-months logarithm change in the CPI and 
industrial production index are also all macroeconomic variables that could potentially 
shed light on how investors interpret the economic outlook disclosed around the 
announcements. First, it needs to be acknowledged that this equity premium is partially 
state dependent, due to the positive significance of the NBER dummy (NBER), and 
particular the negative effect associated with the interaction between the NBER variable 
and my disagreement dummy. The “Kuttner Surprise” (Kuttner S.) mimics the results of 
Table 2.7 in terms of statistical significance, although the interaction variable is also 
statistically insignificant. 
An interesting result, different from the general case is related to the industrial production 
index (Δ12 Log (IP)), which presents an interesting asymmetric result. In columns (7) and 
(8) in Panel B the two regressions are presented, including first the industrial production 
index variable, and second the regression including the industrial production index variable 
and the interaction between my disagreement measure and the industrial production index 
variable. The industrial production variable is associated per se with a negative equity 
premium. It needs to be recalled that the industrial production index is a 12-months change 
of the log of the index, which means that a positive change in the 12-months industrial 
production index is associated with a negative equity premium. Conversely, disagreement 
and positive news on industrial production is associated with a positive equity premium 
around NMP FOMC announcements.  
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Table 2.9: Time Series Analysis of NMP FOMC Meetings’ Returns 
Panel A                 
 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) ( 8 ) 
ItD 0.498** 0.473** 0.423** 0.566*** 0.518*** 0.494** 0.227 -0.135 
 (0.203) (0.224) (0.183) (0.186) (0.189) (0.188) (0.332) (0.826) 
υΔ 0.006 0.021       
 (0.039) (0.054)       
ItD x υΔ 
 -0.045       
  (0.080)       
NBER    0.623* 1.176***     
   (0.320) (0.363)     
ItD x NBER 
   -1.984**     
    (0.690)     
Tight C.     -0.380 -0.357   
     (0.312) (0.337)   
ItD x Tight C.      -0.172   
      (0.915)   
Easy C.       0.380 0.357 
       (0.312) (0.337) 
ItD x Easy C. 
       0.172 
        (0.915) 
Const. 0.250* 0.257* 0.154 0.075 0.314** 0.304** 0.027 0.064 
  (0.138) (0.141) (0.140) (0.138) (0.147) (0.149) (0.269) (0.284) 
Obsv.               118 
R2 0.082 0.083 0.112 0.172 0.092 0.093 0.089 0.091 
Panel B                 
 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) ( 8 ) 
ItD 0.479*** 0.471** -0.337 -0.377 0.464** 0.339 0.509*** 0.532*** 
 (0.185) (0.185) (0.330) (0.458) (0.195) (0.212) (0.182) (0.186) 
Kuttner S. 0.063 0.665       
 (0.153) (0.587)       
ItD x Kuttner S.  -0.645       
  (0.608)       
Vol t-1   0.028** 0.017     
   (0.012) (0.016)     
ItD x Vol t-1    0.003     
    (0.026)     
Δ12 Log (CPI)     0.002 -0.005   
     (0.027) (0.035)   
ItD x Δ12 Log 
(CPI) 
     0.017   
      (0.055)   
Δ12 Log (IP)       -0.104** -0.132** 
       (0.049) (0.053) 
ItD x Δ12 Log (IP)        0.201 
        (0.132) 
Const. 0.241* 0.225 -0.379 -0.122 0.250* 0.285* 0.245* 0.245* 
  (0.134) (0.136) (0.299) (0.400) (0.142) (0.147) (0.131) (0.131) 
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Obsv. 118  
R2 0.084 0.088 0.123 0.134 0.082 0.089 0.117 0.135 
 Note: The table presents the results of the regressions described in equation [2.6], including the vector 
of controls Xt. The variables included in the analysis are both macroeconomic and financial market 
variables. Panel A presents the analysis that includes: the unemployment rate change (υΔ ), the NBER 
dummy variable (NBER), the “Tight Cycle” variable (Tight C.), the “Easy Cycle” (Easy C.) and 
interaction variables between my measure of disagreement (ItD) and the control variables (ItD x υΔ, ItD 
x NBER, ItD x Tight C. and ItD x Easy C.). Panel B presents the analysis that includes: the Kuttner 
Surprise (Kuttner S.), the volatility level the day before the announcement is represented by the level 
of the VIX index at the market close the day before the announcement (Vol t-1), the 12-months log 
change in the industrial production index (Δ12 Log (IP)) and the 12-months log change in the CPI index 
(Δ12 Log (CPI)),  and interaction variables between my measure of disagreement (ItD) and the control 
variables (ItD x Kuttner S., ItD x Vol t-1, ItD x Δ12 Log (CPI), ItD x Δ12 Log (IP)). The dependent variable, 
Ht, is represented by the 1-day return of the CRSP Value-Weighted Index computed as presented in 
equation [2.5]. Standard Errors are presented in brackets. The sample period is (2000–2016) and 
includes only the FOMC announcements where the interest rate level has remained unchanged. 
Signif. codes:  ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1. 
Source: Federal Reserve website, www.federalreserve.gov, Quandl dataset, Wharton - CRSP 
Database, Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis – Economic Research website, fred.stlouisfed.org 
 
This asymmetric response is in line with the results on the state dependent response to 
monetary policy announcements and monetary policy surprises. A positive news on 
industrial production might lead to a future increase in the Federal Fund Target rate, 
whereas if disagreement is realised, it means that investors perhaps expected an interest 







41 The distribution of disagreement on the NMP FOMC announcements is quite heterogeneous, with a 
preponderance of disagreement about interest rates cuts within the 2008 crisis and post-crisis period, whereas 
expectations towards an interest rate hike are related to the 2000, 2005 and 2007 years and after 2015. 
Continued Table 2.9 
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2.7.5 Portfolios Analysis 
 
Early studies (Black, 1972; 1993; Black, Jensen & Scholes, 1972; Fama & French, 1993) 
find a very small relation between equity excess returns and the beta, even though the beta 
should be an important determinant of the risk premium. Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) also 
propose an analysis on industry portfolios (Fama & French Industry Portfolios) around 
monetary policy announcements, although they don’t find a strong relationship with the 
average portfolios’ beta and the response to interest rate change surprises. 
On the contrary, more recent studies on macroeconomic announcements find that the 
behaviour of asset prices during these days is much easier to reconcile with standard asset 
pricing theories. Savor & Wilson (2014) found compelling evidence that stock market 
betas are strongly economically and statistically significantly related to returns around 
macroeconomic announcement days and specifically on pre-scheduled FOMC 
announcements. More recently, Wachter & Zhu (2018) developed a theoretical model to 
explain this relationship and propose a different explanation. They infer that as 
macroeconomic announcements convey information on the economic outlook, this 
additional information updates investors on future economic risk. Investors require, 
therefore, an additional risk premium to hold the equity during these days. A second 
explanation proposed is that these days might themselves create the risk by reflecting the 
competence of the Federal Reserve. They conclude that the security market line appears 
on days with macroeconomic announcements. Building on these findings, I investigate my 
main hypothesis (equation [2.6]) on equity portfolios sorted based on their betas and on the 
Fama & French 10 industry portfolios.  
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2.7.5.1 Beta Portfolios 
 
This section presents the results for equation [2.6] where the dependent variable Ht is 
represented by the daily returns of ten equity portfolios sorted on beta deciles.42 The results 
of this analysis are presented in Table 2.10. Regression estimates to the It
D variable show 
a high level of proportionality in the disagreement response. In particular, when the 
coefficients from the 7th to the 1st decile portfolios are estimated, both the magnitude and 
statistical significance are almost monotonically aligned with CAPM predictions and so 
proportional to portfolio market beta. This result is in line with the findings of Savor & 
Wilson (2014), who demonstrate that the CAPM holds well for FOMC announcements.  
The results in Table 2.10 show that in line with the literature and expectations the response 
of equity returns to FOMC announcements is strongly related to the stock betas. Column 
(1) reports the average returns for the portfolios on FOMC announcement days, column 
(2) reports the average portfolios’ betas. The coefficients for my test (equation [2.6]) are 
presented in column (3). In line with expectations and the literature, the magnitude of the 
response is strongly related to the average portfolios’ beta, although, variable It
D shows a 
higher statistical significance on low betas portfolios, along with a higher difference with 
the overall returns of the FOMC announcements. This result can be ascribed to the 
interpretation of the It





42 The portfolios’ returns, sorted in stock betas, are available on the CRSP Wharton Dataset, and are 




Table 2.10: Beta Portfolio Analysis - Whole Sample (2000–2016) 
 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3) ( 4 )   
Port. µ  Β Const. It
D R2 Obsv 
   Est SE Est SE   
1 0.704 1.7 0.528* (0.277) 1.084*** (0.372) 0.072 
161 
2 0.571 1.4 0.441* (0.221) 0.884*** (0.288) 0.078 
3 0.435 1.2 0.344* (0.190) 0.662*** (0.248) 0.063 
4 0.398 1.0 0.331* (0.174) 0.610*** (0.227) 0.064 
5 0.321 0.9 0.225 (0.156) 0.572*** (0.205) 0.059 
6 0.299 0.8 0.216 (0.138) 0.497*** (0.181) 0.060 
7 0.264 0.7 0.205 (0.125) 0.447*** (0.164) 0.053 
8 0.201 0.6 0.137 (0.104) 0.391*** (0.140) 0.049 
9 0.138 0.4 0.068 (0.070) 0.282*** (0.092) 0.061 
10 0.142 0.2 0.060 (0.052) 0.289*** (0.069) 0.107 
Note: This table presents the results of the dummy variable regression reported in equation 
[2.6] where the dependent variable is represented by the returns on the CRSP Value-Weighted 
Market Portfolios sorted on their beta. The portfolios are ordered from the 1st till the 10th beta 
deciles. The control variables are represented by my measure of disagreement (“ItD”), in 
column (4), and constant (“Const”) in column (3). The “Est” column presents the estimate of 
the coefficients, along with the significant code for both column (3) and (4). The column SE 
presents the standard error of the estimate in brackets. Along with the empirical results, the 
average returns on the FOMC meeting dates are reported in column (1) for comparison, along 
with average portfolio beta in column (2). The sample period (2000–2016) includes all the 
FOMC meeting dates.  
Signif. codes:  ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1. 
Source:  Federal Reserve website, www.federalreserve.gov, Quandl dataset, Wharton - 
CRSP Database, US Labor Statistics websites. 
 
When disagreement is observed ( It
D = 1) investors have to re-update their beliefs on the 
future economic outlook, which they would also do around all the FOMC announcements. 
The main difference between these two situations is that, if disagreement is observed, 
investors have wrongly interpreted the information collected before the meeting on the 
state of the economy, which could result in them perceiving additional risk that could be 
reflected in future expectations on the risk–free rate and expectations on future companies’ 
cash flows (Kontonikas, MacDonald & Saggu, 2013). This result can also be ascribed to 
the high idiosyncratic risk, that could result in stocks being more impacted by future 
uncertain expectations on cash flows. 
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This explanation is supported by the difference between the average FOMC 
announcements returns (column (1)) and FOMC announcements returns when It
D = 1 
(column (4)). On average the magnitude of the coefficients when It
D = 1 is higher on 
average, although the difference between the two is particularly prominent on low beta 
portfolios. Portfolio 10 has an average return around FOMC announcements (“μ”) of 14 
bps, whereas for FOMC announcements where It
D = 1 the coefficient is around 30 bps. 
In line with the findings of Savor & Wilson (2014), who build their findings across all 
major macroeconomic announcement days, I also find some degree of response to the 
“agreement” measure (represented by the constant) in high-beta (and therefore more 
responsive) portfolios. The magnitude of the response is considerably smaller (about a half 
of the bps compared to the disagreement measure) and only mildly significant.  
Further to this, to investigate the “announcement effect”, I replicate the work on the NMP 
analysis. The results of this test are presented in Table 2.11. This test confirms the results 
of Table 2.10, showing, however, a much stronger response in the magnitude of the 
coefficients. In column (1), I report the average FOMC announcement return around the 
NMP analysis. The magnitude in the difference between the average FOMC 
announcements’ return and the FOMC announcement where disagreement is observed is 
higher with respect to the previous results (Table 2.10), ranging between 20 to 40 bps. 
Again the It
D variable is statistically significant across all the portfolios, although more 
strongly in low beta portfolios.  
A further relevant difference with the previous analysis (Table 2.10) is that the “agreement” 
measure is only mildly significance in the first portfolio (Port. 1), confirming previous 
results (Tables 2.5 and 2.8) and providing empirical evidence that across NMP FOMC 
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announcements, “agreement” around NMP reduces uncertainty and resolves into the 
absence of a statistically significant equity premium. 
Table 2.11: Beta Portfolio Analysis - NMP (2000–2016) 
 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3) ( 4) ( 5 ) ( 6 )   
Port. µ  Β Const. It
D R2 Obsv 
   Est SE Est SE   
1 0.733 1.7 0.485 (0.311) 1.145*** (0.421) 0.078 
118 
2 0.564 1.4 0.347 (0.247) 0.889*** (0.335) 0.075 
3 0.457 1.2 0.275 (0.211) 0.735** (0.286) 0.069 
4 0.412 1.0 0.239 (0.192) 0.670** (0.263) 0.067 
5 0.356 0.9 0.181 (0.172) 0.617*** (0.235) 0.067 
6 0.340 0.8 0.207 (0.149) 0.576*** (0.204) 0.078 
7 0.286 0.7 0.165 (0.137) 0.497*** (0.188) 0.068 
8 0.221 0.6 0.101 (0.117) 0.424*** (0.160) 0.063 
9 0.143 0.4 0.042 (0.083) 0.318*** (0.114) 0.065 
10 0.108 0.2 0.017 (0.066) 0.279*** (0.090) 0.077 
Note: This table presents the results of the dummy variable regression reported in equation 2.6 
where the dependent variable is represented by the returns on CRSP Value–Weighted Market 
Portfolios sorted on their beta. The portfolios are ordered from the 1st till the 10th beta deciles. 
The control variables are represented by my measure of disagreement (“ItD”), in column (4), and 
constant (“Const”) in column (3). The “Est” column presents the estimate of the coefficients, 
along with the significant code for both column (3) and (4). The column SE presents the standard 
error of the estimate in brackets. Along with the empirical results, the average returns on the 
FOMC meeting dates are reported in column (1) for comparison, along with average portfolio 
beta in column (2). The sample period (2000–2016) includes all the FOMC meeting dates where 
no interest rate change occurred, the NMP analysis.  
Signif. codes:  ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1. 
Source:  Federal Reserve website, www.federalreserve.gov, Quandl dataset, Wharton - CRSP 
Database, US Labor Statistics websites. 
 
Overall, the results feature two important findings. First, in line with the literature and 
expectations, the response of equity returns to FOMC announcements shows a high degree 
of proportionality with respect to the market beta (Savor & Wilson, 2014; Wachter & Zhu, 
2018). Second, FOMC meetings where disagreement is observed show an even higher 
degree of response, particularly in the NMP analysis. Last, but not least, the impact of 
disagreement is statistically more significant in stocks, bearing a plausible higher 
idiosyncratic risk, showing that investors require an additional premium for bearing 
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additional risk on stocks with a higher likelihood of uncertainty on future cash flows 
(Jensen & Mercer, 2002; Ehrmann & Fratzscher, 2004). 
2.7.5.2 Fama & French Industry Portfolios 
 
Following the reasoning of the previous section on the results of Bernanke & Kuttner 
(2005), I replicate the previous analysis of the 10 Fama & French industry portfolios.43 The 
results of the analysis covering all the FOMC announcements are presented in Table 2.12, 
whereas Table 2.13 presents the results when only the NMP FOMC announcements are 
considered. 
Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) found that the most responsive industries to interest rate 
surprises are high-tech and telecommunications. In Table 2.12 I presents the average 
returns for FOMC announcements’ days (column (1)), the average beta of the portfolios 
(column (2)), computed as in Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) by regressing the returns of the 
industry portfolios over the CRSP Value-Weighted Index returns, a constant term (column 
(3)) and the coefficients for my dummy variable It
D, along with standard errors (column 
(4)). 
This analysis, compared to the previous one, allows me to make inference not only on the 
proportionality of the industry, but also to investigate the response across business sectors. 
At first glance, I also find some degree of proportionality in the industry response (e.g. the 




43 The Fama & French Industry Portfolios are available from Kenneth French’s webpage 
(mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/). The betas of the portfolios are estimated by regressing 
the portfolios returns over the market returns, represented by the CRSP Value-Weighted Index (Bernanke 
& Kuttner, 2005). 
81 
 
beta among the others). In line with the results of Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) the high-tech 
is the most responsive industry in regard to my “disagreement” measure, although I find 
also some degree of response to the “agreement” measure (also represented in this case by 
the constant term). For instance, durables see a positive equity premium of 45 bps only 
around “agreement”, similar to energy and health-care sectors. What is a plausible 
explanation for these findings?  
These results can, perhaps, be ascribed to the disagreement around changes in expected 
future dividends and changes in the companies’ debt conditions, as suggested by Bernanke 
& Kuttner (2005). The explanation of these results relies again, perhaps, in the middle 
between monetary economists and the announcement effect. Future expectations on the 
dividend are surely relevant in interpreting the overall responses of industry portfolios to 
monetary policy, although the difference among the average return on all the FOMC 
announcements days, compared to when disagreement is realised, has to be ascribed to 
other elements. Sectors which have been more largely impacted by the financial crisis 
respond perhaps more harshly to monetary policy uncertainty and institutions’ decisions 
(Kontonikas, MacDonald, & Saggu, 2013), given the information conveyed on the future 
economic outlook (Savor & Wilson, 2013). Conversely, sectors that benefit from stability 
and continuity in monetary policy would respond positively to FOMC decisions which are 







Table 2.12: Fama & French industry Portfolios Analysis-Whole Sample (2000–
2016) 
  ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )     
Port. µ  Β Const. It
D R2 Obsv 
    Est SE Est SE   
High – Tech 0.458 1.20 0.325 (0.214) 0.758*** (0.282) 0.048 
161 
Durables 0.337 1.16 0.450** (0.191) 0.348 (0.251) 0.018 
Other 0.420 1.16 0.413** (0.196) 0.547** (0.257) 0.029 
Energy 0.263 0.99 0.312* (0.164) 0.160 (0.216) 0.011 
Manufacturing 0.299 0.98 0.342** (0.138) 0.342** (0.181) 0.029 
Telecommunications 0.191 0.98 0.144 (0.154) 0.339* (0.203) 0.017 
Wholesale / Retail 0.315 0.86 0.332** (0.145) 0.400** (0.191) 0.035 
Health Care 0.199 0.73 0.238 (0.157) 0.159 (0.154) 0.018 
Utilities 0.112 0.66 0.126 (0.131) 0.119 (0.173) 0.004 
Non-Durables 0.090 0.61 0.105 (0.101) 0.081 (0.133) 0.003 
Note: This table presents the results related to the main hypothesis on the Fama & French 10 
Industry portfolios. Column (1) reports the average returns around my NMP FOMC 
announcements sample for each industry (“µ FOMC” ).The betas of the portfolios are estimated 
by regressing the portfolios returns over the market returns, represented by the CRSP Value-
Weighted Index and reported in column (2). This analysis is comparable to the Bernanke & 
Kuttner (2005) analysis. The control variables are represented by my measure of disagreement 
(ItD), in colum 4, and a constant (“Const.”), in column (3). For both the control variables the 
coefficients estimates (“Est”) is presented along with the significant code. The column SE 
presents the standard error of the estimate in brackets. The sample period (2000–2016) includes 
all the FOMC meeting dates. 
Signif. codes:  ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1. 
Source:  Federal Reserve website, www.federalreserve.gov, Quandl dataset, French website 
(mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/), CRSP Database, Wharton. 
 
It needs to be said that the response to “disagreement” is among all the statistically 
significant cases always bigger in magnitude compared to “agreement”. 
I investigate further the response of the industries around NMP FOMC announcements. 
Although in section 2.7.4 the limitations of this specific subsampling are made explicit, I 
believe the response of single industries to the NMP and to the economic outlook disclosed 
by the FOMC is relevant. In such times (after 2001 and after 2008), the response to the 
economic outlook could definitely shed some light on how industries responded to 
expectations on future dividends and debt conditions.  
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Table 2.13: Fama & French industry Portfolios Analysis -  NMP analysis - 2000 -
2016 
   ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )     
Port. µ β Const. ItD R2 Obsv 
    Est SE Est SE   
High-Tech 0.446 1,20 0.392** (0.161) 0.601*** (0.220) 0.099 
118 
Durables 0.367 1,16 0.398* (0.205) 0.284 (0.286) 0.039 
Other 0.456 1,16 0.333* (0.198) 0.698** (0.272) 0.074 
Energy 0.357 0,99 0.281 (0.174) 0.554** (0.238) 0.057 
Manufacturing 0.301 0,98 0.246* (0.145) 0.401** (0.198) 0.056 
Telecommunications 0.213 0,98 0.096 (0.153) 0.406* (0.212) 0.034 
Wholesale / Retail 0.279 0,86 0.258* (0.139) 0.343* (0.190) 0.054 
Health Care 0.269 0,73 0.196 (0.124) 0.368** (0.170) 0.055 
Utilities 0.244 0,66 0.171 (0.134) 0.392** (0.184) 0.042 
Non-Durables 0.150 0,61 0.128 (0.105) 0.180 (0.144) 0.026 
Note: This table presents the results related to the main hypothesis on the Fama & French 10 
Industry portfolios. Column (1) reports the average returns around my NMP FOMC 
announcements sample for each industry (“µ FOMC” ).The betas of the portfolios are estimated 
by regressing the portfolios returns over the market returns, represented by the CRSP Value-
Weighted Index and reported in column (2). This analysis is comparable to the Bernanke & 
Kuttner (2005) analysis. The control variables are represented by my measure of disagreement 
(ItD), in colum 4, and a constant (“Const.”), in column (3). For both the control variables the 
coefficients estimates (“Est”) is presented along with the significant code. The column SE 
presents the standard error of the estimate in brackets. The sample period (2000–2016) includes 
all the NMP FOMC meeting dates. 
Signif. codes:  ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1. 
Source:  Federal Reserve website, www.federalreserve.gov, Quandl dataset, French website 
(mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/), CRSP Database, Wharton 
 
The response around NMP FOMC announcements is virtually similar to the response 
related to the overall FOMC announcements, showing the same asymmetries around 
sectors. One relevant difference is represented by the energy industry, which in the general 
case was not responsive with respect my disagreement variable. Around NMP, the energy 
sector not only shows a positive equity premium with respect to disagreement of about 55 
bps. The average response to NMP FOMC announcements “μ” (column (1)) of the energy 
sector is slightly above 35 bps, which means that disagreement is associated with an 
additional 25 bps equity premium. 
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A similar tale can be observed in the case of the health care sector that shows a positive 
statistically significant equity premium associated with disagreement around NMP FOMC 
announcement. The response to agreement is, however, lower then the average response to 
the FOMC announcements (“µ”), whereas disagreement presents a 10 bps premium 
compared to the overall FOMC announcements (“µ”). A more homogenous industry 
response to FOMC announcements around NMP (energy, health-care and high-tech) can 




In the previous subsections, several analyses were presented to validate the hypothesis 
postulated in section 2.3. In this section, I summarise the interpretations and possible 
explanations for the results. The main result, shown in Table 2.5, points out a relevant 
equity premium associated with FOMC announcement days, where the market disagrees 
with the outcome decided by the FOMC. The dummy model shows an average of 42 bps 
returns around these days, in comparison to the 32 bps yield on normal FOMC 
announcement days. The FOMC announcements where investors agree with the FOMC 
decisions present an equity premium of around 27 bps and mildly significant (at 10%). 
Lucca & Moench (2015) found that the pre-announcement stock drift, which materialises 
during the trading day before the actual meeting time (they include intra-day return 24 
hours before the meeting time, which on average occurs around 2 pm), is of about 50 bps. 
They associate the announcement stock drift with several explanations that could apply 
also to the present study. Lucca & Moench (2015) infer that the additional equity premium 
associated with the upcoming FOMC announcement is explained by the additional 
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information, conveyed in the announcements on the future economic outlook and the 
additional risk compensation that investors require to hold the stock during these days.  To 
interpret my results in relation to their findings, I analyse the time series of FOMC 
announcements returns against a series of economic, monetary policy surprises and 
financial market-based variables. The result presented in Table 2.7 feature important 
findings which are partly in line with the findings of Lucca & Moench (2015) and partly 
in line with the findings of the seminal paper of Bernanke & Kuttner (2005).  
When analysing the whole returns’ series, I find some evidence that FOMC returns, are 
state dependent and influenced by the economic outlook disclosed by the FOMC and by 
the current economic conditions (these results are inferred from the unemployment change 
variable and the NBER dummy variable). My disagreement variable remains positive and 
statistically significance throughout the analysis, featuring two important results. First, the 
FOMC announcements equity premium might not be associated with “any” FOMC 
announcements as could be inferred from the results of Lucca & Moench (2015). Second, 
the premium associated with the realization of investors’ expectations around the 
announcement are an important driver of the FOMC equity premium. A possible 
explanation for this result can be found in the literature on disagreement among investors 
and its effect on stock market prices, trading volume and volatility.  
Investors update their beliefs upon information arrival (French & Roll, 1986), although 
FOMC announcements are among the most highly anticipated announcements around the 
world, leading one to infer that investors would also react to the content of the 
announcements influenced by their prior beliefs. An extensive theoretical literature on 
disagreement (Varian, 1985; 1989; Abel, 1989) implies that disagreement and divergence 
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of opinions should lead to a positive risk premium.  Carlin, Longstaff & Matoba (2014) 
find recent empirical evidence that disagreement among financial market participants is 
associated with higher expected return, volatility and trading volume. The literature on 
macroeconomic announcements (Savor & Wilson, 2013; Lucca & Moench, 2015) doesn’t 
provide evidence of additional market volatility during FOMC announcements. On the 
contrary, my analysis of the FOMC announcement returns shows that, when subsampling 
the time series with respect to the expectations of market participants, the volatility variable 
shows an interesting asymmetric result, more in line with the results of Carlin, Longstaff 
& Matoba (2014). 
These results are further bolstered by the work on the “NMP analysis”. This analysis is 
novel in the literature on macroeconomic announcements (Savor & Wilson, 2013; Lucca 
& Moench, 2015; Ai & Bansal, 2018), which differentiates among macroeconomic and 
monetary policy announcements, although FOMC announcements haven’t been analysed 
on the basis of the FOMC decision. The NMP analysis represents a natural setting to 
investigate the announcement effect, without any change in the current economic 
condition. My results on this subsample feature a higher equity premium associated with 
these days. When investors disagree with the FOMC on neutrality, the equity premium 
associated with these announcements is on the magnitude of 50 bps, similar in magnitude 
to the findings of Lucca & Moench (2015).  
Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) partially analysed the effect of “no change” in the Federal Fund 
Target rate level and suggested that the market was reacting to the FOMC failing to take 
action and just “postponing the inevitable”. Compared to their study, my sample period 
encompasses both the post-crisis years of 2000–2001 and the more prolonged zero-lower 
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bound after the 2008 financial crisis. These should be taken into consideration when 
interpreting the additional equity premium associated with NMP FOMC days, considering 
also earlier findings in the literature (Barsistha & Kurov, 2008; Kurov, 2012; Kontonikas, 
MacDonald & Saggu, 2013) who suggested that the response to monetary policy 
statements and suprises is state dependent and stronger during a recession period.  
Overall, these results contribute also to the stream of literature that analyses the 
communication policy of institutions. Kurov, Gilbert & Wolfe (2020) claim, in fact, that 
since the end of Lucca & Moench’s (2015) sample of analysis (2011), the pre-
announcement drift has started to progressively “disappear”, consisent with the explanation 
of reduced uncertainty. Ultimately, this “reduced uncertainty” is linked to the 
“communication reform” begun many years ago for the FED (1994) and still continuing 
(Blinder, et al. 2001; 2008; Faust and Svensson, 2001), with the precise aim of being as 
transparent as possible with regards to the public and improve the accountability of the 
FOMC actions.  
My results on portfolio analysis are in line with the findings of Savor & Wilson (2014) and 
Wachter & Zhu (2018). I find a high degree of proportionality in the equity response with 
respect to their systematic risk factor, in line with CAPM predictions. The magnitude of 
the response is in line with past findings, although the significance of the response shows 
a relevant asymmetry between high and low beta portfolios. This result is marginally also 
in line with the findings on sector analysis. The response of portfolios sorted by sector (the 
Fama & French 10 Industry Portfolios) is heterogeneous and not consistently in line with 
the average beta of the portfolio. This asymmetry could perhaps be imputed to the 
considered sample (2000–2016) that encompasses the financial crisis and the subsequent 
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zero-lower bound interest rate period. Industries who have been more impacted by the 
financial crisis would react more strongly to upcoming information (even more 
disappointing information) on the future of monetary policy. The findings of Boyd, Hu & 
Jagannathan (2005), Barsistha & Kurov (2008), Kurov (2012) and Kontonikas, MacDonald 
& Saggu (2013), in fact link the equity reaction on macroeconomic announcements to the 
state of the economy and the business cycle. This explanation applies specifically to 
industry sectors and even more to those sectors characterised by seasonality in cash flows 
(Ehrmann & Fratzscher, 2004).  
To summarise the results show, in line with the explanations provided in the literature, that 
the expectations of investors on the content of the FOMC announcements and realised on 
the announcement day play an important role in the equity premium associated with these 
days.  
2.8 Robustness   
 
2.8.1 Liquidity and Volatility Risk 
 
Lucca & Moench (2015) assess the role of volatility and liquidity, with the specific purpose 
of understanding why most of the returns are realised in advance of the announcement. My 
sample period (2000–2016) partially includes the pre-announcement effect. I, therefore, 
also assess the role of the liquidity and volatility risk. My explanation for this additional 
equity premium is given by the expectations of investors, formulated prior to the meeting. 
I, therefore, decompose the measures of liquidity and volatility into an innovation given by 
these expectations and a t–1 measurable component using simple univariate AR(1) models.  
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 2.14.  
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Table 2.14: Liquidity and Volatility Risk 
  ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) 
ItD 0.380** 0.384** 0.371** 0.394*** 
  (0.167) (0.167) (0.167) (0.138) 
Vix Lag 0.005**  0.006** 0.010*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Vix ItD  Inn    -0.418*** 
     (0.010) 
Volume Lag 
 0.003 -0.100 -0.127 
 (0.099) (0.108) (0.089) 
Volume ItD Inn    -0.056 
     (0.170) 
Constant -0.091* -0.011 0.795 0.948 
  (0.049) (0.893) (0.950) (0.784) 
R2 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.320 
Observations 4157 
Note: The table presents the results for the regression in equation [2.6], at a daily frequency, 
when controlling for measures on liquidity and volatility. Column (1) presents the results for the 
time series daily analysis including the disagreement dummy variable (ItD ) and the “Vix Lag”, 
which is the lagged value of the Vix on the previous day. Column (2) presents the results for the 
regression including my the disagreement dummy variable (ItD ) and the “Volume Lag”, which 
denotes the logarithm of the trading volume on the day before. Column (3) presents the 
regression analysis that includes the disagreement dummy variable (ItD ) and both the “Vix Lag” 
and the “Volume Lag”. Column (4) presents the regression that includes all the variables 
included in column (3), plus the “Vix (ItD inn)” and “Volume (ItD inn)” variables. The “Vix (ItD 
inn)” is the residual from an AR(1) regression of the daily Vix Index on a constant, the value of 
the Vix the day before and the disagreement dummy variable (ItD ). The “. The “Volume (ItD 
inn)” is the residual from an AR(1) regression of the logarithm of the daily volume on a constant, 
the logarithm of the volumes the day before and the disagreement dummy variable (ItD ). 
Standard Errors are presented in brackets. 
Signif. codes:  ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1. 
Source:  Federal Reserve website, www.federalreserve.gov, Quandl dataset, Wharton-CRSP 
Database, US Labor Statistics websites, Bloomberg. 
 
As a benchmark in this time series analysis, the dummy variable It
D is positive and 
statistically significant at a 5% confidence level with an average response of 38 bps, in line 
with previous results. The “Vix Lag” is the level of the VIX index on the before the trading 
day, similarly the “Volume Lag” is the logarithm of the total volume of the day before. 
The variables “Vix It
D Inn” and “Volume It
D Inn” are the decomposed measures of 
innovation for volatility and liquidity, respectively. The two measures of innovations are 
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both statistically significant, negative in the case volatility and positive in the case of 
volumes. 
The two variables show that part of the returns associated with FOMC announcements, 
conditional to the expectations on such announcements, is explained by lower volatility 
and higher market liquidity. The asymmetric results between the “Vix Lag” and the “Vix 
It
D Inn” are in line with the findings of Lucca & Moench (2015). The higher volatility 
associated with the day before the announcement (“Vix Lag”) is in line with the Lucca & 
Moench (2015) stock drift and possibly explained by the attendance created around the 
outcome of the FOMC announcement. Consequently, the realization of the expectations is 
associated with lower volatility on the announcement day and higher liquidity, which is 
consistent with investors re-updating their beliefs and revising their positions. 
2.8.2 Endogeneity 
 
Given the forward-looking nature of monetary policy and the contemporaneity of effects 
between monetary policy and macroeconomic variables, endogeneity is one of the main 
issues in the literature, when studying these relationships. As my empirical strategy is 
constructed to analyse the influence of pre-event expectations to post-event equity returns, 
endogeneity doesn’t affect my results for three main reasons. First, there is no evidence in 
the literature of a simultaneous effect between stock prices and monetary policy. For 
example, there is no clear cut evidence that a drop in equity prices leads to an interest rate 
cut (Bernanke & Kuttner, 2005). Secondly, I control for several macroeconomic and 
financial market variables that might affect the equity premium and investors’ expectations 
around FOMC announcements. Third, the literature has frequently discussed issues of 
using monthly data and the conjoint effect of more than one meeting per month. In my 
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analysis, I imply the 1-day return on the meeting date. Therefore, I can infer that the impact 
is strongly associated with the specific event. 
2.9 Limitations  
 
This chapter aims to contribute to the literature on investigating the effects of monetary 
policy on the equity market and provide an additional explanation of the average returns 
observed in the equity market around macroeconomic announcement days. To do so, 
inspired by the seminal methodology of Kuttner (2001) and then Bernanke & Kuttner 
(2005) I developed a dummy variable model that differentiates the FOMC announcements’ 
days with regard to the expectations of investors formulated prior to the announcement and 
realised on the announcement day.  
The first limitation of this study is related to my methodology. To infer the expectations of 
market participants I employ Federal Funds rate futures (as in Kuttner, 2001), which is an 
efficient mechanism to infer whether or not investors expected a change in the interest rate. 
This approach is, however, inefficient in inferring the precise direction of the expectations 
of investors in regard to the interest rate level, which could be analysed by employing an 
option-based methodology. Although Federal Funds Rate Futures represent a “good 
enough” instrument to gauge future FOMC policy actions (Krueger & Kuttner, 1996; 
Owens & Webb, 2001; Gürkaynak, 2005; Gürkaynak, Sack, & Swanson, 2006) options on 
Federal Funds Rate Futures can give superior information on the distribution of investors 
beliefs around FOMC announcement.  
Carlson, Melick & Sahinoz (2003) at the time that these options become available on the 
market, showed that an option-based methodology was superior in providing information 
on the probability of the magnitude of the interest rate change (or no change), which I have 
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assumed to be 25 bps in my methodology.  Carlson, Melick, & Sahinoz (2003) show that 
the presence of alternative strike prices is representative of the distribution of the 
underlying opinions, that might be more varied than “no change” or a “25 bps change” 
(regardless of whether there is a cut or a hike) and perhaps include also the possibility of 
other magnitudes in the change (50 bps). Option-based methodologies are largely 
employed in the industry44 to infer the probabilities that investors assign to different future 
levels of the interest rate. The availability of option metrics would, therefore, complete this 
analysis, by giving more precise estimates on the expectations of investors with respect to 
the Federal Fund Target rate. 
The study of Lucca & Moench (2015) also highlighted a relevant price drift before the 
actual FOMC announcement. Their results partially reflect mine, although it would be 
beneficial to investigate the equity returns just after the FOMC announcement which 
usually occurs in the middle of the trading day, around 2 pm.45 In this study the equity 
returns are computed as the 1-day return of the CRSP Value-Weighted Index (equation 
[2.5]), therefore including part of the pre-announcement drift and the also the return 
realised just after the announcement. Investigating the intra-day trading activity of 
investors with respect to pre- and post-announcements will definitely be of great interest 
to enhance the accuracy of the analysis in regard to the expectation of investors and the 




44 The very well–known news data and quotes’ provider Bloomberg employs an option-based methodology 
to infer the probability assigned by market participants to the future level of interest rates prior to the 
FOMC announcement.  
45 Lucca & Moench (2015) provide specific details in their study of FOMC announcements’ timing from 
1994 to 2011. 
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The last limitation is linked to the role of media and information providers around these 
events. The week before the announcement is defined as a “blackout period”, therefore 
policy makers are not allowed to disclose any information on the upcoming meeting or on 
the state of the economy. This “blackout” obviously doesn’t apply to media providers and 
other relevant individuals commenting on the upcoming decision of the FOMC. It will be 
therefore interesting to control for the information that hit the market from different 
resources in the week previous to the meeting and how this further affected the shaping of 
expectations. 
2.10 Conclusions  
 
This chapter shows in a novel way how disagreement regarding FOMC committee 
decisions can impact the equity markets. When the market agrees with FOMC decisions I 
find a small or no significant impact on stock market excess returns. We can think of these 
cases as FOMC meetings being similar to the “anticipated events” that we observe in many 
other instances in the continuous evolution of financial markets. Thus, consistent with 
market efficiency theory as well as with a vast empirical literature, information contained 
in the FOMC subsequent meeting release is largely incorporated in equity returns, resulting 
in no meaningful consequences on market outcomes. However, when investors disagree 
with FOMC committee decisions I find the effects on stock excess returns highly 
significant. Furthermore, my results highlight that market expectations will play an 
important role in the post–meeting reaction, rather than a monetary policy innovation. This 
result is particularly evident when analysing the NMP analysis. Although no action is taken 
from the FOMC committee, the impact is strong and consistent when the market was 
actually expecting them to take a stand. The NMP analysis is a natural experiment that 
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further confirms predictions of the EMH.  As no change in interest rates occurs, the effects 
I find are entire to be credited to ex-ante price quality and investors’ information set.  As 
this chapter shows, anticipated information doesn’t have a significant impact on financial 
market metrics. Thus, central bank institutions could improve their disclosure policy 
particularly during economic downturns, when the risks of announcing unexpected 





















The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on 
Macroeconomic Variables: Evidence 




Uncovering the effects of monetary policy on real and nominal macroeconomic variables 
has been a long-debated challenge in the literature and practitioners. Policy makers and 
industry practitioners, especially in the past decade, have allocated a large amount of 
resources in estimating the effect of monetary policy for two main purposes: evaluating the 
efficacy of monetary policy and predicting its future effects on the economy. This chapter 
analyses the response of industrial production (output) and inflation (prices) to monetary 




46 A different version of this research has been published in Economic Letters, reference can be found at 
L.M.Murgia (2020) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108803. 
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Following the narrative approach of Romer & Romer (2004) and gathering a novel dataset 
of macroeconomic forecasts, I derive a new measure of monetary policy shocks for the 
Eurozone across the 2000–2016 sample period. 
Consistent with the existing literature, I find that output is more responsive to monetary 
policy shocks, having a decline of over 0.5% and starting its downward path 10 months 
after a 100 basis points shock. Conversely, the response of inflation to a monetary policy 
shock is very weak and unstable. My results on output are in line with earlier findings that 
used data from central banks in the United Kingdom (UK) (Cloyne & Hürtgen, 2016), 
United States (US) (Romer & Romer, 2004) and Canada (CA) (Champagne & Sekkel, 
2018). On the other hand, the response of inflation is weaker when compared to studies in 
the UK and the US.  
I also find evidence of the heterogeneous response of single Eurozone countries’ output 
and a homogenous response in prices. The overall responses among the single Eurozone 
countries (Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Portugal) show a decline of inflation between 
0.1% and 0.2%, with the only exception being represented by Greece. The overall 
responses of industrial production range from an overall decline of 0.5% (Germany, Italy 
and Greece) with peaks around almost 1% for Portugal, France and Spain. Overall the paths 
show similar tendencies, although their volatility shows a high degree of heterogeneity 
among the countries. This level of heterogeneity in their responses is particularly relevant 
from the policy makers’ perspective, considering that the ECB deliberates on monetary 
policy with the intent of homogenously affecting all the countries in the union. 
To investigate these effects, I first estimate the monetary policy shocks series, following 
closely the methodology of Romer & Romer (2004) and also employed by Cloyne & 
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Hürtgen (2016) for the Bank of England (BOE) and Champagne & Sekkel (2018) for Bank 
of Canada (BOC). To compute the monetary policy shocks I collect the forecasts for 
inflation and GDP from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), to construct the 
information set of policy makers at the meeting date. The forecasts are carefully matched 
with the ECB monetary policy meeting dates, following the “information availability 
concept” first proposed by Romer & Romer (2004). Constructing this information set poses 
one main challenge, also reported by Romer & Romer (2004), Cloyne & Hürtgen (2016) 
and Champagne & Sekkel (2018): there are more intended interest rate changes then 
forecasts. The “information availability concept” assigns every forecast that was released 
before the considered meeting date to ensure that it wasn’t already influenced by the current 
policy decision. To extract the monetary shock series, I then run a first-stage regression, 
where the monetary policy shock series is represented by the residual of a restricted VAR 
that includes all the variables composing the information set of policy makers. 
Past studies have used different VAR approaches to estimate the monetary policy shocks 
and overcome the endogeneity issue of monetary policy and macroeconomic variables 
(Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans, 1996; 1999; Uhlig, 2005). These studies find very little 
effect of monetary policy on macroeconomic variables in terms of magnitude. On the 
contrary, Romer & Romer (2004) present evidence of significant effects of monetary 
policy shocks on macroeconomic variables in the United States. Their approach, unlike 
previous studies, estimates monetary policy shocks that are orthogonal with respect to the 
information set available to policy makers at the decision time. The orthogonality of the 
shock series resolves both the issue of endogeneity and anticipatory movements. Coibion 
(2012) finds a middle ground between earlier results and Romer & Romer (2004). In his 
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study he compares the large effects on output and prices found by Romer & Romer (2004), 
who found a decrease of almost 4% in output, and the more modest results found earlier in 
the literature: Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans, (1999) found a mild decrease in output of 
about 70 bps by re-estimating the effects on output and prices. 
Coibion (2012) attributes the differences in the results to three different factors: the 
different contractionary “impetus” (in other words, the size of the shocks estimated with 
the different methodologies), the lag-length selection and the period of reserves targeting 
by the FOMC. The lag-length selection might represent a potential limitation in the 
comparison between my results and earlier results, given the smaller sample size employed 
in my analysis.  
A more recent strand of the literature has proposed a monetary policy shock series for the 
Eurozone by employing financial market-based methodologies. Jarocinski & Karadi 
(2020) provide a recent series of monetary shocks for the Eurozone, following the approach 
of Gertler & Karadi (2015) and imposing sign restrictions on the series to disentangle the 
“Pure Policy Shock” from the “Information Policy Shock”. Altavilla et. al (2019) also 
employed a similar approach and extensively analysed the monetary policy conduct in the 
Eurozone.  
To estimate the impulse responses of inflation and industrial production, I follow two 
different methods. First, I estimate the impulse response functions with a classical baseline 
VAR approach to make my results as comparable as possible with other empirical studies. 
Second, as my sample is considerably smaller than that of the existing research in other 
countries, I rely on a more flexible methodology: local projections á la Jordà (2005). 
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The chapter contributes to the literature in three different ways. First, to best of my 
knowledge, I propose a new monetary policy shock series for the ECB, following the 
methodology of Romer & Romer (2004) and therefore taking the perspective of the policy 
makers. Second, I provide empirical evidence of the effects of monetary policy shocks on 
the Eurozone at both an aggregate level and at a country level. The overall negative effect 
on output is confirmed at a country level with very heterogenous volatility in the path. 
Third, I also document a rise in the case of both output and prices, when employing the 
interest rate changes as a measure of monetary shocks. This puzzling result is ultimately 
resolved when employing my new monetary shock series.  
3.2 Literature Review 
 
The accuracy of the estimates of the effects of monetary policy on macroeconomic 
variables depends essentially on the adequacy of the measure of monetary policy. 
Identifying the adequate measure of monetary policy has become increasingly challenging, 
due to the multiple conventional and unconventional monetary policy instruments 
employed by central banks and monetary policy institutions to influence the economy. 
Conventional measures are subject to two important flaws, which represent big challenges 
for researchers when estimating the effects of monetary policy: endogeneity and 
anticipatory effects. Monetary policy instruments, interest rates and macroeconomic 
variables are, in fact, determined simultaneously, resulting in a challenge for 
econometricians to identify the causality effects among them. Furthermore, monetary 
policy is, by nature, a forward-looking instrument, and influences the economy with a “lag” 
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(Svensson, 2003). Therefore, monetary policy makers are likely to respond to future 
economic conditions rather than ex-post information. 
A large number of empirical studies has attempted to overcome these challenges using 
VAR methodologies by following the lead of Sims (1972; 1980; 1986). Among the first 
results on the effect of contractionary monetary policy shocks were initial anomalies, 
further coined as a “Price Puzzle”. In fact, Sims (1992) found initially that the price level 
would rise after two years of contractionary monetary policy shock. However, Christiano, 
Eichenbaum & Evans (1996), by employing a similar identification strategy for monetary 
shocks found very opposite results. They, in fact, found a sharp and persistent decline in 
real GDP, employment, retail and nonfinancial corporate profits. They ascribe this result 
to the assumption that monetary authorities include commodity prices in their information 
setting. In their seminal work, they include two monetary policy instruments: non-
borrowed reserves and the Federal Funds rate.  
Bernanke & Mihov (1998) argued that there is no consensus on the size and direction of 
the changes in monetary policy. They pointed out that changes in the stock of money were 
not adequate since the growth rate of monetary aggregates also depends on non-policy 
influences. They employ a “semi-structural VAR” approach to evaluate and develop 
measures of monetary policy based on reserve market indicators. Following the 
inflationary events of the 1970s, Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (1999) address the 
question of how institutions should respond to these economy shocks. Their recursive VAR 
assumptions aim to investigate the effect of monetary policy shocks with a two-step 
procedure. At the end of the 1990s, they assessed that the literature was in a “healthy state” 
to tackle the questions with the appropriate tools and wisdom from the “Volcker recession”.  
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Some facts are therefore acknowledged from this era: first, the identification strategy of 
monetary policy shocks is crucial in correctly assessing the effects of monetary policy 
(Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans, 1996). Second, attention has moved from reserves and 
money growth to the Federal Funds rate (Bernanke & Blinder 1992; Bernanke & Mihov, 
1998). Last, according to conventional wisdom, contractionary monetary policy shocks 
should lower prices and reduce real output. Whenever this is not the case, the results are 
defined as a “puzzle” (Sims, 1992). 
Building on these findings and on the “conventional wisdom”47 that impulse responses that 
are inconsistent with the theory should be excluded (Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans, 
1999), Uhlig (2005) developed a model by imposing sign-restrictions to impulse responses. 
Uhlig’ s (2005) methodology confirms the results that had been demonstrated so far in the 
literature and found very gradual small effects on prices and ambiguity regarding the 
effects on output (declines ranging from 0.3% to 1%). 
Aside from this literature, Romer & Romer (1989) firstly introduce a “narrative 
identification” strategy by reading the minutes of the FOMC discussions. This narrative 
identification, based on historical records, departed from the existing statistical literature, 
tackling the question on the effects of monetary policy from a different perspective. This 
methodology posed two important problematics however, first the isolation of monetary 
shocks, second whether the identified shocks were followed by unusual output movements. 




47 The term “conventional wisdom” refers to the fact that monetary contractions should 
raise the federal funds rate, lower prices and reduce real output. See section I, p. 383 of Uhlig (2005). 
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Reserve has attempted to exert a contractionary influence in order to reduce inflation. The 
reasoning behind the employment of this methodology was to analyse what the Federal 
Reserve said rather than the outcome of their actions.  
Romer & Romer (2004) then applied their narrative identification to the historical records 
of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) “Greenbook” to construct a series of 
changes in interest rates and further isolate the shocks with the identification strategy first 
proposed by Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (1996). Their “narrative” approach, unlike 
previous studies, estimated monetary policy shocks that were orthogonal, with respect to 
the information set available to policy makers at the decision time. The “orthogonality” of 
the shock series resolved both the issue of endogeneity and the anticipatory effects. Unlike 
the traditional statistical approaches, the results of Romer & Romer (2004) estimated an 
overall impact of about -4% on both prices and output.  
The magnitude of their results is therefore significantly different than that of previous 
studies. Coibion (2012) finds a middle ground between past results and Romer & Romer 
(2004) and the earlier results. He highlights three important key elements that account for 
the difference in the magnitude of the results: first, the shocks estimated by Romer & 
Romer (2004) are much larger then with recursive VAR approaches. Second, the period in 
which the Federal Reserve abandoned targeting the Federal Funds Rate between 1979 and 
1982 plays an important role in the difference among the results. Last, Romer & Romer 
(2004) is sensitive to the lags’ specification. Coibion (2012) extracted a measure of 
monetary policy shocks from an estimated Taylor Rule, with time-varying parameters, 




More recently, the methodology of Romer & Romer (2004) has been applied to investigate 
the effect of monetary policy shocks in other countries. Cloyne & Hürtgen (2016) fill the 
gap in the literature on other country applications. The UK represents a natural setting for 
developing this methodology as BOE releases the forecasts of policy makers in its quarterly 
“Inflation Report”, which are virtually similar to the information contained in the FOMC 
Greenbook. The results of Cloyne & Hürtgen (2016) are similar in magnitude to the results 
of Coibion (2012) and Romer & Romer (2004) finding an overall reduction of 0.5% in 
industrial production and close to 1% in inflation, but much delayed in time. 
Champagne & Sekkel (2018) extend the discussion and provide narrative evidence for CA. 
Similarly to BOE and the FOMC, BOC releases the forecasts of policy makers. Unlike 
from Romer & Romer (2004) and Cloyne & Hürtgen (2016), they directly examine the 
effects of real GDP, as BOC provides a monthly series of GDP ex-post data. They find that 
output declines about 1% in the 18 to 24 months after the shock and that the inflation 
response is weaker and reaches a peak decline of about 0.4% after 3 years. Additionally, 
they highlight the importance of accounting for other information to correctly isolate the 
shocks. In fact, they control for US interest rates as well as the exchange rate as part of the 
information set of policy makers. They also account for structural breaks in the conduct of 
monetary policy.48 
This chapter applies to this strand of the literature and aims to identify a series of monetary 




48 In 1991, the BOC joined the inflation targeting framework. For further details, see section 2.1 in 
Champagne & Sekkel (2018) 
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extending it to account for the unconventional monetary policies put in place by the 
Governing Council for the ECB in the past decade. Burriel & Galesi (2018) estimate the 
effects of unconventional monetary policies with a VAR methodology by including as a 
variable of interest the total assets of the ECB. I follow their reasoning and include the total 
assets in my analysis. Champagne & Sekkel (2018) account for structural breaks in the 
conduct of monetary policy. The structural break considered by them is the “advent” of the 
IT framework, joined by BOC in 1991. The ECB also has joined the IT framework in 2003. 
I don’t account for structural breaks in this case as my sample period ranges only from 
2000 until 2016, and so the IT framework still represents the majority of my sample. 
Excluding the studies of Cloyne & Hürtgen (2016) and Champagne & Sekkel (2018), most 
of the evidence is provided on the US, although recently some evidence has been provided 
in the Eurozone and the ECB by a different strand of the literature. Jarocinski & Karadi 
(2020) provide recent evidence of a monetary shock series for the ECB by applying a 
financial market-based measures VAR methodology. Financial market-based measures 
have been largely employed since the pioneer methodology of Kuttner (2001) that aims to 
identify the monetary policy shock by disentangling the expected from the unexpected 
component of the interest rate change. This long standing literature (Faust, Swanson & 
Wright, 2004; Bernanke & Kuttner, 2005; Gürkayanak, Sack & Swanson, 2005; 
Wingender, 2011; Barakchian & Crowe, 2013; Gertler & Karadi, 2015) has provided 
compelling evidence of the effects of monetary policy shocks on the stock market. 
The novel findings of Jarocinski & Karadi (2020) is linked to the sign restrictions 
methodology. They define as a “pure-policy shock” a shock followed by a decline in the 
stock price, and vice versa they define as an “information-shock” a shock followed by a 
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rise in the stock price. They provide evidence that a contractionary monetary policy shocks 
and the stock market response are highly informative of the future negative response of the 
economy. Furthermore, the information-shock, a contraction in monetary policy followed 
by a rise in the stock price, could account for the so-called “price puzzle”. They also 
support the communication transparency of the ECB with respect to the US, denoted by 
the higher number of information-shocks in the Eurozone sample, which are caused by the 
information on the future economic outlook conveyed in the announcements. Altavilla et. 
al (2019) also provide very recent evidence of the Eurozone monetary policy by mapping 
the ECB policy communication into yield curve changes and study their information flow 
on policy dates. Although they don’t provide evidence on real economy variables, their 
contribution to the literature is fundamental in tackling high-frequency data about 




3.3.1.1 Dataset Construction for the First Stage Analysis 
 
To construct the dataset for the first stage of the analysis the variables forming the 
information set of policy makers need to be matched with the intended policy rate variable.  
The first stage of the analysis is run at a meeting-by-meeting frequency. To correctly match 
the data, it is fundamental to be clear on the definition of the monetary policy decision 
point (“meeting”, for short). At its inception in 1999, the ECB Governing Council took 
policy decisions twice a month, whereas a press conference took place only once a month, 
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on the first meeting of the month.49 During 1999 ECB decisions regarding interest rates are 
published under two different press releases, called “Monetary Policy Decisions” and 
“Decisions on ECB Interest Rates”, which have been further combined under the 
“Monetary Policy Decisions” appellation in the second half of 1999. 50  As a young 
institution the ECB has gone through several changes across the years to improve its 
communication policy. For the purpose of my analysis, I have started the sample in 2000 
where the denomination of the “meeting” was homogenised. 
Over the sample period 2000–2016, I gathered data on 187 monetary policy meetings. To 
build the set of information of policy makers I have collected the gross domestic product 
(GDP) and inflation forecasts, available at a quarterly frequency, from the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters (SPF) and the Economic Bulletin of the ECB.  The SPF, included 
in the quarterly bulletin of the ECB, is analogous to the Staff forecasts included in the 
Greenbook and used by Romer & Romer (2004). Similarly, Cloyne & Hürtgen (2016) used 
the Inflation Report, issued by the BOE, whereas Champagne & Sekkel (2018) used the 
staff economic projections issued by the BOC. 
The issue faced, first by Romer & Romer (2004) when matching the data, is that staff 
projections are often available at a quarterly frequency, although interest rate changes and 
policy makers meetings might occur more often. To match the data, I followed Romer & 
Romer (2004) and assign to the considered meeting the last available forecast before the 




49 The meeting dates and the appropriate details are available on the ECB website (www.ecb.europa.eu). 




state of the economy, the interest rate level two weeks before the meeting is included, along 
with the unemployment rate and the total assets of the ECB (all available at a monthly 
frequency from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse). Since these data are available 
monthly, the last data issued before the meeting was considered. Table 3.1 presents an 
example of the matching methodology applied to the sample for the first-stage analysis.  
Table 3.1: Assigning Forecasts and Economic Variables to the Interest Rate Decision 





 [ Q1:2001 ] 
11/04/2001 
 [ Q2:2001 ] 
10/05/2001  
[ Q2:2001 ] 
Name Source Forecast   
/Data 




st   
/Data 
Source Forecast   
/Data 
1Y Inflation  Jan Pr Jan-01 Jan Pr Jan-01 Apr Pr Mar-01 Apr Pr Mar-01 
2Y Inflation Jan Pr Jan-01 Jan Pr Jan-01 Apr Pr Mar-01 Apr Pr Mar-01 
1Y Inflation Rev. Oct Pr Oct-00 Oct Pr Oct-00 Jan Pr Jan-01 Jan Pr Jan-01 
2Y Inflation Rev. Oct Pr Oct-00 Oct Pr Oct-00 Jan Pr Jan-01 Jan Pr Jan-01 
1Y GDP Jan Pr Jan-01 Jan Pr Jan-01 Apr Pr Mar-01 Apr Pr Mar-01 
2Y GDP Jan Pr Jan-01 Jan Pr Jan-01 Apr Pr Mar-01 Apr Pr Mar-01 
1Y GDP Rev. Oct Pr Oct-00 Oct Pr Oct-00 Jan Pr Jan-01 Jan Pr Jan-01 
2Y GDP Rev. Oct Pr Oct-00 Oct Pr Oct-00 Jan Pr Jan-01 Jan Pr Jan-01 
Unemployment 
rate 
RT Jan-01 RT Feb-01 RT Mar-01 RT Apr-01 
Interest rate RT Jan-01 RT Feb-01 RT Mar-01 RT Apr-01 
Total Asset RT Jan-01 RT Feb-01 RT Mar-01 RT Apr-01 
Note: The table presents 4 examples of ECB “meeting dates”. Columns (1) and (2) present two meeting 
dates related to the first quarter of 2000, 1st February and 1st March, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) 
present two meeting dates related to the second quarter of 2001. The dates were randomly chosen to 
show how the matching of the data was carried across two different quarters and two different meeting 
dates within the same quarter. The data matched with the meeting dates are the 1st and 2nd consecutive 
years Inflation forecasts (1Y Inflation and 2Y Inflation), the revisions of these forecasts (1Y Inflation 
Rev. and 2Y Inflation Rev.), the 1st and 2nd consecutive years GDP forecasts (1Y GDP and 2Y GDP), 
the revisions of these forecasts (1Y GDP Rev. and 2Y GDP Rev.), the current monthly unemployment 
rate (Unemployment Rate) the level of the interest rate (MRO interest rate) 2 weeks before the meeting 
date, and the monthly Total Assets of the ECB. In each column is presented first the source of the data 
with the month in which the data were published and whether the data were projections (Pr.) or real 
time data (RT), second the month and year to which they refer.  
Source: The Survey of Professional Forecasters, the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
(sdw.ecb.europa.eu) 
 




The present section presents the summary statistics of the first and the second stage of the 
analysis. The summary statistics are presented in Table 3.2: Panel A presents the summary 
statistics for the first stage of the analysis and Panel B presents the summary statistics for 
the second stage of the analysis. In Panel A, the data are divided between “Forecasts” and 
“Ex-Post” to distinguish between the forecasts retrieved from the SPF of the ECB and the 
ex-post data retrieved from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. 
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics on the Sample (2000–2016) 
  Avg St.Dev Median Min Max Freq N 
Panel A: 
Forecasts 
GDP 1Y 1.169 1.463 1.500 -4.600 3.500 Q 
188 
GDP 2Y 1.755 0.658 1.800 0.000 3.200 Q 
GDP 1Y Revision -0.613 1.467 -0.200 -5.000 1.600 Q 
GDP 2Y Revision 0.071 0.636 0.100 -1.800 1.400 Q 
Inflation 1Y 1.752 0.791 2.000 0.000 3.500 Q 
Inflation 2Y 1.671 0.339 1.700 1.000 2.600 Q 
Inflation 1Y Revision 0.551 1.366 0.450 -1.600 5.400 Q 
Inflation 2Y Revision -0.094 0.601 0.000 -1.400 1.200 Q 
Panel B: 
Ex-Post 
MRO  2.062 1.457 2.000 0.000 4.750 D 
Log of Total Assets 1.414 0.108 1.486 1.193 1.537 M 
Unemployment Rate 9.069 1.020 9.100 6.800 11.000 M 
Commodity Index 93.753 17.399 86.805 65.890 129.310 M 
204 Industrial Production 96.953 4.766 96.550 84.500 108.600 M 
HICP  89.817 8.156 91.285 75.130 101.130 M 
Note: The table presents the summary statistics for the data employed in my analysis. For each 
variable is presented: the average (“Avg”, the standard deviation (“St.Dev”), the median 
(“Median”), the minimum (“Min”), the maximum (“Max”), the frequency at which data are 
sourced (“Freq”) and the number of observation included in the analysis (“N”). The frequency at 
which data are sourced is either quarterly (“Q”), monthly (“M”) or daily (“D”). The forecasted 
data included in the analysis are the 1 and 2 years ahead GDP and Inflation forecasts (“GDP 1Y”, 
“GDP 2Y”, “Inflation 1Y” and “Inflation 2Y”) and the revisions of the forecasts for both 1 and 2 
years ahead (“GDP 1Y Revision”, “GDP 2Y Revision”, “Inflation 1Y Revision” and “Inflation 
2Y Revision”). The ex-post data included in the analysis are the interest rate level (“MRO”), the 
logarithm of the ECB total assets (“Log of Total Assets”), the level of the unemployment rate 
(“Unemployment Rate”), the ECB Commodity Index (“Commodity Index”), the ECB industrial 
production index (“Industrial Production index”) and the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP). Additional information on the sources and how the indexes are computed are available in 
Appendix B.1. 




As mentioned, the first stage analysis is conducted at a meeting-by-meeting frequency, 
whereas the second stage of the analysis is conducted at a monthly frequency. The 
macroeconomic variables included in the second-stage analysis, are all available in index 
form at a monthly frequency and therefore, no transformation has been run on these 
variables. The industrial production is included in the analysis to represent output, as GDP 
level or growth is only available at a quarterly frequency. Cloyne & Hürtgen (2016) follow 
the same approach for the UK and include the industrial production index as a measure of 
output. Champagne & Sekkel (2018) were able to include a monthly frequency GDP level, 
as the BOC produces these data.  
3.3.2 First Stage Analysis: The Monetary Shocks Series 
 
3.3.2.1 The Identification Strategy 
 
The identification strategy I adopt in my research has been proposed by Christiano, 
Eichenbaum & Evans (1996) and assumes that the intended change in interest rate, St,  is 
the combination of a systematic component ( f (Ω)), which is a function of the information 
set, available to policy makers at the decision point,51 and an unexpected component εt. 
Equation [3.1] formalises the function for St :  
St  = f (Ωt) + εt                                                   [3.1] 
The narrative approach of Romer & Romer (2004) aims to identify the component εt, which 








meeting time (t). Following Romer & Romer (2004), I estimate a reduced form VAR 
regression, to separate the systematic component f (Ωt) from the unexpected component εt.: 
Δim = α + β1 Ψ(1y)m   +  β2 Ψ(2y)m  +  β3 Δ Ψ(1y)[m– (m-1)]  + 
+  β4 Δ Ψ(2y) [m-(m-1)] +  β5 Π(1y)m +  β6 Π(2y)m  +                           [ 3.2 ] 
+  β7 Δ Π(1y)[m– (m-1)]  + β8 Δ Π(2y)[m– (m-1)] + β9 υm   + β10 i(m-14)   + β11 Am   + εm 
All the variables in equation [3.2] are at a meeting-by-meeting frequency, as defined in the 
subscript m. The detailed description of the variables included in equation [3.2], is provided 
in Table 3.3.  
Table 3.3: Variables’ Description 
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) 
Symbol Name  Description 
Δim 
Interest Rate change (MRO 
Interest Rate) 
The change in the MRO rate of ECB at 
the meeting date (Δim = im - im-1) 
Ψ(1y)m 1 Year ahead Inflation Forecasts 
The inflation forecast level for 1 year 
ahead 
Ψ(2y)m   2 Years ahead Inflation Forecasts 
The inflation forecast level for 2 years 
ahead 
Δ Ψ(1y)[m– (m-1)]   
1 Year ahead Inflation Forecasts 
Revision from the previous 
meeting 
The revision of 1 year ahead inflation 
forecast from the previous meeting 
(Ψ(1y)m - Ψ(1y)m-1)  
Δ Ψ(2y) [m-(m-1)]  
2 Years ahead Inflation Forecasts 
Revision from the previous 
meeting 
The revision of 2 years ahead inflation 
forecast from the previous meeting 
(Ψ(2y)m - Ψ(2y)m-1)  
Π(1y)m 1 Year ahead GDP Forecasts The GDP forecast level for 1 year ahead 
Π(2y)m 2 Years ahead GDP Forecasts The GDP forecast level for 2 years ahead 
Δ Π(1y)[m– (m-1)] 
1 Year ahead GDP Forecasts 
Revision from the previous 
meeting 
The revision of 1 year ahead GDP 
forecast from the previous meeting 
(Π(1y)m - Π(1y)m-1) 
Δ Π(1y)[m– (m-1)] 
2 Years ahead GDP Forecasts 
Revision from the previous 
meeting 
The revision of 2 years ahead GDP 
forecast from the previous meeting 
(Π(2y)m - Π(2y)m-1) 
υm Unemployment Rate 
The unemployment rate level at the 
meeting date 
i(m-14) MRO Interest Rate Level 
The interest rate level two weeks before 
the meeting date 
Am Total Asset 
The logarithm of the Total Assets of the 
ECB 
Note: The table presents the details of the variables included in equation [3.2]. In column (1) 
presented the symbol that links the included variables to equation 3.2 (“Symbol”), column (2) 
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names the variables (“Name”) and column (3) (“Description”) provides a short description of the 
variable.  
Source: The Survey of Professional Forecasters, The ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
(sdw.ecb.europa.eu). 
 
The variables included in the information set of monetary policy makers are the forecasts 
for inflation and GDP for two years ahead. The change in forecasts from the previous 
meeting is also included to control for the policy makers’ expectation revisions. The 
interest rate level two weeks prior to the meeting and the current unemployment rate are 
included as state of the economy controls.  Differing from the original methodology of 
Romer & Romer (2004), the logarithm of the total assets of the ECB was included to 
control for the unconventional monetary policies put in place by the Governing Council of 
the ECB. The total assets were included following Burriel & Galesi (2018), who investigate 
the effect of unconventional monetary policies.  
3.3.2.2 The Determinants of the Change in the ECB Policy Rate 
 
Table 3.4 presents the results of equation [3.2] and provides novel evidence on the interest 
rate determinants of the ECB.  The sample period 2000–2016 was broken down into a 
subsample crisis (2008–2016) and pre-crisis (2000–2007) sample with the purposes of 
investigating the interest rate determinants in the different business cycles. 
Considering statistically significant estimates, my results imply that longer-term forecasts 
on output and shorter-term forecasts on prices are what monetary policy makers focus on 
when voting through monetary policy innovations.  Interestingly, the results show that for 
the 2000–2016 period the monetary policy has been a-cyclically conducted. The forecast 
coefficients for outputs are positive, implying a 14 positive bps reaction of the interest rate, 
Continued Table 3.3 
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whereas the short-term revisions in output are negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that a positive revision in output is associated with a 10 bps cut in the interest 
rate level. The sum of the revision coefficients shows an impact of only 4 bps, although 
the coefficient related to the revision of the two-years forecast is insignificant and therefore 
unstable.  
Table 3.4: Determinants of the Change (Δ) in the Policy Rate   
 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) 
  
  
Whole Sample Pre-Crisis Sample  Post-Crisis Sample 
2000–2016  2000–2007 2008–2016 
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Δ Interest Rate 0.077  (0.093) -0.219* (0.121) 0.016 (0.152) 
Output       
Forecast (1y) -0.015 (0.017) 0.003 (0.051) -0.024 (0.022) 
Forecast (2y) 0.144** (0.055) 0.307*** (0.097) 0.053 (0.083) 
Forecast Δ (1y) -0.115** (0.046) 0.160 (0.119) -0.079 (0.051) 
Forecast Δ (2y) 0.072 (0.087) 0.035 (0.147) 0.033 (0.078) 
Inflation       
Forecast (1y) 0.097** (0.043) 0.218** (0.099) 0.166*** (0.051) 
Forecast (2y) 0.063 (0.075) 0.041 (0.119) -0.006 (0.107) 
Forecast Δ (1y) -0.005 (0.018) 0.036 (0.041) -0.012 (0.021) 
Forecast Δ (2y) 0.033 (0.057) 0.133 (0.091) 0.046 (0.066) 
Unemployment Rate 0.004 (0.017) -0.175 (0.13) -0.030 (0.023) 
Interest Rate( t - 14) -0.067*** (0.023) -0.187*** (0.063) -0.126** (0.054) 
Total Assets 0.864* (0.513) -0.670* (4.536) -0.219 (1.861) 
Observations 187   90   97   
R2 0.34   0.46   0.51   
Notes: The table presents the results of equation [3.2] for the whole sample (“Whole Sample”, 
2000–2016) in column (1), for the pre-crisis sample (“Pre-Crisis Sample”, 2000–2007) in column 
(2) and for the post-crisis sample (“Post-Crisis, 2008–2016) in column (3). Equation [3.2] is 
estimated with a reduced form VAR. The detailed variables included in the analysis are presented 
in Table 3.2. The dependent variable is represented by the interest rate change (MRO). Robust 
White Standard errors in parenthesis; asterisks indicate statistical significance i.e. 
(***:p<0.01,**:p<0.05,*:p<0.1). 
Source: SPF, Survey of Professional Forecasters, Economic Bulletin, ECB Statistical Data 




The coefficients related to inflation (forecasts and revisions) on the whole sample are less 
informative as only the 1-year forecast is positive and statistically significant, suggesting 
that a 1% increment in prices forecasts is associated with an interest rate hike of about 10 
bps. Statistically significant and with a negative sign is the interest rate level 14 days before 
the meeting, which suggests a sort of mean-reverting behaviour when voting through an 
interest rate change.  
The comparison between the pre-crisis and post-crisis period shows interesting 
asymmetries with the 2-years forecast in output being only significant during the pre-crisis 
sample and the 1-year revision forecasts in output becoming insignificant. A 1% positive 
“longer-term” forecast in output is associated in the pre-crisis sample with a contraction in 
the interest rate of over 30 bps. The short-term inflation forecasts (1-year forecast) remains 
the only variable positive and statistically significant throughout the analysis. This result 
is in line with expectations, since IT and price stability has been the first pillar of the ECB 
monetary strategy since 1999 when it was combined with reserves targeting and further 
when the inflation target was redefined to be close to but below 2% in 2003. The coefficient 
on short-term inflation forecasts is statistically significant at 1% during the post-crisis 
period and only at 5% during the pre-crisis period, with a mild difference of 5 bps between 
the two.  
The variable presenting the logarithm of the total assets of the ECB, included to account 
for the unconventional monetary policy put in place by the Governing Council of the ECB 
during the sample period is statistically significant across the whole sample period, 
showing a positive 86 bps reaction in the interest rate for a variation in total assets. The 
variable is, however, only mildly significant (at 10%) and negative during the pre-crisis 
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period and is insignificant in the post-crisis period, when the unconventional monetary 
policy was put in place.  
The interest rate 14 days before the meeting date remains negative and strongly significant 
(at 1%) in the pre-crisis period and significant in post-crisis period (at 5%). Both the 
coefficients show a mean-reverting behaviour, also confirmed by the mildly statistical 
significance of the lagged variable during the pre-crisis period (Δ Interest Rate). A 1% 
change in the interest rate was associated with a future reduction of the almost 20 bps, 
which perhaps could be interpreted as an interest rate “smoothing” behaviour of the ECB. 
As a preceding interest rate rise is associated with a reduction in the interest rate, it can be 
inferred that the ECB is willing to maintain a certain balance in the official interest rate. 
This result is in line with the findings of the seminal work of Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1998), 
who find that the interest rate path for European countries could have been well described 
by adding a “smoothing factor” to the Taylor Rule. 
The pre-crisis sample is comparable to other studies conducted under different institutional 
settings: in the United Kingdom by Cloyne & Hürtgen (2016) and Champagne & Sekkel 
(2018) and in Canada by Champagne & Sekkel (2018). These two studies also document 
an a-cyclical behaviour in the conduct of monetary policy. In line with the results of Romer 
& Romer (2004) the R2 for the whole sample analysis shows that a third of the decisions 
regarding the ECB interest rate levels have been taken based on forecasts. The comparison 
between my results and those of Romer & Romer (2004) is far from perfect. Their study 
encompasses, in fact, very different economic cycles and further benefits from a larger 
sample size. Nonetheless, the results on output in particular are similar in magnitude to 
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what they found in the US (Romer & Romer, 2004 found a response of almost 30 bps to a 
1% positive change in output, similar to what I find in the pre-crisis period). 
3.3.2.3 Analysing the New Shocks Series 
 
The residuals of equation [3.2] represent the component εt of equation [3.1], and therefore 
my new measure of exogenous monetary shocks for the Eurozone. Following Romer & 
Romer (2004), I convert the monetary shock series from a meeting-by-meeting frequency 
to a monthly frequency, by assigning each shock to the month in which the corresponding 
meeting occurred and 0% for each month where no meeting had occurred. It needs to be 
recalled that in other countries’ samples, the frequency of the meetings is closer to 
quarterly, rather than monthly. The months where a 0% shock was assigned are fewer in 
the case of the ECB, compared to the FED, BOE and BOC. The new monetary policy shock 
series is plotted in Figure 3.1.   
The series of monetary policy shocks shows a high level of volatility around the period of 
the 2008 financial crisis and a more modest level of volatility in the pre-crisis period and 
across the last part of the sample. Several facts need to be recalled to correctly interpret the 
series. First, after the 2008 financial crisis, the ECB put in place unconventional monetary 
policy programmes, differing from the countries included in past studies (Cloyne & 
Hürtgen, 2016; Champagne & Sekkel, 2018). Second, the 2011 crisis undoubtedly had a 
greater impact on the Eurozone than on other economic areas. Third, previous studies 
include different sample periods, which makes comparisons less reliable. Cloyne & 
Hürtgen (2016) do not include the 2008 financial crisis in their sample while Champagne 
& Sekkel (2018) include the years 2008–2014 in their sample, although they found greater 
volatility in the monetary shocks series between 1974 and 1994.  
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The sharp increase and then decline of the interest rate between 2000 and 2004, is 
responsible for the sustained volatility of the shock series in the pre-crisis period. For most 
of the monetary policy institutions around the world interest rates have been, on the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, maintained steadily low and combined with other 
monetary policies. The persistence of negative shocks in the last part of the sample 
(particularly after 2014) could be due to the presence of these additional unconventional  
monetary policy programmes. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first monetary shock series computed for the ECB 
with this specific methodology. Other recent studies have produced monetary shock series 
for the Eurozone employing different methodologies, mostly with financial markets-based 
variables. Recently Altavilla et al. (2019) and Jarocinski & Karadi (2020), building on the 
methodology of Gertler & Karadi (2015), built two different monetary shock series for the 
Figure 3.1. Exogenous Monetary Shocks for the ECB 
Notes: Figure 3.1 presents my new monthly shock series for the Eurozone, computed following the 
methodology of Romer & Romer (2004) and presented in section 3.3.2. The monetary shocks series is 
represented by the residual term of equation 3.2. As the analysis was conducted at a meeting by meeting 
frequency, to convert my monetary shocks series into a monthly shocks series, I have assigned 0% for 
every month where no ECB meeting was held. Sample: 2000–2016  
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Eurozone based on financial markets’ variables and both follow a sign-restriction 
methodology.52 These monetary shock series are, however, derived with a very different 
procedure that makes them less comparable to my monetary shocks series53. 
3.3.2.4 The Unpredictability of the Monetary Shocks Series 
 
Following Coibion (2012) and then Cloyne & Hürtgen (2016) and Champagne & Sekkel 
(2018), I test whether my new measure of monetary policy shocks is unpredictable. To do 
so, I run a series of Granger tests against additional macroeconomic variables. The monthly 
series of monetary policy shocks is regressed against a set of lagged macroeconomic 
variables. In particular, I include the unemployment rate, the change in industrial 
production, the money supply, the Produce Price Inflation (PPI) index and inflation (CPI). 
Equation [3.3] summarises the test: 
εt = c+ Σ(i=1)γi κt-I      [3.3] 
Under the null hypothesis that εt is unpredictable, the γi are jointly equal to 0.  Table 3.5 
presents the F-statistics and P-Value for the test. The shock series shows a high degree of 






52 The sign-restriction methodology, as previously mentioned, allowed the authors to identify “Pure Policy 
Shocks” and “Information Shocks”. “Pure Policy Shocks” are monetary policy shocks, followed by a decline 
in equity prices. Vice versa “Information Shocks” are followed by a rise in stock prices. A similar 
methodology was first proposed by Uhlig (2005) and further re-defined by Gertler & Karadi (2015). 
53 To the best of my knowledge, this chapter presents the first monetary shocks series for the ECB 
computed with a narrative methodology. 
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Table 3.5: Predictability of the Monetary Policy Shocks 
Series   
 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) 
  I = 3 lags I = 6 lags 
Variable F P-value F P-value 
Unemployment Rate 0.531 0.662 0.954 0.457 
Change in Industrial Production 0.596 0.618 1.519 0.173 
Money Supply 0.634 0.594 0.438 0.852 
PPI  0.325 0.807 0.517 0.794 
CPI 1.281 0.282 0.598 0.731 
Commodity Index 0.481 0.696 0.446 0.846 
Note: The table presents the results for equation [3.3] and represents a series 
of Granger test with 3 and 6 lags, respectively, which I have run to confirm 
the unpredictability of monetary series. The variable included in the analysis 
are the unemployment rate, the change in the industrial production index, the 
log of the money supply, the PPI index, the CPI index and the ECB 
commodity index. The dependent variable is represented by the measure of 
monetary shocks, computed in equation [3.2]. Column (1) presents the results 
related to the 3 lags and the related F-test and P-Value of the test. Column (2) 
presents the same tests, but computed with 6 lags. 
Source: SPF, Survey of Professional Forecasters, Economic Bulletin, ECB 
Statistical Data Warehouse, ECB Website. 
 
3.3.3 Second-Stage Analysis: VAR and Local Projections 
 
The next stage of my analysis aims to identify the effects of the monetary shocks series on 
the Eurozone economy. To do so, I employ two different methodologies: VARs and Local 
Linear Projections (LPs) á la Jordà (2005). The studies of Romer & Romer (2004), Cloyne 
& Hürtgen (2016) and Champagne & Sekkel (2018) all include parsimonious VARs with 
large lags, which have become a standard in empirical macroeconomic research since Sims 
(1980).  
LPs differ from VARs mainly in their estimation methodology: they can be estimated by 
simple least squares, they are robust to the data generating process (whereas VARs may be 
a significantly misspecified as a representation of the data generating process) and they 
easily accommodate experimentation with highly non-linear specifications.  
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The suggestion of Jordà (2005) on why LPs are preferable to VARs when estimating 
impulse responses revolves around the key insight in the estimation of the impulse 
responses with a model based on the sample, such as a VAR. A VAR represents a linear 
global approximation of the data generating process, optimal for a 1-period ahead forecast, 
even when the model is misspecified.  Jordà (2005) argues that as impulse responses are a 
function of forecasts at increasingly distant horizons and misspecifications errors are 
compounded with the forecasts horizon, LPs are therefore preferable as they represent a 
collection of local projections to each forecast horizon. Furthermore, Jordà (2005) points 
out that since LPs are based on sequential regressions of the endogenous variable shifted 
several steps ahead, they are more similar to multi-step direct forecasts rather then iterated 
forecasts. 
Recently, LPs have been challenged by Plagborg-Møller & Wolf (2019), who claim that 
LPs and VARs produce a similar impulse response function, arguing against the robustness 
of LPs to model misspecifications compared to VARs. Their findings are, however, 
strongly linked to unrestricted lag lengths. In simple terms, iterated VAR(∞) forecasts 
coincide with direct LP forecasts. Therefore, if the results differ between the two 
methodologies, it is due to lags restrictions. They also acknowledge, that empirically, 
researchers working with a “smaller” sample size are going to be limited in the lags number 
and, therefore, will obtain different impulse response from the two methodologies. 
The first methodology employed is the parsimonious VAR, which includes only 4 variables 
at a monthly frequency: the log of the industrial production index (IP index), the log of the 
harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP index), the log of the ECB commodity price 
index and my measure of monetary policy shocks. The estimated second-stage VAR is: 
120 
 
Zt = P(L) Zt−1  + εt                                 [ 3.4 ] 
 
where P(L) is a lag polynomial with 5 lags, including a constant and a time trend.   
The main specification of my VAR includes the vector of observable Zt defined as: [ Yt , 
Pt , P.Comt , C.shockt ]  and a constant and a trend. Yt is the log of the IP index, Pt is the 
log of the HICP index, P.Comt is the log of the ECB commodity index and C.shockt is my 
measure of monetary policy shocks. The macroeconomic variables included in the analysis 
are all in the form of the variable “level”, not the change. Therefore, I cumulate my measure 
of monetary shocks54 and order it last in the VAR.  
The lags were chosen by conducting different lag length tests. When setting the maximum 
lag length at 12, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) suggests 7 lags, whereas the 
Schwarz Criterion (BIC) suggests 5 lags. As my sample is rather small, I rely on the BIC 
test. Romer & Romer (2004) include 36 lags in their VAR, whereas Cloyne & Hürtgen 
(2016) and Champagne & Sekkel (2018) include 24 lag. These large lags VARs are not 
suitable for my sample size. The impulse responses, which represents the main results of 
this chapter are all presented in subsection 3.4.1.   
Alternatively to the VAR methodology, I estimate and model LPs. Cloyne & Hürtgen 
(2016) and Champagne & Sekkel (2018) add the estimations with local projections to their 
results, finding them in line with the VAR, although slightly stronger. Fieldhouse, Martens 




54 I followed the same approach as Romer & Romer (2004) and the more recent Cloyne & Hürtgen (2016) 
and Champagne & Sekkel (2018) 
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identification strategy to investigate the portfolio activity of federal housing agencies and 
its impact on mortgage markets and the economy. 
In particular, I estimate the following local projection model: 
xt+h- xt = c + P(L)Zt-1  + βh C.shockt + εt+h      [ 3.5 ] 
where h = 0,1,2,…24.  
The variable of interest is x, P(L) is a polynomial lag operator, Zt-1 is a vector of controls, 
which includes the same variables included in the VAR (equation [3.4]). C.shockt is my 
measure of cumulated monetary policy shocks. The same number of lags was included in 
the analysis, as in the previous VAR methodology. The impulse responses produced from 
this analysis are presented in subsection 3.4.2. 
3.4 Empirical Results 
 
This section presents the results of the second-stage analysis presented in subsection 3.3.3. 
The results, represented by the impulse responses of inflation and industrial production, 
are firstly estimated with a promiscuous VAR and secondly with the LPs methodology. 
The VAR analysis is further extended to additional macroeconomic variables and trade 
variables. The HICP index employed in the analysis to investigate the response of inflation 
to monetary shocks is the weighted average of the HICP indexes of the single Eurozone 
countries. Even though it is highly representative of the inflation response across these 
countries, I investigate the responses of the single country HICP indexes to shed light on 
eventual asymmetries. Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1998) firstly analyse the asymmetries 




The 2011 sovereign debt crisis has also highlighted important imbalances among countries. 
Shedding light on these imbalances indirectly tests the efficiency of the ECB in supporting 
the economy of the single countries. Building on this reasoning, I also investigate the 
response of the output of single Eurozone countries.  
Given the additional flexibility of the LPs methodology and the suitability for smaller 
samples, I estimate a quarterly specification of equation [3.5] to investigate the effects 
directly on the GDP. Romer & Romer (2004) as well as Cloyne & Hürtgen (2016), employ 
industrial production as a measure of output, given the fact that GDP is not available at a 
monthly frequency. Champagne & Sekkel (2018) are able to directly analyse the response 
of GDP as the BOC provides a monthly frequency estimate of real GDP. Lastly, to 
corroborate my results I investigate whether employing the narrative approach resolves the 
“Price Puzzle” firstly documented by Sims (1992). 
3.4.1 VAR 
 
3.4.1.1 Eurozone: Inflation and Industrial Production 
 
Figure 3.2 presents the impulse responses to my monetary shock series for prices (inflation) 
in Panel A and output (industrial production) in Panel B, computed from the second-stage 
VAR presented in equation [3.4]. The VAR includes the HICP index, the industrial 




55 The impulse responses to a 100 bps monetary shocks for all the 4 variables included in the analysis are 
presented in appendix B.2. 
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and a trend.56 The impulse responses are plotted along with 95% bootstrapped confidence 
bands and are not statistically significant. Panel A documents a weak and statistically 
insignificant response of inflation with a very modest decreasing tendency at the end of 24 
months. The weak response of inflation is also documented by Champagne & Sekkel 
(2018), who find a modest 0.4% decline after 36 months. The studies that analyse other 
countries (Romer & Romer, 2004; Cloyne & Hürtgen, 2016; Champagne & Sekkel, 2018) 
are able to retrieve longer estimates of the responses (36 months), with much larger lags 




56 A robustness check was carried excluding the constant and the trend and the results are qualitatively 
identical. The impulse responses can be found in appendix B.3. 
Figure 3.2 The Response Functions to a Monetary Policy Shock. 
Note: In Panel A, the blue path corresponds to the impulse response of prices (inflation) to a 100 bps 
contractionary monetary policy shock, plotted along with 95% bootstrapped confidence bands (grey area). 
In panel B, the blue path corresponds to the impulse response of output (industrial production index) to a 
100 bps contractionary monetary policy shock, plotted along with 95% bootstrapped confidence bands 
(grey area). P= 5, 2000 repetitions. Sample: 2000–2016.  
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Panel B presents the response function of industrial production to a 100 bps contractionary 
monetary shock. In the first 5 months output, represented by industrial production, shows 
a small increment of about 0.15% and starts its downward path after 10 months. The decline 
persists for 24 months, reaching -0.5% after 15 months and peaking around -1% at the end 
of the path (24 months). Similarly, Cloyne & Hürtgen (2016) and Champagne & Sekkel 
(2018) find that output declines consistently up to -1%, around 18 to 24 months after the 
shock. Even though the response of output is closer to the lower bound the results are still 
statistically insignificant at 95% confidence level. Additional explanations for this result 
will be provided with the LPs’ analysis and the analysis of single Eurozone countries.  
3.4.1.2 Eurozone: Comparisons with the Romer & Romer (2004) Shocks 
Series 
 
To construct my new measure of shocks series I extend the narrative identification of 
Romer & Romer (2004) and include the total assets of the ECB, following Burriel & Galesi 
(2018) to account for all the unconventional monetary policy programmes put in place by 
the Governing Council of the ECB. I also re-estimate the monetary shocks series, mirroring 
Romer & Romer (2004) and therefore excluding the total assets from the first-stage VAR. 
I estimate the impulse responses with respect to this monetary shock series and plot the 
results in Figure 3.3,57 along with the impulse responses presented in Figure 3.2. The 




57 The variables included in the VAR are the one described in equation [3.4], including a constant and a trend. 
The impulse response for all the variables included in the analysis (equation [3.4], where the monetary shocks 




responses produced in this analysis show are also statistically insignificant as in the 
previous case.  
These controversial results can be partially ascribed to the heterogeneity in the results 
found by Burriel & Galesi (2018) in the response of single Eurozone countries to 
unconventional monetary policy programmes. Unconventional monetary policies have a 
stronger effect on inflation, as reported by Burriel & Galesi (2018), showing a defined 
decline at the end of the path, unlike to conventional monetary policy shocks. The response 
of output is also stronger but displays a relevant initial positive peak similar to the findings 
in figure 3.2 and the more pronounce initial peak in Figure 3.3. Overall, the results are 
virtually similar, and in both cases lies on the same confidence bands.  
Figure 3.3 The Response Functions to a Monetary Policy Shock comparison with the Romer & 
Romer (2004) series 
Note: In Panel A, the blue path corresponds to the impulse response of inflation to a 100 bps 
contractionary monetary policy shock, plotted along with 95% confidence bands (grey area). In panel B, 
the blue path corresponds to the impulse response of output to a 100 bps contractionary monetary policy 
shock, plotted along with 95% confidence bands (grey area). The black dotted line corresponds to the 
impulse responses of inflation and output (Panel A and B, respectively) to a 100 bps monetary policy 
shock, computed with the traditional methodology of Romer & Romer (2004) in the first-stage regression. 




3.4.1.3 Additional Macroeconomic Variables 
 
In this section, I present the results for an extended second-stage VAR analysis, including 
additional macroeconomic variables. Specifically, compared to the VAR described in 
equation [3.4], I add the PPI index and the unemployment rate. The VAR includes 7 lags, 
as suggested by the BIC tests when adding these two additional variables. 




58 The impulse response of all the variables included in the analysis can be found in Appendix B.4. 
Figure 3.4 VAR Additional Macroeconomic variables. 
Note: The Figure presents the impulse responses of an extended VAR that includes all the variables 
described in equation [3.4] plus the log of the PPI index and the unemployment Rate. Panel A, B, C and 
D present the response of 100 bps monetary policy shocks of log of (inflation), output (the industrial 
production index), the PPI index and the unemployment rate, respectively. The impulse responses are 
plotted along with the 95% confidence bands. P= 7, 2000 repetitions. Sample: 2000–2016. 
127 
 
Champagne & Sekkel (2018) also include additional variables in their analysis. They 
include the unemployment rate and find an increase of  0.5% 2 years after the shock. The 
unemployment rate, similar to the findings of Champagne & Sekkel (2018) increase by 
almost 1% after 18 months. The tendency is increasing throughout the response of the 
unemployment rate but remains constant after reaching its peak. The PPI index experiences 
a strong decline, starting immediately and being almost monotonic until its statistically 
significant peak after 24 months. When adding these two additional variables the dynamics 
of inflation and industrial production also slightly change. Both the responses of industrial 
production and inflation show a more marked decline, more evident in the case of inflation. 
However, as for the previous analysis the impulse responses are not statistically significant 
at 95% confidence level.  
3.4.1.4 Additional Macroeconomic Variables – Trade Variables 
 
For completeness, I also estimate an extended VAR including trade variables. Similar to 
Champagne & Sekkel (2018), I estimate an extended VAR that includes the variable of 
equation [3.4], the exchange rate EUR/USD, the import index and the export index.59 
Champagne & Sekkel (2018) find a decrease in the exchange rate USD/CAD and a 
decrease both in the case of import and export, starting after 12 months.  
The results are essentially similar to my findings for the Eurozone, finding an mildly 
statistically significant appreciation of the Euro, after 100 bps contractionary monetary 








shocks in both cases. The import index, although, more similar to the path followed by 
industrial production, has an initial rise of 0.25%, before starting the decline after 7 months.  






Figure 3.5 VAR Additional Macroeconomic variables – Trade Variables 
Note: The Figure presents the impulse responses of an extended VAR that includes all the variables 
described in equation [3.4] plus the log of the Import index, the Export index and the exchange rate. Panel 
A, B, C, D and E present the response of 100 bps monetary policy shocks of log of inflation, output, the 
log of the Import Index, the Export index and the exchange rate, respectively. The impulse responses are 
plotted along with 95% confidence bands. P=7, 2000 repetitions. Sample: 2000-2016 
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3.4.2 Local Projections 
 
This section presents the impulse responses estimated following equation [3.5] and 
employing LPs á la Jordà (2005). First, I will present a replication of the analysis 
previously conducted with the second-stage VAR analysis, which has quantified the effect 
of my new series of monetary shocks primarily on Eurozone prices (HICP index) and 
output (industrial production index) and then on other macroeconomic variables of interest. 
The results have partially mirrored the results previously found in the literature, providing 
empirical evidence of a weak unstable response of prices and more pronounced effect on 
output. Second, I will present an additional analysis, intended to investigate the different 
response of prices and output across the Eurozone countries, specifically Germany, France, 
Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal.60  
The analysis on the single Eurozone countries is specifically conducted with the LPs’ 
methodology for two main reasons: first the results on different macroeconomic variables 
of the previous subsection (3.4.1) were rather unstable. Second, as previously mentioned 
in the methodology section 3.3.3 the LPs’ methodology normally yields more “detailed” 
paths compared to the VARs, given how the forecasts are computed. Since the Eurozone 
countries indexes are the “components” of the overall Eurozone HICP and the industrial 
production indexes, I expect to find some similarities in the responses but also differences, 




60 For completeness the analysis was conducted also with the VAR presented in equation [3.4] for all 6 
Eurozone countries. The impulse responses for all the variables for each country are presented in Appendix 
B (B.17, B.18, B.19, B.20, B.21, and B.22). The impulse responses estimated with the VAR present 
qualitatively very similar paths to the one estimated with LPs, although less “specified”.  
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3.4.2.1 Eurozone: Inflation and Industrial Production 
 
Figure 3.6 shows the impulse responses to a 100 bps contractionary monetary policy shock 
computed with the local linear projections of prices (inflation) and output (industrial 
production index). 61  The results for industrial production and inflation are similar in 
tendency to the one obtained with the baseline VAR methodology, although as expected 
the path obtained with LPs is much more volatile than the one obtained with the VAR, 
given also the specification of the model. The response of output shows a more consistent 
rise in the first stage of the period, rising about 0.25% after 5 months. The downward path 
of the output begins after 10 months, consistent with the VAR estimate, and continues till 
the 24th month, although the estimate only predicts an overall decline of 0.5%.  
The decline starts after 10 months with quite a sharp decrease from about +0.15% to –0.25. 
The response of inflation is more pronounced than the estimations obtained with the VAR, 
showing a more marked downward tendency after 5 months and terminating after 24 
months with an overall decline of 0.05%. In line with the VAR results and past studies, 
output still remains more responsive than inflation to monetary shocks.  Different from the 




61 The impulse responses of all the variables included in the analysis can be found in Appendix B.8. 
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months when the proper decline starts, whereas it remains insignificant for inflation 
throughout the periods. 
3.4.2.2 Countries’ Specifications: Inflation and Industrial Production 
 
In this section, I investigate whether the response of industrial production and inflation 
varies across the Eurozone countries. In particular, I investigate the response of Germany, 
France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece. Previous studies conducted in Canada 
(Champagne & Sekkel, 2018) and the UK (Cloyne and Hürtgen, 2016) analysed the effects 
of monetary shocks on small open economies. Differently from BOE and BOC, the 
decisions of the ECB affect a number of deeply diverse countries. Clarida, Gali & Gertler 
(1998) analysed the monetary policy of European countries and found different effects on 
them.  
Figure 3.6 Impulse Responses to Monetary Policy Shocks – Local Projections 
Note: The figure presents the impulse responses of inflation and output (respectively) to a 100 bps 
contractionary monetary policy shock, plotted along with the 95% confidence intervals (the grey area). 
The impulse responses are computed with local projections á la Jordà (2005) from the model presented 
in equation [3.5]. P=5, 2000 repetitions. Sample: 2000-2016 
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Since their seminal studies, less has been investigated on the Eurozone given its “young” 
age and therefore the lack of historical data. Even less has been said on the single Eurozone 
countries, even though the 2011 Sovereign Debt Crisis has highlighted the differences 
among countries. Figures 3.7–3.12 present the impulse responses for the Eurozone 
countries, plotted along with the impulse response for the overall Eurozone for comparison. 
To analyse the countries difference I employ the LPs methodology to obtain a more precise 













Figure 3.7 presents the impulse responses for Germany of inflation and industrial 
production respectively.62 The impulse response of German inflation is essentially in line 
with the response of the Eurozone, excluding a more marked peak between 10 and 15 
months. The decline is less pronounced, although persistence until the end of the 24th 
month.  The decline in output starts at a later time, after 15 months, whereas the initial peak 
is characterised by a higher volatility. Between the 10th and 15th month I observe a second 




62 The impulse responses of all the variables included in the analysis can be found in Appendix B.9. 
Figure 3.7 LP - Germany 
Note: The figure presents the impulse responses of inflation and output to a 100 bps contractionary 
monetary policy shock, plotted along with the 95% confidence intervals (the grey area). The blue line 
represents the impulse responses for Germany, whereas the black line represents the impulse responses 
for the whole Eurozone. The impulse responses are computed with local projections á la Jordà (2005) 




virtually the same at the end of the periods, the path to reach it is similar in tendency in the 
case of inflation and very divergent in the case of the output, especially in the first half.  
France 
Figure 3.8 presents the impulse responses for inflation and industrial production in the case 
of France.63 Differently from the previous results in Germany, the responses of France are 
more “linear” compared to both Germany and the overall Eurozone. The response of 
inflation is a consistent decline that culminates in an overall –0.05%, in line with the overall 
Eurozone. The result of industrial production is in line with this tendency, although the 




63 The impulse responses of all the variables included in the analysis can be found in Appendix B.10. 
Figure 3.8 LP - France 
Note: The figure presents the impulse responses of inflation and output to a 100 bps contractionary 
monetary policy shock, plotted along with the 95% confidence intervals (the grey area). The blue line 
represents the impulse responses for France, whereas the black line represents the impulse responses for 
the whole Eurozone. The impulse responses are computed with local projections á la Jordà (2005) from 




in France declines by an overall 0.8%, consistently higher then the overall response of the 
Eurozone and Germany. Furthermore, the initial peak of the industrial production is 
practically non–existent in the case of France with a peak of only about 0.1% initially and 
ending before 5 months. 
Spain  
Figure 3.9 shows the impulse responses of inflation and industrial production of Spain.64 
The paths of both macroeconomic variables are both more volatile then the overall 
response of the Eurozone macroeconomic variables. The overall decline of inflation is 




64 The impulse responses of all the variables included in the analysis can be found in Appendix B.11. 
Figure 3.9 LP - Spain 
Note: The figure presents the impulse responses of inflation and output to a 100 bps contractionary 
monetary policy shock, plotted along with the 95% confidence intervals (the grey area). The blue line 
represents the impulse responses for Spain, whereas the black line represents the impulse responses for 
the whole Eurozone. The impulse responses are computed with local projections á la Jordà (2005) from 




production is different from the overall Eurozone and the other countries. The tendency of 
the industrial production response is negative, although the constant decline starts only at 
the 18th month. 
The volatility of the initial peaks continues and reflects more the response observed in that 
of France. Similarly, the overall decline is stronger than the overall Eurozone (0.75% 
approximately against the 0.5%). 
Italy 
Figure 3.10 presents the impulse responses of inflation and industrial production of Italy.65 




65 The impulse responses of all the variables included in the analysis can be found in Appendix B.12. 
Figure 3.10 LP - Italy 
Note: The figure presents the impulse responses of inflation and output to a 100 bps contractionary 
monetary policy shock, plotted along with the 95% confidence intervals (the grey area). The blue line 
represents the impulse responses for Italy, whereas the black line represents the impulse responses for 
the whole Eurozone. The impulse responses are computed with local projections á la Jordà (2005) from 




more linear in the case of industrial production. The path followed by inflation shows a 
slightly stronger decline throughout the period, although it culminates in a lower decline 
than the overall Eurozone. Throughout the path, the decline is closer to a –0.1% reduction. 
After 22 months inflation starts to rise and partially recovers some of the decline. The 
industrial production path shows a tendency very close to the overall Eurozone path. The 
initial peak lasts for 12 months (as for the overall Eurozone), although it presents a slightly 
more volatile path, showing an initial decline before 10 months and a small increase lasting 



















Figure 3.1166 presents the impulse responses of inflation and industrial production for 
Portugal. The response of inflation is more linear and slightly stronger, culminating in an 
overall decline of 0.1%, similar to the path observed in the case of Spain.  
The response is moderately more volatile then in the overall Eurozone response. The 
response of industrial productions mimics more the path followed in the case of France. 
Similarly to the industrial production of France, the initial peak lasts for less than 5 months. 




66 The impulse responses of all the variables included in the analysis can be found in Appendix B.14. 
Figure 3.11 LP - Portugal 
Note: The figure presents the impulse responses of inflation and output to a 100 bps contractionary 
monetary policy shock, plotted along with the 95% confidence intervals (the grey area). The blue line 
represents the impulse responses for Portugal, whereas the black line represents the impulse responses 
for the whole Eurozone. The impulse responses are computed with local projections á la Jordà (2005) 




peak after 20 months, which cancels out relatively quickly and confirms an overall decline 
of almost 1%.  
Greece 
Figure 3.1267 shows the impulse responses for inflation and industrial production, which 
perhaps represent the two most heterogeneous paths, in comparison with the overall 
Eurozone indexes and also with the other countries, particularly in the case of inflation. 
Inflation, in the case of Greece, rises almost 0.2% at the end of the 24 months. The path is 
moderately volatile, with a marked positive tendency. The path of the overall Eurozone 
lies in the very lower confidence band and sporadically lies outside of it. The path of 




67 The impulse responses of all the variables included in the analysis can be found in Appendix B.13. 
Figure 3.12 LP - Greece 
Note: The figure presents the impulse responses of inflation and output to a 100 bps contractionary 
monetary policy shock, plotted along with the 95% confidence intervals (the grey area). The blue line 
represents the impulse responses for Greece, whereas the black line represents the impulse responses for 
the whole Eurozone. The impulse responses are computed with local projections á la Jordà (2005) from 




initial peak and a consistent decline till the 18th month. The last six months of the period 
display a volatile path with an important peak across the 20th month that immediately 
cancels out. These last two peaks represent perhaps two outliers, as the overall decline is 
in line with the response of the Eurozone as whole. 
Comparison among countries 
The overall responses among the single Eurozone countries show a homogenous overall 
decline of inflation between 0.1% and 0.2%, with the only exception represented by 
Greece. The overall responses of the industrial production range among an overall decline 
of 0.5% with peaks around almost 1% for Portugal, France and Spain. Overall the paths 
show similar tendencies, although the volatility in the paths shows a high degree of 
heterogeneity among the countries. Overall, in line with the responses of the Eurozone (as 
a whole), the responses of industrial production are mostly robust at the 95% confidence 
band, especially when the persistent decline starts. On the contrary the results on inflation 
remain very weak and unstable. This level of heterogeneity in the responses is particularly 
relevant from a policy makers’ perspective, considering that the ECB deliberates on 
monetary policy with the intent of homogenously affecting all the countries in the union.  
The present research doesn’t intend to provide an explanation for the lack of homogeneity 
in the responses of inflation and industrial production in the Eurozone countries. However, 
the heterogeneity in the responses of the single countries, might be a further interesting 
aspect to investigate and potentially a source of concern for policy makers. Burriel and 
Galesi (2018) assess the effects of unconventional monetary policy shocks among all the 
countries in the monetary, finding that countries with a more “fragile” banking system 
benefitted less from unconventional monetary policies and output gains. The heterogeneity 
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of these effects can, therefore, lead to the ineffectiveness of monetary policy measures 
across the Eurozone countries.  
3.4.2.3 GDP Quarterly Specification 
 
Champagne & Sekkel (2018) are able to provide directly real GDP as a measure of output, 
as the BOC provides a monthly series of GDP. The ECB doesn’t provide a monthly series 
for GDP and therefore, similarly to Romer & Romer (2004) and Cloyne & Hürtgen (2016), 
I employ the industrial production index as a measure of output. In this section, I provide 
a quarterly analysis to investigate the effects of monetary policy shocks on the real GDP. I 
estimate the impulse responses with LPs, as the sample period is even further reduced when 
considering a quarterly frequency, and therefore inadequate for the VAR methodology.  
The results on GDP analysis, presented in Figure 3.13,68  are stronger with respect to 
industrial production, which is in line with the previous studies in other countries. Both 
Romer & Romer (2004) for the US and Cloyne & Hürtgen (2016) for the UK, find a starker 
decline for GDP compared to industrial production.  
To investigate the response of the real GDP, I estimate a quarterly local projection model 
(equation [3.5]) including the log of the HICP Index, the log of real GDP, the log of the 
commodity index and the quarterly cumulated monetary policy shocks series. Similar to 




68 The impulse response of all the variables included in the analysis are available in Appendix B.15. 
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almost a 2% rise, followed by a sharp decline that peaks over –2%. The decline starts 
therefore after more than a year from the 100 bps shock and starts to recover after 2 years.  
 
3.4.3 The “Price Puzzle” 
 
Sims (1992) found compelling evidence of high interest rates predicting a rise in inflation, 
which he defined as “hard to reconcile” with effective monetary policy. These results, 
where a contraction in monetary policy raises macroeconomic variables, such as inflation, 
has been defined a “puzzle result” and further commonly called the “Price Puzzle” among 
the literature. The “Price Puzzle” has been widely discussed in the literature and also 
documented by Romer & Romer (2004) and further by Cloyne & Hürtgen (2016) and 
Champagne Sekkel (2018).  
Figure 3.13 LP – GDP Quarterly Specifications 
Note: The Figure presents the impulse response of  output, represented by the GDP of the Eurozone to a 
100 bps contractionary monetary policy shock, plotted along with the 95% confidence intervals (the grey 
area), and computed with local projections á la Jordà (2005). In the local projection model (analogous 
to the model presented in equation [3.5]), were included the log of the quarterly HICP Index, the log of 
the real GDP, the quarterly log of the Eurozone commodity index and  the quarterly cumulated series of 




Romer & Romer (2004) document a rise in inflation after a contractionary monetary shock 
when employing the changes in the actual Federal Funds rate as a shocks series. Cloyne &  
Hürtgen (2016) and Champagne & Sekkel (2018)  found qualitatively similar results when 
employing the Bank Rate as measure of shocks in the UK and in Canada respectively. In 
all these studies, employing the monetary shocks series computed with the narrative 
methodology resolves the puzzle and produces results which are easier to reconcile with 
standard theory predictions.  
The present section aims to investigate two elements: first, whether estimating the effect 
of monetary policy contractions using the changes in the interest rates produces a “puzzle” 
in the case of the ECB and second, whether this “puzzle” is eventually resolved by the 
monetary shocks series estimated with the narrative methodology. To provide this 
empirical evidence I need to compare the results previously presented in Figure 3.2, with 
a VAR estimated by employing the changes in interest rates (the MRO) as shocks series. 
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Figure 3.14 presents the impulse response of prices and output for this last VAR, along 
with the VAR results previously presented in Figure 3.2. The blue line represents the 
impulse response computed with the interest rate changes as a shocks series, whereas the 
black line plots the responses of Figure 3.2. 
The output presents a large stable increase, peaking after 24 months at 2%, whereas 
inflation presents a milder increase of 0.2%. Output remains more responsive and 
statistically significant than inflation, in line with previous results. The impulse responses 
clearly show that when estimating the effect of contractionary monetary shocks with 
Figure 3.14 VAR with ECB Policy Rate. 
Note: In Panel A, the blue path corresponds to impulse response of inflation to a 100 bps contractionary 
change in the interest rate, computed with the variables presented in equation [3.4] and the change in the 
MRO changes as measure of shocks (MRO IRF). The black line corresponds to impulse response of 
output to a 100 bps contractionary monetary policy shock computed with the variables presented in 
equation [3.4] and my new measure of monetary shocks (MPS IRF).Analogously,  in panel B, the blue 
path corresponds to impulse response of output to a 100 bps contractionary change in the interest rate 
computed with the MRO changes as a measure of monetary shocks (MRO IRF), and the black line 
corresponds to impulse response of inflation to a 100 bps contractionary monetary policy shock 
computed with my new measure of monetary shocks (MPS IRF). The 95% confidence bands (the grey 
area) refer in both panels to the impulse response computed with the MRO changes. P=5, 2000 
repetitions. Sample: 2000-2016. 
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changes in the interest rates, as a shocks series, I find “puzzling” results. In other words, 
both prices and output respond positively to a contractionary monetary shocks. Compared 
to the impulse responses computed in the previous section with my monetary shocks series 
the effects are qualitatively very different. My monetary shocks series shows a downward 
path, particularly in the case of output, which is easier to reconcile with standard theory 
expectations, although the effect estimated with the change in interest rate show a more 
robust path. The same cannot be said about inflation, where the effect estimated with 
interest rate changes still remains unstable in both cases. 
3.5 Robustness  
 
The present section proposes some robustness exercises to further validate the main results 
presented in section 3.4. First, as the monetary policy shocks series should be orthogonal 
and independent, I order the shock series first in the VAR (equation [3.4]) and in the LP 
model (equation [3.5]). Second, even though the lags were established on the basis of the 
“BIC test”, I investigate whether enlarging the lags and therefore estimating more 
parameters yields consistent results with respect to the previous results presented. Studies 
in other countries included larger VAR specifications, due to their extended sample sizes. 
 
3.5.1 Monetary Policy Shocks ordered first 
 
A fundamental condition for the correct estimation of the effects of monetary policy shocks 
on macroeconomic variables is that the monetary shock series employed in the analysis 
should be orthogonal and “unpredictable”. These two conditions ensure the absence of 
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endogeneity and anticipatory effects, which are the main challenges in the literature, when 
estimating the effects of monetary policy on the economy.  
In subsection 3.3.2.4, I performed a Granger test to investigate the predictability level of 
my new shocks series. The Granger test showed a high degree of unpredictability of my 
shocks series, allowing me to employ it in the second stage of the analysis. To further 
corroborate the results of the Granger test I place my monetary shocks series first in the 
VAR (equation [3.4]) and in the LPs’ model (equation [3.5]). The intuition behind this is 
that, if my monetary shocks series is definitely orthogonal its place in the vector of controls 
in equation [3.4] shouldn’t matter and the impulse responses estimated from it should 
remain unchanged from the one previously presented in Figure 3.2.  
 
 
Figure 3.15 VAR – MPS ordered first 
Note: In Panel A, the blue path corresponds to the impulse response of inflation to a 100 bps 
contractionary monetary policy shock, plotted along with 95% confidence bands (grey area). In panel B, 
the blue path corresponds to the impulse response of output to a 100 bps contractionary monetary policy 
shock, plotted along with 95% confidence bands (grey area). Monetary policy shocks were ordered first 




In my main specification, the vector of observable Zt  was defined  as: [ Yt , Pt , P.Comt , 
C.shockt ]. In this robustness checks Zt  is defined as: [ C.shockt , Yt , Pt , P.Comt ] and also 
includes a constant and a trend.69 The impulse responses, plotted in figure 3.15,70 are 
estimated with the same parameter as the previously presented in Figure 3.2.  
The same exercise is repeated on the LPs model and the response functions are presented 
in figure 3.1671. Both the figures show that the results are unchanged with respect to the 






69 The same reasoning is applied to the vector of controls in the LPs model in equation [3.5]. 
70 The impulse responses of all the variables included in the analysis are available in Appendix B.6. 
71 The impulse responses of all the variables included in the analysis are available in Appendix B.16. 
Figure 3.16 LP – MPS ordered first 
Note: In Panel A, the blue path corresponds to the impulse response of inflation to a 100 bps 
contractionary monetary policy shock, plotted along with 95% confidence bands (grey area). In panel B, 
the blue path corresponds to the impulse response of output to a 100 bps contractionary monetary policy 
shock, plotted along with 95% confidence bands (grey area). Monetary policy shocks were ordered first 




3.5.2 Different VAR Specifications 
 
In this section, I analyse the VAR results yielded with different lags specifications. I 
enlarge the lag and estimate the VAR (equation [3.4]) with 12 lags, which is originally the 
maximum lag length used to perform the lag selection. The purpose of this test is to 
investigate whether a larger number of parameters yields fundamentally different results 
with respect to those previously presented. The impulse responses from this enlarged VAR 
are presented in Figure 3.17. The response of industrial production is virtually similar in 
the negative trend. However, consistent with the previous analysis, both impulse responses 
are not statistically significant. 
Past studies have employed large lags VAR (24 lags in Cloyne & Hürtgen, 2016; and 
Champagne & Sekkel, 2018; 36 in Romer & Romer, 2004), with larger sample periods. 
Coibion (2012) criticises the large number of lags employed in Romer & Romer (2004), 
arguing that stronger results might be perhaps ascribed to the model construction. 
Following the critics of Coibion (2012) I have employed a smaller number of lags, more 
suitable to the smaller sample size included in my study. This robustness exercise confirms 




The most relevant differences are represented by the initial peak shown in the previous 
results, which are sensibly smaller in this case and by the overall stronger response. The 
response of industrial production, in fact, shows a consistent decline that culminates with 
an overall reduction of almost 2%. The response of inflation is also stronger, showing an 
overall reduction of inflation of 0.2%. The responses therefore coincide in trend with the 
previous results although show both overall stronger declines.  
3.6 Limitations 
 
This chapter suffers from three important limitations. First, in the first stage of the analysis, 
it only includes an additional variable (total assets) to enlarge the information set of policy 
Figure 3.17 12 Lags’ VAR 
Note: In Panel A, the blue path corresponds to the impulse response of inflation to a 100 bps 
contractionary monetary policy shock, plotted along with 95% confidence bands (grey area). In panel B, 
the blue path corresponds to the impulse response of output to a 100 bps contractionary monetary policy 




makers at the “decision point”. As more recent literature (Gertler & Karadi, 2015; 
Jarocinski & Karadi , 2020) have pointed out, financial market-based measures are also a 
fundamental piece of information around monetary policy announcements. Champagne & 
Sekkel (2018) make the case for exchange rates and include the exchange rate USD/CAD 
in their first-stage analysis. Although many academics have argued against the influence 
of the financial markets in the policy makers’ decision-making process, it would perhaps 
be interesting to include financial market variables in the policy makers’ information set 
to investigate whether it yields different results. Second, the sample period is an evident 
limitation of the study. The “young age” of the ECB doesn’t allow it to have extended time 
series. Research in the future will, therefore, be able to successfully overcome this issue.  
Third, there is an additional lack of data. The forecasts included to construct the first stage 
regression are retrieved from the  Survey of Professional Forecasters data, which are only 
available quarterly. This limitation was overcome with the matching methodology 
proposed by Romer & Romer (2004) and also applied to more recent studies. However, 
other sources of forecasts data have recently become available at a monthly frequency, 
which could increase the precision in estimating the information set available to policy 
makers at the meeting date. Among others, “Economic Consesus Data”, provide monthly 
frequency forecasts, that could increase the precision of the estimates of the information 
set available to policy makers at the meeting date.  
3.7 Conclusions  
 
Measuring the effect of monetary policy and monetary policy shocks is one of the most 
debated questions in macroeconomics. This chapter presents fresh evidence on the effects 
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of a new measure of monetary policy shocks in the Eurozone. In line with the existing 
literature, and by adopting a narrative approach, I present empirical findings of monetary 
policy shocks on Eurozone output and inflation. The monetary policy shocks series is 
estimated following the seminal work of Romer & Romer (2004) and carefully matching 
the information available to policy makers at the decision point to extract an orthogonal 
shocks series. The narrative methodology of Romer & Romer (2004), unlike with the more 
standard statistical approaches employed previously, yielded starker results with respect to 
the US economy and overcame the issue of endogeneity and anticipatory effects. Unlike 
the existing literature, the second stage of the analysis is performed with an additional 
methodology, local linear projection à la  Jordà (2005). My results are in line with evidence 
found in other countries for output and slightly milder for inflation. 
Specifically, my results show that output is more responsive to monetary policy shocks, 
with an overall decline of 1%, compared to inflation that shows an overall unstable decline 
of only 0.1%. I also document a price and an output puzzle when estimating the response 
with the interest rate instead of the new measure of monetary policy shocks.  Additional 
macroeconomic variables are included in the analysis. In particular, trade variables are 
strongly affected by monetary shocks: both the import and export indexes are negatively 
impacted by contractionary monetary policy shocks.  
I further provide evidence of the heterogeneous effects of monetary shocks among 
Eurozone countries on inflation and industrial production. The heterogeneity in the effects 
of monetary policy shocks on single Eurozone countries is a potential source of concern 
for policy makers, as it could lead to ineffective monetary policy. Overall, my findings 
offer new results on the response of the Eurozone economy to monetary policy shocks and 
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acknowledge the importance of understanding the determinants of interest rate changes to 























Forecasts Targeting and Financial 
Stability: Evidence from the European 




Should a central bank include financial markets stability in its mandate? Has financial 
stability already entered the discussions of policy makers? These questions are frequently 
debated among academics and practitioners, and they remain an unresolved topic, 
particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.  In this chapter, I present evidence 
that financial markets stability matters to monetary policy makers in the context of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of England (BOE)  by using an Augmented Taylor 
(1993) Rule. Although many have discussed this matter, most of the literature has focused 
on the Federal Reserve (FED), whereas less has been documented on the ECB and BOE.  
Bernanke (2011) has stated that the 2008 financial crisis has reminded monetary policy 
makers of their responsibility of maintaining financial stability, as an equally important 
element in their mandate as price stability and economic growth. Bernanke (2011) also 
asserts the importance of financial stability, although he does not propose specific 
155 
 
guidelines or elaborate on how the two key aims of the central bank should interact. Kuttner 
(2011) revisited Bernanke & Gertler (1999), pointing out that financial stability and asset 
prices stability should be pursued to the extent which supports the pursuing of inflation 
stability. Oet & Lyytinen (2017) show that the discussion on financial stability has entered 
the topics of the FOMC committee, although with differing opinions across recent years. 
More importantly, they point out that a Tri-Mandate Taylor Rule better explains the FED 
monetary policy conduct after 2008. 
In this chapter, I depart from the existing academic evidence and viewpoints of policy 
makers and investigate two research questions within the well-known Taylor (1993) Rule 
framework. First, I assess whether financial market stability played any role in the ECB 
and BOE interest rate setting during the 2003–2018 sample period. Second, I investigate 
whether the ECB and BOE follow a “forward-looking” or a “simple-feedback” Taylor 
Rule, to empirically support the theoretical critiques of Svensson (2003, 2010, 2019), who 
argues that a “forward-looking” monetary policy rule is needed, given the fact that 
monetary policy affects the economy with a lag and therefore “ex-post” data are not a 
suitable information with which to decide on an interest rate change. The terms “forward-
looking” and “simple-feedback” were also reiterated on various occasions by Bernanke 
(2004), who focused on the need for a forward-looking monetary policy rule.  
My chapter contributes to the existing literature primarily by showing that financial market 
stability is a source of concern for policy makers and can explain the deviations of realised 
interest rates from the predicted values of the Taylor (1993) Rule. Additionally, I support 
the theoretical critiques of Svensson (2003, 2010, 2019) in showing that monetary policy 
makers follow a forward-looking Taylor (1993) Rule. Two other contributions emerge 
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from my study. First, I provide empirical evidence that the financial market stability of the 
United States affects the decision of the ECB policy makers. Second, I provide an effective 
comparison between the monetary policy conduct of the ECB and BOE, which operate in 
different economic environments, although pursuing the same mandate of price stability 
and economic growth. 
To estimate the ECB and BOE Taylor (1993) Rules, I address most of the methodological 
criticisms raised during the years to this framework. The Taylor (1993, 1999a) Rule, as a 
very straight-forward and computationally easy rule, has been criticised partly for its 
simplicity and the lack of inclusion of potentially relevant information for policy makers 
when assessing the level of the interest rate. To address these critiques I first, fix the 
reaction coefficients that are commonly used in Taylor-type Rules studies following the 
approach of Clark (2012) and Oet & Lyytinen (2017). Second, I include real-time 
forecasted data available to monetary policy makers, addressing the critique of Orphanides 
(2001), who claims that the Taylor Rule is not robust for minor variations in data sources. 
Lastly, following Oet & Lyytinen (2017) and unlike Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1998) and 
Rudebusch (2006), I don’t estimate an “inertial” Taylor-type Rule. As my objective is to 
establish the size of the explanatory power of omitted variables in the Taylor Rule, adding 
an interest rate “inertia” variable (e.g interest rates’ smoothing variables) in my model 
could potentially hide the variations resulting from omitted variables. 
The Taylor-type Rules are, then, estimated following an OLS approach as in Oet & 
Lyytinen (2017). The Taylor Rule has been mostly estimated using a Generalised Methods 
of Moments (GMM) methodology (Clarida, Gali & Gertler, 1998) and Non-Linear Square 
(NLS) estimates (Gorter, Jacobs & De Haan, 2008). The GMM and the NLS estimates 
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could, however, be biased by the starting parameters employed in the analysis, which are 
arbitrarily estimated. Recently, Carvalho, Nechio & Tristao (2018) find empirical evidence 
that the OLS methodology is statistically efficient to estimate the Taylor Rule, compared 
to other methodologies such as Instrumental Variables (IV). Lastly, given the major 
changes in the economic environment, also driven by the financial crisis, I test my Taylor–
type Rules on regime samples, following the Bai-Perron structural break analysis (Bai &  
Perron, 1998, 2003).  
My empirical analysis points to several novel findings. First, financial market stability 
plays a crucial role in setting interest rates. Although financial markets are a fundamental 
channel in transmitting monetary policy decisions, they also represent a concern for policy 
makers. Second, in line with evidence in Gerlach (2007) and Gorter, Jacobs & De Haan 
(2008) a forward-looking Taylor, dominates a traditional ex-post data Taylor (1993) Rule 
across the whole sample period 2003–2018 for both the ECB and BOE. Both banks care 
about the outlook on economic growth as well as the forecasted inflation gap. In line with 
expectations, both conclusions from the empirical literature and the mandates of the central 
banks imply that inflation is a key factor in interest rate setting. Moreover, the analysis of 
different regimes indicates that after the 2008 financial crisis the Taylor Rule Augmented 
version, which includes financial market stability, dominates the traditional Taylor (1993) 
Rule version.  
Oddly, when considering the forward-looking vs ex-post data across regime samples which 
include financial market stability, ex-post data models dominate forward-looking models. 
There are two possible explanations for this result. First, when considering regime sample 
analysis, the forecasted macroeconomic variables have a lower frequency then ex-post 
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data. Second, the inflation and output gap computed with forward-looking data display a 
lower variability in the time series across the whole sample period 2003–2018, which can 
potentially introduce a bias when analysing shorter subsample periods. 
A novel result which emerges from my research, is the joint importance of both European 
and US financial market stability in affecting monetary policy makers. To further explore 
the role of financial market stability, I add a measure of financial market stability slack 
(FMSS) for the US stock market. This result can be interpreted as the joint effort of 
monetary policy makers in re-establishing trust among investors and towards institutions 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis. However, when I analyse BOE monetary policy, the 
variable related to the US financial market stability never enters with a statistically 
significant estimate.  
The interconnection among central bank monetary policies is an established empirical fact. 
Caputo & Herrera (2017) found that the Federal Reserve played a “leader role” among 
several international institutions in the setting of monetary policy. Moreover, Bekaert, 
Hoerova & Lo Duca (2013) show that US financial market volatility strongly co-moves 
with the measure of US monetary policy. Therefore, there is compelling evidence to 
suggest that the ECB has certainly been taking into account US financial market stability 
and monetary policy during the 2003–2018 time period. US financial market volatility is 
represented, in the study of Bekaert, Hoerova, & Lo Duca (2013), by the VIX index. I also 





4.2  Literature Review 
 
Friedman & Kuttner (2010) rightly note that most of the literature has debated how central 
banks should optimally set interest rates, while much less attention has been directed to the 
more important question on how they actually do set them. Thus, the second question 
remains an open and unsolved one in central bank monetary policy literature. Particularly 
in the past two decades, monetary policy makers have been affected by many big changes 
affecting their decision process: from technology innovations to the impact of the financial 
crisis and economic recessions and to the fundamental forces that influence the way 
financial market activity is conducted. Some consequences have been a switch in financial 
regulation as well as the adoption of new policies and tools affecting markets and 
intermediaries.  
Thus, central banks started to acknowledge that they no longer have a significant influence 
on market rates by relying on conventional monetary policy tools. Before the “advent” of 
the IT Framework most of the monetary policy institutions, specifically the ECB, between 
1999 and 2003, influenced the level of interest rate by influencing the level of reserves (4% 
as a target in the case of the ECB). Most of the central banks have committed to IT, which 
has proven to be an efficient tool in interest rate setting (Svensson, 2010).  
Within this framework, the Taylor (1993) Rule has given the first “computationally easy” 
monetary policy tool to link the level of interest rates to the inflation target and economic 
slack. In the last two decades, several central banks have been using Taylor (1993) Rule 
guidance when setting interest rates, although in an informal way. The Taylor (1993) Rule, 
including some alternative versions, has been quite successful in explaining how Eurozone 
monetary policy has been conducted. Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1998) show that an interest 
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rate smoothing version of the Taylor Rule is capable of interpreting short-term interest rate 
dynamics in a G-3 country sample (Germany, Japan, US). 
Along the same lines, there is evidence in Gerlach & Schnabel (2000) showing that short-
term interest rates in the Euro Area in the 1990s were consistent with a simple Taylor 
(1993) Rule with a coefficient of 0.5 on the output gap and 1.5 on inflation. Taylor (1999b) 
proposed a revision of his own Rule, which adjusted to exchange rates, and which is well 
suited to ECB monetary policy. Taylor (2001), moreover, suggested that more research 
and empirical evidence is needed on the influence of exchange rates on monetary policy 
rules. Lubik & Schorfheide (2007), following the Taylor (1993) Rule framework, found 
evidence that in the specific case of the BOE, exchange rates played an important role in 
the setting of interest rates, empirically supporting Taylor (2001). 
However, the original version of the Taylor (1993) Rule has been frequently criticized, and 
its main prescriptions extended to better “fit” a central bank monetary policy path. For 
example, Gorter, Jacobs & De Haan (2008) take Svensson’s (2003) critiques and estimate 
a Eurozone Taylor (1993) Rule by relying on Consensus Economic data for expected 
inflation and output growth in the pre-crisis period of 1999–2006. Svensson (2019) is a 
prominent and recent critique of the Taylor (1993,1999a) Rule in the context of US 
monetary policy. Svensson (2019) argues that monetary policy is more effective in 
fulfilling its mandate if it is guided by forecasts rather than by current data. And this is 
even more persuasive when considering the forward-looking nature of monetary policy and 
the fact that such policy tends to influence economic activity and prices with a lag (see also 
Svensson, 2010). Thus, a Rule supported by acceptable forecasts is better suited compared 
to a standard Taylor-type Rule, as it benefits from all the currently available information 
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and could be adapted to news as well as to changes of circumstances. My chapter aims to 
enter this debate by providing fresh evidence in support of Svensson (2003, 2010, 2019) 
and using ECB and BOE monetary policy data as an out-of-sample experiment. In the end, 
this essay investigates whether a central bank monetary policy follows a “forward-looking” 
or a “simple-feedback” Rule.  
To add complexity to my study, the unique event of the 2008 financial crisis has to enter 
my research design. The 2008 financial crisis shook monetary policy equilibria around the 
world and left academics and practitioners with additional doubts on whether and how 
financial market stability should be included in the central bank mandate. Bernanke & 
Gertler (1999) propose that central banks should respond to asset prices’ volatility as the 
unintended outcomes in the financial sector could affect aggregate price levels and generate 
macroeconomic imbalances. Kuttner (2011) revise the Bernanke & Gertler (1999) 
prescription, by proposing macro prudential policies and regulation as more efficient tools 
for designing a monetary policy which also looks also at financial market stability. Kuttner 
(2011) is unconvinced that relying only on interest rate setting could be effective in 
achieving the central banks’ goals when considering the influence that financial markets 
have on the economy.  
Bernanke (2011) revises the doctrine and practice of central banks in light of the 2008 
financial crisis experience. He emphasises that the financial crisis reminded central bankers 
of their responsibility to maintain financial market stability. He argues that, ahead of the 
2008 financial crisis, central bankers and academics achieved a high degree of consensus 
on an effective institutional framework for monetary policy, characterised by committing 
to price stability and transparency in central banking communication policy. However, it 
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is fair to note that the existing literature is far from agreeing on a common ground for 
monetary policy tools. Oet & Lyytinen (2017) find recently that financial stability did 
matter to the FOMC committee in setting the interest rates between 1992 and 2012 and that 
a Tri-Mandate Taylor-type Rule better explains the conduct of US monetary policy. 
4.3 Hypothesis Development 
 
I start from the first Taylor (1993) Rule which links the current level of interest rates to the 
equilibrium interest rate, inflation gap and the economic slack (or output gap). The Taylor 
(1993) Rule, is presented in equation [4.1]: 
rt = r*  + kπ( πt – π*) + ky(yt – y*)    [ 4.1 ] 
Where, r* represents the interest rate level in equilibrium, kπ and ky represents the 
coefficient values for the inflation and output gap. Taylor (1993) suggested that the interest 
rate level in equilibrium is equal to 2%, and the coefficient values for the inflation gap (kπ) 
and output gap (ky) are 1.5 and 0.5 respectively. The inflation gap is computed as the current 
level of inflation (πt) and the target inflation (π*), which is set to be the 2% target. Similarly, 
the output gap is computed as the difference between the current level of output yt growth 
and the output growth at the economy’s full potential.  
A second version of the Taylor (1999a) Rule proposed the unemployment rate as a measure 
of output growth, consistent with the FED mandate to pursue “full employment”. However, 
both the ECB and BOE maintain that the secondary stated monetary policy objective 
should be economic growth. My chapter adopts the Taylor (1993) Rule in its first version, 
as the empirical analyses of Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1998) and Gerlach & Schnabel (2000) 
have shown that it is the original model that better explain short-term interest rates in the 
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Eurozone. Specifically, Gerlach & Schnabel (2000) find that in the 1990s average short-
term interest rates in the euro area can be described by a simple Taylor Rule with a 
coefficient of 0.5 on the output gap and 1.5 on inflation. Subsequently, Taylor (1999b) 
recommends that the ECB should also adopt exchange rates in monetary policy.  
One of the fundamental positive aspects of the Taylor Rule is its simplicity and 
computationally easy nature. Contemporary this is also one of its most discussed drawback. 
Specifically, its computationally easy aspect is given by the reduced number of variables 
included in its equation, which implies a limited amount of information included in the 
setting of the official interest rate level. In an unprecedented event such as the 2008 
financial crisis, the financial stability goal has been found to play a crucial role in monetary 
policy decisions. Kuttner (2011) has been a prominent voice on the importance of financial 
stability in monetary policy. He proposes to revise Bernanke & Gertler’s (1999) monetary 
policy framework by adding financial stability to their mandate, as the financial markets’ 
channel is now acknowledged in the literature to be a fundamental factor in maintaining 
stability in the price level. Oet & Lyytinen (2017) provide a theoretical underpinning and 
evidence to suggest that a “Tri-Mandate Taylor-type Rule” was guiding the FED monetary 
policy in the aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis. 
I take stock of the reviewed theoretical as well as empirical literature and establish my first 
hypothesis for the conduct of the ECB and BOE as follows:  
 
H I: Financial market stability matters to monetary policy makers and explains the 




This chapter's goal is to investigate whether an Augmented Taylor (1993) Rule, better 
explains interest rate setting in the case of the ECB’s and BOE’s observed decisions 
concerning monetary policy. Unlike most of the augmented versions of the Taylor Rule 
and similar to the one proposed by Oet & Lyytinen (2017), financial market stability is also 
represented by a “Financial Market Stability Slack” (FMSS). In the spirit and logic of the 
Taylor Rule, the FMSS variable doesn’t only convey information on the health of the 
financial system, but also on its distance from the optimum, which is consistent with the 
forward-looking nature of monetary policy and the critique raised by Svensson (2003, 
2010, 2019).  
In addition, the Svensson (2003) critique argues that more relevant information should 
enter into interest rate setting, and he develops a theoretical model that links the optimal 
level of interest rates to forecasts of inflation and output. Svensson (2003, 2010) argues 
that as monetary policy affects the economy with a “lag” and market interest rates are 
naturally forward-looking, a simple-feedback rule would not be adequate. Following this 
critique, Gorter, Jacobs & De Haan (2008) estimated a forward-looking Taylor Rule for 
the ECB, providing empirical evidence that for the pre-crisis period (1997–2006) a 
forward-looking Taylor Rule, better explains the monetary policy conduct of the ECB. A 
particularly relevant critique of monetary policy rules has been raised by Svensson (2019), 
who argues that a forward-looking monetary policy rule, although potentially more 
complicated to implement, should be the appropriate guide for monetary policy rules. 
Looking at the available evidence, macroeconomic projections seem to be a more 
reasonable set of information to be included in a monetary policy decision, taking into 
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account the parallel aspects of being on the one hand forward-looking but on the other 
impacting the economy with a time lag (Svensson, 2003, 2010, 2019). 
Based on these findings I postulate my second hypothesis: 
 
H II: Monetary policy makers follow a forward-looking Taylor Rule, which is a more 
reasonable set of information for interest rate setting compared to “ex-post” data.  
 
This further research question aims, therefore, to investigate further the types of 





The data included in the analysis are retrieved from the ECB and BOE websites for the 
inflation and GDP forecasts. In particular, the ECB forecasts are retrieved from the Survey 
of Professional Forecasters (SPF), whereas the forecasts of the BOE are retrieved from the 
Inflation Reports. The monthly data on the unemployment rate and inflation are retrieved 
from the OECD website. GDP growth is available at a quarterly frequency also from the 
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OECD website.72 Financial markets volatility data are retrieved from Bloomberg for both 
the EU and UK financial markets.73  
My sample period for both the institutions covers 2003–2018. This sample choice was 
made for one main reason: the ECB gave the definition of the inflation target to be “below 
but close to 2%” in 200374. The primary objective of the ECB monetary policy, as stated 
in Art. 2 of the Statute of the ECB, is maintaining price stability in the Eurozone and 
consequently enhancing economic growth and job creation. In the case of the BOE, the 
government settled the 2% target, in 1992, and the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is 
in charge of maintaining the level of inflation and price stability and give appropriate notice 
to the government when it misses its target. 
4.4.2 Variables’ Construction 
 
This section will give appropriate details on the construction of the dataset and variables 






72 Quarterly forecasts were transformed to monthly, reversing the methodology of Gorter, Jacobs & De 
Haan (2008) 
73 A detailed description of the data sources and descriptive statistics  included in the analysis are provided 
in Appendix C, Table C.1 and Table C.2, respectively. 
74 In a speech on 4th May 2018,  Vítor Constâncio (at the time Vice President of the ECB) identified the 
period between 1997 and 2003 as the period before the “revision of the monetary policy strategy”, where the 
monetary aggregate M3 was still the first pillar of the ECB monetary strategy. The IT framework with the 
definition of the target below but close to 2% was published with the review of the monetary framework in 
May 2003. Reference can be found at Vítor Constâncio,“Past and future of the ECB monetary policy”, 4th 
May 2018,  www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp180504.en.html. 
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4.4.2.1 The Inflation Gap 
 
The inflation gap is the difference between the level of inflation (current or forecasted) and 
the target level of inflation, set to be 2% for both institutions. 
Πt = πt – π*      [ 4.2 ] 
where Πt is the inflation gap, πt is the current or forecasted level of inflation, and π* is the 
inflation target. Both institutions share the common policy of price stability and IT. Figure 
4.1 shows the inflation gap computed with both ex-post and forecasted data for the ECB 
(Panel A) and BOE (Panel B). 
Through an initial inspection of Figure 4.1, it appears clear that the inflation gap time-
series dynamics of the two banks, computed with both ex-post and forecasted data, are 
Figure 4.1: Inflation Gap 
The figure presents the inflation gap, computed with both ex-post and forecast data for the ECB (Panel 
A) and BOE (Panel B). The inflation gap is computed has shown in equation [4.2]. The inflation gap is 
the difference between the inflation (ex-post or forecasts) and the inflation target, set to be at 2% for both 
central banks. The green line (in both panels) represents the inflation gap computed with ex-post data and 
the red line represents the inflation gap computed with forecasts. Sample period is (2003–2018) and 
includes192 monthly observations. 
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rather different. In the case of the ECB, the trend between the ex-post and forecasted 
inflation gap follows a similar trend, although the magnitude of the inflation gap, computed 
with ex-post data is higher compared to the forecasted inflation gap. 
4.4.2.2 The Economic Slack 
 
Taylor (1993) Rule defines “economic slack” or the output gap as the difference between 
GDP quarterly growth and its “potential” growth. As a measure of potential growth, Taylor 
suggests the GDP growth rate which can be achieved at its full potential. 
Equation [4.3] describes this idea and measures the output gap Yt as the difference between 
yt and y*, computed considering both ex-post and forecasted data.  
Yt = yt – y*      [ 4.3 ] 
As measure of “potential growth” y*, I employ a rudimental measure of the average GDP 
growth in the Eurozone (2.25%) and in United Kingdom (UK) (3%) between 2000 and 
2007. This measure might include some potential biases. First a look-head bias is 
represented by the fact that the estimated potential growth using data from 2000-2007 is 
also employed to retrieve the output gap around the first 4 years of the sample (2003-2007). 
Second, this measure also assumes that the output growth estimated with the 2000-2007 
sample period is a reliable measure for the (2008–2018). The 2000-2007 sample period is 
also assumed to be a booming economy cycle, which is not entirely accurate in period 
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around 2000–200175.Figure 4.2 displays the whole (2003–2018) time-series behaviour of 





75 In future research, I aim to include more measures of the output gap, including a compounded measure 
and a ready available data series. For example, Cooper & Priestley (2009) employed three different 
“computed” measures of the output gap relying on the work of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000). The measure 
first proposed by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) is the most commonly used in the macroeconomics 
literature and employs a de-trended series of the GDP. Both Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and Cooper & 
Priestley (2009) also employed the already available data from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 
Recently two other series have become available in the industry from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Taylor (1999a) rule 
employs a different measure of output gap, built with the unemployment rate. This measure of output gap is 
consistent with second mandate of the FED (full employment) and less consistent with the ECB and BOE. 
Clark (2012) shows that the FED monetary policy conduct can be better explain with the output gap computed 
as the difference between the normal long-run unemployment rate (set to be 6% in his case) and the current 
unemployment rate. Oet & Lyytinen (2017) also provide a measure of the output gap with the unemployment 
rate and employ the CBO measure of long-run unemployment rate, consistent with the inflation remaining 
stable over time. For completeness. I will also provide a measure of the Taylor (1999a) rule and employ a 
measure of output gap estimated with the unemployment rate. This measure of unemployment rate and 
computational details can be found in Appendix C.1. 
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Output slack significantly decreases during financial crisis years for both banks, and never  
entirely recovers afterwards. 
4.4.2.3 Financial Market Stability Slack 
 
The  FMSS is computed as the difference between the long-run “stability state” (Σ) and the 
current financial markets condition (σt) as presented in equation [4.4]: 
FMSSt = Σ - σt    [ 4.4 ] 
  
This variable is constructed following Oet & Lyytinen (2017), who compute their stability 
gap measure as the difference between an estimated upper threshold for the long-run 
normal range of financial system stress the current financial system stress. During 
conditions of unusually high stress the stability gap measure fells below 076. My measure 
of the estimated upper threshold (Σ) is computed by following the same economic logic as 
for the potential growth (y*), considering the average financial market volatility in the pre-
crisis period (2000–2007). I consider the financial market volatility (represented by the 
VSTOXX for the ECB and VFTSE for the BOE) in a “normal market condition” to be the 




76 A detailed discussion on the variable construction see Section 4, pp. 411 of  Oet & Lyytinen (2017). 
77 The values obtained for the Eurozone (average monthly VSTOXX between 2000 and 2007) is 23.717%, 
whereas the value obtained for the UK (average monthly VFTSE between 2000 and 2007) is about 19.624%. 
To the best of my knowledge no measure of FMSS are readily available in the industry. 
Figure 4.2: Output Gap 
The figure presents the time series for the output gap, in Panel A for the ECB and in Panel B for the BOE. 
The output gap is computed as in equation [4.3], and it is the difference between the ex-post (green line) 
or forecast (red line) of the economic growth and economic growth potential. Sample period is (2003–
2018) and includes192 monthly observations. 
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FMSS is plotted in figure 4.3 both for the ECB and BOE. As expected, and similar to the 
output gap trend, the time series shows a downward path around the 2008 financial crisis. 
Compared to the output gap series, it shows a much higher volatility for both institutions. 
Empirical evidence in Bekaert, Hoerova & Lo Duca (2013) shows a significant correlation 
between the VIX Index, as a measure of risk aversion and uncertainty in financial markets, 
and the monetary policy stance. They decompose the VIX into a measure of risk aversion 
and expected stock market volatility and find that a lax monetary policy decreases both. 
Based on Bekaert, Hoerova & Lo Duca’s (2013) evidence, my empirical strategy computes 
FMSS using VSTOXX for the ECB, the volatility index of the European Stocks Index, and 
VFTSE for BOE, the volatility index for the UK stock index. Both VSTOXX and VFTSE 
are computed following the VIX Index computational method, that uses S&P500 options 
Figure 4.3: Financial Markets Stability Slack 
The figure presents the FMSS variable, computed following equation [4.4] for the ECB (Panel A) and 
BOE (Panel B). Sample period is (2003–2018) and includes192 monthly observations. 
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Sources: European Central Bank Website,Bank of England Website,Bloomberg.
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implied volatility as proxy for financial markets conditions. Oet & Lyytinen (2017) 
consider different factors in building their financial stability variable. They point out that 
up to 1998 most discussions over financial market stability revolved around financial 
market factors such as exchange rates, as well as to the real estate market. Subsequently, 
attention has been directed to specific financial instruments, such as credit market 
securities which were increasingly appearing in global markets. Oet & Lyytinen (2017) 
develop a time regime analysis. They show that in the pre-crisis period (2001 – 2006) five 
factors were constantly considered at time of FOMC discussion: the financial market and 
its condition as whole, equity market, foreign exchange, the mortgage market, the non-
financial sector debt and mutual funds. In the post-crisis period, three more factors are 
added: corporate bonds, treasury securities and liquid deposits. A volatility index 
summarises most of this information by providing an indicator of the level of “fear” in the 
financial markets, which could have a significant impact on the financial stability literature 
(Whaley, 2000).78 
4.4.3 Structural Breaks’ Analysis 
 
My empirical analysis covers the whole sample period (2003–2018), but as in Oet & 
Lyytinen (2017), I test for the presence of time series structural breakpoints using the Bai 
& Perron (1998) method. A minimum permissible length of the observation segment of h 




78 Although the volatility indexes could be representative of most of the information regarding Oet & 
Lyytinen (2017) financial stability measure, a further version of this research could benefit from a more 
detailed measure of “Financial Stability Slack”.  
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found for the ECB were on 06/2006, 12/2008, 12/2011 and 04/2015. The structural breaks 
for BOE were identified on 06/2006, 10/2008, 11/2011 and 06/2016.  
The first two structural breaks coincided with the raising of interest rates in Europe and 
then the cutting of interest rates following the crisis events in 2008. Subsequently, a third 
structural break for the ECB was identified in 2011, during the sovereign debt crisis, and 
at the end of April 2015, when ECB further cut interest rates and started the Eurozone QE 
program. The 3rd break for BOE was analogously identified at the end of 2011. Differently, 
the BOE 4th break was identified as 06/2016, after the Brexit vote.  
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Figure 4.4 Panel A, displays the ECB Nominal Rate, along with the regimes identified with 
the structural break analysis. In Panel B, I similarly present the same data pattern for the 
BOE. Figure 4.4 shows that the first two regime samples are almost parallel in time. Across 
the whole period, the structural break analysis indicates when in 2006 the two central banks 
started to raise interest rates, to counteract higher economic growth and potential 
deflationary inflationary pressures. The second and the third structural breaks, both 
coincides (for both institutions) with the 2008 turmoil and the 2011 sovereign debt crisis. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Structural Breaks Analysis 
The figure presents the structural break analysis for the ECB (Panel A) and BOE (Panel B). The structural 
break analysis was conducted for both institutions following the Bai-Perron (1998) test on the overnight 
interest rates for the ECB (Euribor) and BOE (Libor), respectively. A minimum permissible length of the 
observation segment of h = ε * T, where ε = 15% and T is the total number of observations. The breaks 
are shown on the Nominal Interest rate. Sample period is (2003–2018) and includes192 monthly 
observations. 
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4.4.4 The Taylor-Guide Rule 
 
In this section, I estimate the predicted interest rate values following the traditional 
framework of the Taylor (1993, 1999a) Rules both with ex-post and forecasted data. These 
estimates present a descriptive analysis to show the deviation of the realized interest rates 
from the predicted values of the Taylor (1993, 1999a) Rules. These deviations are the 
primary motivation for my study. The “traditional” Taylor (1993) Rule, presented in 
equation [4.1], links the current level of the Federal Fund Target rate to an equilibrium 
interest rate level, the current inflation and output gap. Since the development of this first 
model (Taylor, 1993), many other versions of this rule have been developed to describe 
the monetary policy conduct of different central banks. Oet & Lyytinen (2017) in their 
empirical analysis estimate a “Taylor-type” Rule, adjusting the reaction coefficients 
according to Clark (2012). Clark (2012) proposes a modified version of the traditional 
Taylor (1993,1999a) Rules presented in equation [4.1]. Clark (2012) shows how a Taylor-
type rule better explained the conduct of monetary policy in the US during the monetary 
policy tightening period around 2004–2006. The coefficients of Clark (2012) also include 
the previous period level of the interest rate. As shown in equation [4.5]: 
rt =0.8(rt-1 ) + 0.2( r*  + kπ( πt-1 – π*) + ky(yt-1 – y*))    [ 4.5 ] 
Where kπ is the coefficient value for the inflation gap and is set to be 1.5 and ky is the 
coefficient for the output gap and in this case is set to be 2 (differently from the Taylor 
(1993) Rule, where the output gap coefficient is 0.5). rt-1 represents the previous period 
level of the nominal interest rate, whereas r* represents the equilibrium level of the 
nominal interest rate, set to be 2%. 
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This Taylor-type Rule takes strongly into account the prior period level of interest rates, 
and for this reason I don’t include a “smoothing factor” as in Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1998) 
and Rudebusch (2006), in order to further capture the explanatory power of omitted 
variables. Equation [4.5] is employed to estimate the Taylor (1993, 1999a) rules for both 
the ECB and BOE. The Taylor-type (1993, 1999a) Rules will be estimated with both ex-
post and forecast data and the interest rate (rt-1) will be the Nominal Interest Rate for both 
institutions.79 
In Figure 4.5, I present estimates of Taylor (1993, 1999a) Rules for the ECB (Panel A) and 
the BOE (Panel B) with ex-post data, along with the patterns of Nominal Interest Rates. 
The ex-post Taylor (1993, 1999a) Rules convey important information about ECB and 
BOE monetary policy rules. At a first glance, as in Oet & Lyytinen (2017), the Taylor 
(1993, 1999a) Rules explain well the pre-crisis monetary policy conduct. However, by the 
end of the second regime in 2008, which is October for the BOE and December for the 
ECB, both Taylor Rule (1993) and (1999a) depart from the Nominal Interest Rates. 
It’s interesting to note that the Taylor (1993, 1999a) Rules both depart from the Nominal 
Interest Rate in a symmetrical way and for both central banks. The Taylor (1993) Rule 
(shown as the green line in both Panel A and B), largely underestimates the level of interest 
rates within the third regime, whereas the Taylor (1999a) Rule (shown as the violet line in 
both Panel A and B) overestimates the level of interest rates. In the ECB case (see Panel 




79 Following partly the criticism of Wu & Xia (2016) I also estimate the Taylor Rules with Overnight 
Interest rates, to take into account the zero-lower bound time period of the ECB. The descriptive analysis is 
available in Appendix C.2. 
177 
 
earlier, whereas observing Taylor (1999a) Rule the level of Nominal Interest Rate should 
have been settled slightly higher at time of economic recovery in 2009, and potentially 
back to the pre-crisis level by 2010.  
 
Furthermore, the Taylor (1999a) Rule suggests a “smoother” cut of interest rates during 
the 4th regime. The two Taylor Rules converge after 2017 (the 5th regime), even though 
both overestimate interest rates. Similarly, for the BOE, the two Taylor (1993, 1999a) 
Rules overestimate interest rates by settling above the Bank Rate at all times. Only the 
Taylor (1993) Rule, as happens for the ECB, underestimate the level of interest rate in the 
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Sources: European Central Bank Website,Bank of England Website,ECB Statistical Data Warehouse,Office for National Statistics,Bloomberg.
Figure 4.5: Ex-Post Data Taylor Rule 
The figure presents the Taylor Rule for the ECB (Panel A) and BOE (Panel B) computed using ex-post 
data. The estimation of the Taylor (1993, 1999a) Rules, following Oet and Lyytinen (2017), is conducted 
as Taylor-type Rule, as suggested by Clarke (2012) and as described by equation [4.5]. The Nominal 
Interest rates are plotted along to the ex-post data Taylor (1993, 1999a) Rules. The regime samples 
computed with Bai-Perron (1998) are also plotted for both institutions. Sample period is (2003–2018) 






first half of the 3rd regime. In the case of the BOE, the two Taylor (1993, 1999a) Rules 
converge in the second half of the 4th regime and smoothly decline into the 5th regime.  
Summing up, and for both central banks, Taylor (1993, 1999a) Rules do a good job in 
explaining the path of Nominal Interest Rates up to the surge of the 2008 financial 
meltdown. However, when the Eurozone had to encounter the sovereign debt crisis in 2011, 
I observe a significant difference in the path of Nominal Interest Rates between the ECB 
and BOE. On the other hand, the BOE had its own unique event at the time of the 2016 
Brexit referendum, which affected its monetary policy.  
Furthermore, I estimate the predicted value of the official interest rate for both institutions 
with forecasted data. Figure 4.6 shows those estimates along with Figure 4.5’s ex–post and  
Nominal Interest Rate series. It’s clear that adding macroeconomic forecasts to Taylor 
(1993) Rule estimates for both central banks we obtain a better explanation of the path of 
Nominal Interest Rates. Taylor (1993) Rule doesn’t underestimate the level of interest rate 
when the 3rd regime begins, but overestimates the level of interest rate after the second half 
of the 3rd regime, particularly in the case of the BOE. On the other hand, the Taylor (1999a) 
Rule systematically overestimates the level of rates for both institutions.  
Lastly, I employ the Taylor (1993) Rule, with forecasted data, to estimate the level of the 
interest rates implied by my Augmented Taylor Rule. To compute my Augmented Taylor 
Rule, I extend equation [4.5] to include my measure of FMSS and I assign to it the same 
coefficient assigned to the output gap (the coefficient for the output gap is equal to 2). As 
shown in Figure 4.7 (Panel A: ECB, Panel B: BOE), the Augmented Taylor Rule does a 
much better job in tracking the path of interest rates of the two central banks. This finding 
parallels the results shown in Oet & Lyytininen (2017), where the Augmented Taylor Rule 
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explains the deviations of interest rates from those implied by the Taylor (1993) Rule, 
particularly during the turbulent times of the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
This study partially departs from the study of Oet & Lyytininen (2017) and I don’t employ 
the Taylor (1999a) Rule to estimate my Augmented Taylor Rule, as in the two previous 
estimates. This (1999a) version of the Taylor Rule overestimates the level of official 
interest rates, regardless of the type of data involved (ex-post or forecasted). It seemed 
natural to exclude this version of the Taylor Rule for the Augmented Taylor Rule, as the 
second mandate of both the ECB and BOE is not the full employment objective but the 
economic growth implied by the output gap. In figure 4.7, I have plotted the Taylor (1993) 
Figure 4.6: Forecasted Data Taylor Rule 
The figure presents the Taylor Rule for the ECB (Panel A) and BOE (Panel B) computed using forecasts. 
The estimation of the Taylor (1993, 1999a) Rules, following Oet and Lyytinen (2017), is conducted as 
Taylor-type Rule, as suggested by Clarke (2012) and as described in equation [4.5]. The Nominal Interest 
Rate series is plotted along both for the ECB and BOE. The regime samples computed with Bai-Perron 
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rule computed forecast data, along with its Augmented version, to show the “progression” 
of the explanatory power of my FMSS variable.  
 
Two important aspects emerge from Figure 4.7. First, although the Taylor (1993) Rule 
computed with forecasted data does a better job in explaining the path of interest rates 
compared to the Taylor (1993) rule estimated with ex-post data, both the specification of 
the Taylor (1993) Rule still overestimate the path of interest rate. Second, when including 
the FMSS variable, the Augmented Taylor Rule mimics the path of the interest rates more 
precisely then both the other specification of the Taylor (1993) Rule. Interestingly in the 
Figure 4.7: The Augmented Taylor Rule 
The figure presents the Augmented Taylor Rule for the ECB (Panel A) and BOE (Panel B) computed 
using forecasts. The Augmented Taylor Rule is computed following the Taylor (1993) Rule and adding 
the FMSS variable (computed as shown in equation [4.4]). The Augmented Taylor Rule is computed with 
a Taylor-type Rule, as suggested by Clarke (2012) and as shown in equation [4.5]. The coefficient for the 
FMSS variables is equal to the coefficient of the output gap. The Augmented Taylor Rules are computed 
with forecasts. The Nominal Interest Rates is plotted along both for the ECB and BOE. The regime 
samples computed with Bai-Perron (1998) are also displayed for both institutions. Sample period is 
(2003–2018) and includes192 monthly observations. 
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case of the BOE, in the 5th regime (after the Brexit vote) the predicted level of interest rates 
accordingly to the Augmented Taylor Rule should have been maintained lower for a longer 
period. In the case of the ECB (Panel A), it still looks as if the Augmented Taylor Rule 
overestimates the level of Nominal Interest Rates.  
The focus of the results in Oet & Lyytininen (2017) is on the performances of their 
Augmented Taylor Rule in the after-crisis period, however my descriptive analysis shows 
that my Augmented Taylor Rule does a decent job in explaining the Nominal Interest 
Rate’s path also in pre-crisis period, particularly in the case of BOE. When considering the 
first regime, the BOE Nominal Interest Rate place itself just between the Taylor (1993) 
Rule with forecasted data and the Augmented Taylor Rule. Moving on to the second 
regime, the Augmented Taylor Rule clearly suggests a lower level of the Nominal Interest 
Rate, whereas the path is almost perfectly explained by the Taylor (1993) Rule with 
forecasted data. These results obviously suggest the forward-looking nature of BOE 
monetary policy conduct, but perhaps they weren’t yet particularly concerned about 
financial markets’ stability.  
In the case of the ECB, the paths suggested by the both the Augmented and the Taylor 
(1993) Rule with forecasted data are slightly more volatile. The Nominal Interest Rate in 
the 1st regime place itself just below both the Taylor rules, suggesting perhaps an even 
more precautionary attitude from the ECB. On the contrary, during the 2nd regime, just in 
the pre-crisis period the Nominal Interest rate is also almost perfectly explained by the 
Taylor (1993) rule and sets above the Augmented Taylor Rule. This result, common to 
both the ECB and BOE could potentially suggest that the FMSS was mildly predicting 
what was about to come. 
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4.5 Empirical Results 
 
Motivated by the hypothesis outlined in section 4.3 and the descriptive analysis in section 
4.4.4, in this section I present the empirical tests to investigate whether an Augmented 
forward-looking Taylor Rule better describes the realised interest rates paths for both the 
ECB and BOE. First, I present my empirical research design and second the related results 
for the whole sample (2003–2018) and the regime subsamples.  
4.5.1 Empirical Research Design 
 
Equations [4.6], [4.7], [4.8] and [4.9] outline the regression models I adopt to test the 
hypotheses of section 4.3: 
rt = r*  + kπ( Πt ) + ky( Yt )       [ 4.6 ] 
rt = r*  + kπ( Π
f
t ) + ky( Y
f
t )       [ 4.7 ] 
rt = r*  + kπ( Πt ) + ky( Yt ) + kFMSS(FMSS)     [ 4.8 ] 
rt = r*  + kπ( Π
f
t ) + ky( Y
f
t ) + kFMSS(FMSS)     [ 4.9 ] 
Where my dependent variable is the level of the Nominal Interest Rate (rt) and the 
explanatory variables are the inflation gap, ex-post (Πt) and forecasted (Π
f), the ex-post 
and forecasted output gap (Yt and Y
f
t) and the FMSS (equations [4.8] and [4.9]). 
The explanatory variables are computed as shown in equation [4.2] in the case of the 
inflation gap, equation [4.3] for the output gap and equation [4.4] for the FMSS variable.  
The analysis is conducted for both institutions for the whole sample period (2003–2018) 
and also across the subsamples computed with the structural breaks’ analysis (section 
4.4.3).  The purpose of this analysis is to estimate the coefficients kπ, ky  and kFMSS to 
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investigate which factors better explain the monetary conduct of the ECB and BOE. The 
factor r* represents the interest rate “in equilibrium” and is a constant factor of value 2%. 
The coefficients of the Taylor Rules are estimated with an OLS methodology, following 
Oet & Lyytinen (2017). OLS estimation of monetary policy can potentially produce 
imprecise estimations of policy parameters, because of endogeneity issues between the 
macroeconomic variables and monetary shocks. Recently, though, Carvalho, Nechio & 
Tristao (2018) find empirical evidence that the OLS methodology is statistically efficient 
to estimate the Taylor Rule, compared to other methodologies such as Instrumental 
Variables (IV). They argue that since the shocks only explain a small fraction of the 
variance of the regressors, the endogeneity bias is small. 
Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1998), use a GMM methodology to estimate monetary policy rules 
for the G-3 and E-3 countries and show that the observed monetary policy is consistent 
with a “smoothing” parameter for the actual level of interest rates. Gorter, Jacobs, & De 
Haan (2008) use a NLS estimation, even though this methodology could potentially yield 
results that are arbitrarily dependent on the starting values of the non-linear procedure. Oet 
& Lyytinen (2017) use an OLS methodology to estimate the Taylor Rule. 
4.5.2 Results 
 
This section presents empirical findings when testing hypotheses as in section 4.3, and 
following the empirical methodology outlined in section 4.5.1. 
4.5.2.1 Whole Sample Results (2003–2018)  
 
Panel A of Table 4.1 presents the ECB results and Panel B shows the findings for the BOE. 
“EP” columns (1, 3, 5 and 7) are regression models that use ex-post data, whereas “F” 
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columns (2, 4, 6 and 8) use forecasts. Columns (3) and (4) for the ECB and (7) and (8) for 
the BOE present regression results when the financial market stability variable is included.  
The results in Table 4.1 are for the 2003–2018 time series. In both central banks' cases, 
they show clearly that by using forecasts we may better explain the observed interest rate 
pattern. For the ECB case (see Panel A), the estimate of forecasted inflation is three times 
higher than the coefficient of ex-post inflation, the regression R2 is consistently higher, and 
RMSE is much lower. Interestingly, the results of both equations [4.6] and [4.7] show that 
the output variable, either observed or forecasted, is statistically insignificant. Estimates of 
regressions [4.8] and [4.9] indicate that the FMSS coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant, as is the economic slack. For the BOE case (see Panel B), the estimate for the 
kπ ex-post coefficient is positive, whereas the estimate for the forecasted kπ is negative. The 
estimated coefficients for the ky coefficient are statistically significant for both banks, 
although the size of forecasted variables estimates are much higher than in the case of ex-
post data.  Similar to Gerlach (2007), the results of columns 1 and 2 highlight that 
expectations about output growth play an important role in the ECB interest rate decisions. 
Gorter, Jacobs, & De Haan (2008) also find similar results in the case of the ECB, whereas 
the results in columns (5) and (6) shed new light on the conduct of monetary policy in the 
BOE.80 Consistent with Svensson’s critiques (2003, 2010, 2019) both institutions follow a 
forward-looking (Bernanke, 2015) monetary policy.  Similarly, to the ECB, the 




80 To the best of my knowledge, there aren’t any studies which effectively compare ex-post and forecasted 
data in the context of BOE monetary policy. 
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and [4.8]. Interestingly, the FMSS coefficient is significant, in the case of the BOE only 
when considering ex-post data. These results can be due to the closer attention that the 
BOE gives towards forecasted economic variables, in particular to inflation, given the strict 
commitments that the BOE has towards the government in maintaining a stable inflation 
rate.   
Table 4.1: Results - Whole Sample: 1:2003–12:2018 
 Y = rt  Panel A: ECB  Panel B: BOE  
  EP (1) F (2) EP (3) F (4) EP (5) F (6) EP (7) F (8) 
r* 0.870*** 1.345*** 0.936*** 1.520*** 1.280*** 2.321*** 1.426*** 2.327*** 
 (0.052) (0.073) (0.058) (0.077) (0.090) (0.138) (0.108) (0.140) 
kπ 0.980*** 3.067*** 0.953*** 3.032*** 0.480*** -1.805*** 0.437*** -1.762*** 
 (0.092) (0.263) (0.091) (0.248) (0.168) (0.637) (0.167) (0.659) 
ky 0.037 0.278 0.104* 0.642*** 0.266*** 3.129*** 0.359*** 3.129*** 
 (0.047) (0.179) (0.055) (0.184) (0.078) (0.333) (0.086) (0.334) 
kFMSS 
  0.747** 1.292***   1.158** 0.098 
   (0.314) (0.257)   (0.488) (0.371) 
R2 0.656 0.711 0.666 0.745 0.567 0.697 0.580 0.697 
MAPE 2.535 4.249 2.653 4.755 1.908 1.453 1.800 1.461 
RMSE 1.223 1.122 1.205 1.054 2.047 1.713 2.017 1.712 
Obsv 192 
Note: Table 4.3 presents the results for both hypotheses, across the whole sample period. Panel A presents 
the results related to the ECB and Panel B presents the results related to BOE. The dependent variable (rt) is 
represented by the monthly time series of the EURIBOR and LIBOR for the ECB and BOE respectively. 
Estimates for the inflation gap (kπ) are presented for both institutions, computed with both ex-post and 
forecasted data. Similar estimates are made for the economic slack (ky) and financial market stability slack ( 
kFMSS ). Panel A presents the results for the ECB, Panel B presents the results for the BOE. In Panel A, 
columns (1) and (3) present the results of equations [4.5] and [4.7], computed considering ex-post data, 
whereas columns (2) and (4) present the results of equations [4.6] and [4.8] computed considering forecasted 
data. Columns (3) and (4) present the results including the FMSS variable. Similarly, Panel B, columns (5) 
and (7) presents the results of equations [4.5] and [4.7], computed considering ex-post data, whereas columns 
(6) and (8) present the results of equations [4.6] and [4.8] computed considering forecasted data. Columns 
(7) and (8) present the results including the financial market stability variable. Standard errors for the 
estimates are presented in brackets. For each regression, the R2, the Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) 
and the Residual Mean Square Error (RMSE) are presented. 
Signif. codes:   ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1  
Source:  ECB website (www.ecb.europa.eu), ECB statistical Data Warehouse (sdw.ecb.europa.eu), BOE 
website (www.bankofengland.co.uk), The Office for National Statistics Website (www.ons.gov.uk), the 
OECD Website (www.oecd.org) and Bloomberg. 
 
Overall, comparing the results between the two institutions, it’s clear that Financial Market 
Stability (FMSS*) played a role in the setting of monetary policy for the ECB and partly 
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for the BOE. The stronger result in the case of the ECB could be due to the 2011 sovereign 
debt crisis, which certainly was an unprecedented experience in the management of 
Eurozone monetary policy. My results are also aligned with findings in Botzen & Marey 
(2010), who show that the ECB responded to stock market prices even prior to the financial 
crisis. The coefficient related to the equilibrium interest rate ( r* ) remains positive and 
statistically significant in all my regression models. Although I haven’t included any 
interest rates smoothing factor as in Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1998), this result clearly states 
that institutions are concerned about the equilibrium level of interest rates and will consider 
the current level of such interest rates when deciding a monetary policy innovation.  
4.5.2.2 Regime Samples Analysis 
 
Table 4.2 presents empirical results across different regimes samples. In order to discover 
the explanatory power of different monetary policy rules, in Table 4.2, I compare the R2 of 
equations [4.6], [4.7], [4.8] and [4.9] across different regime samples. Time regime 
samples were constructed using the Bai–Parron (1998) method. They find that the FOMC 
changed their way of conducting policy so that different monetary policy rules explain 
differently the conduct of US monetary policy. Panel A of Table 4.2 presents results for 
the ECB and Panel B for the BOE. In columns (1) and (5) are reported  the coefficients’ 
estimates of equation [4.6] using ex–post data, whereas, in columns (2) and (6), I present 
regression estimates for equation [4.7], which is run using forecasted data. Estimates of 
equation [4.8] are displayed in columns (3) and (7), while equation [4.9] results are 
reported in columns (4) and (8). 
The results related to the ECB (Panel A) show clearly multiple deviations in the preferences 
of the ECB monetary policy makers. Specifically, the regression model in column (4) 
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(equation [4.7]) R2 is highest in the first regime sample which spans the time period 2003 
to the middle of 2006. This result is consistent with the ECB decision to join the IT 
framework. However, column (4) R2 is decreasing across the regime samples. Focusing on 
the last 3 years of monetary policy (the 5th regime sample), the traditional Taylor (1993) 
Rule explains less the 70% of interest rate variations. Similarly, the traditional Taylor 
(1993) Rule loses some of its explanatory power in the case of BOE with 1st regime R2 at 
0.99 compared to a 5th regime an R2 of 0.95.  
To put these results in the right perspective we have to interpret the difference between the 
inflation gap computed using either historical data or forecasts. As shown in Figure 4.1, 
Panel A, the ECB inflation gap when considering historical data ranges from -2% to +2%, 
which means that the ECB has missed its target by the same amount of the actual target. 
For the BOE (see Panel B), I observe a similar pattern with the inflation gap ex- post data, 
which ranges from -2% to +3%. What is different between the two banks is the forecasts 
for the inflation gap. In the case of BOE, the forecasted inflation gap is more frequently 
closed to 0. These differences support the view that the ECB forecasts are closer to the 
realised data then the BOE forecasts. A possible explanation of these differences could be 
linked to the BOE’s stricter regulation in missing the inflation target. As inflation forecasts 
are known in advance of BOE policy decisions, the “notice” obligation could have an 
influence in opinions of the forecasters, whenever the inflation target might be missed. 
Turning to the role of the FMSS, two results are common for the two banks: the variable 
is statistically significant in explaining their monetary policy at times of the 3rd regime. As 
shown in Table 4.2, the R2 of equation [4.8] is the highest across the last three regime 
samples. Surprisingly, when inserting the FMSS, forecasts of macroeconomic variables 
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lose their explanatory power. There could be alternative explanations for this result. First, 
forecasts of macroeconomic indicators, even though they are transformed, are conceptually 
at a lower frequency and variability then ex-post data.  
Table 4.2 : Regime Samples Analysis - Results         
  Panel A: ECB Panel B: BOE 
 EP (1) F (2) EP (3) F (4) EP (5) F (6) EP (7) F (8) 
  Regime 1: M1:2003-M6:2006 Regime 1: M1: 2003 - M4:2006 
R2 0.992 0.994 0.993 0.995 0.993 0.998 0.997 0.998 
MAPE 0.069 0.059 0.063 0.059 0.071 0.039 0.049 0.034 
RMSE 0.210 0.177 0.188 0.154 0.365 0.197 0.253 0.173 
  Regime 2: M7:2006 - M12:2008 Regime 2: M5: 2006 - M10:2008 
R2 0.987 0.983 0.987 0.983 0.991 0.997 0.995 0.997 
MAPE 0.094 0.116 0.094 0.115 0.079 0.040 0.060 0.039 
RMSE 0.492 0.563 0.490 0.561 0.533 0.296 0.418 0.285 
  Regime 3: M1:2009 - M12: 2011 Regime 3: M11:2008 - M11: 2011 
R2 0.949 0.870 0.966 0.908 0.932 0.899 0.953 0.917 
MAPE 0.168 0.360 0.161 0.294 0.224 0.281 0.161 0.283 
RMSE 0.270 0.431 0.222 0.363 0.280 0.342 0.232 0.310 
  Regime 4: M1:2012 - M4:2015 Regime 4: M12:2011 - M6:2016 
R2 0.970 0.887 0.973 0.938 0.960 0.943 0.968 0.957 
MAPE 0.390 0.542 0.370 0.496 0.163 0.153 0.149 0.151 
RMSE 0.147 0.285 0.138 0.211 0.129 0.154 0.116 0.134 
  Regime 5: M5:2015 - M12 2018 Regime 5: M7:2016 - M12: 2018 
R2 0.678 0.552 0.700 0.553 0.957 0.944 0.960 0.957 
MAPE 1.029 2.207 1.144 2.233 0.172 0.205 0.158 0.160 
RMSE 0.149 0.175 0.144 0.175 0.116 0.132 0.111 0.116 
Note: Table 4.4 presents the results of the model horse race across the regime samples analysis 
for the ECB and BOE. Panel A presents the results for the ECB and Panel B presents the results 
for the BOE. The regime sample analysis is based on the structural breaks’ analysis conducted as 
explained in detail in section 4.4.3. The regime sample analysis was conducted setting a minimum 
segment length of h * N, where h is a parameter of 0.15 and N is the total number of observations. 
In Panel A, columns (1) and (3) present the results of equations [4.6] and [4.8] (ex-post data), 
whereas columns (2) and (4) present the coefficients’ estimates for equations [4.7] and [4.9] 
(forecasted data).. Columns (3) and (4) present the results including the FMSS. Similarly, Panel 
B, columns (5) and (7) presents the results of equations [4.6] and [4.8] (ex-post data), whereas 
columns (6) and (8) present the results of equations [4.7] and [4.9] (forecasted data). Columns (7) 
and (8) present the results including the FMSS. For each regime sample analysis, the R2, the Mean 
Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) and the Residual Mean Square Error (RMSE) are presented. 
The R2 coefficients highlighted in bold represent the highest R2 within the regime. 
Source:  ECB website (www.ecb.europa.eu), ECB statistical Data Warehouse 
(sdw.ecb.europa.eu), BOE website (www.bankofengland.co.uk), The Office for National 





Second, as I noted earlier, the historical inflation gap time series has higher volatility 
(Figure 4.1), which may affect the consistency of regression estimates. The third motive 
for my finding may be linked to the behavior of forecasters specifically at the time of 
economic shocks. Lansing & Pyle (2015) have studied FOMC members’ economic 
forecasts and observed that their economic growth forecasts have been systematically high 
and revised afterwards. Although I have no knowledge of empirical evidence on the ECB 
and BOE monetary policy member forecast ability,81 a possible explanation of my results 
could be similar to the American case, and so during downturns, macroeconomic 
expectations are systematically overestimated and revised afterwards when more hard data 
become available. 
4.5.2.3 Dissecting Financial Market Stability 
 
In this section, I examine whether further financial market factors have a significant 
influence on the two banks decision making process.  In particular, other factors could be 
the dynamics of international financial markets and exchange rates. There are a few reasons 
to think that this could be the case. First, in Taylor (1999b), the exchange rates’ market has 
been given its importance in central banking in the setting of the interest rate. Taylor (2001) 
asserts that more research is needed to understand the implication of monetary policy rules 
that directly target exchange rates.  
Lubik & Schorfheide (2007) found evidence that the BOE and BOC included nominal 




81 To the best of my knowledge 
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do not target exchange rates. Second, as ECB President Mario Draghi announced in the 
famous statement of July 2012, there has been a strong commitment to supporting 
Eurozone economies through both conventional and unconventional central banking 
policies. Third, as I mentioned earlier, there is evidence that the FED has an impact on the 
monetary policy of other central banks (Caputo & Herrera, 2017).   
Further support of the idea that financial markets are key to central banking is the study of 
Bekaert, Hoerova, & Lo Duca (2013) who find a high correlation between the FED 
monetary policy and the VIX Index. Thus, to take into account all the above I add to my 
regression models the FMSS variable for the US82, in order to analyse whether outcomes 
from international financial markets have any influence on the two banks’ monetary policy 
decision makers.  
In what follows, I set-up equations [4.10] and [4.11] to formally test those intuitions:  
rt = r*  + kπ( Πt ) + ky( Yt ) + kFMSS(FMSS) +  
kFMSS_US(FMSS_US) + kEX(EX)      [ 4.10 ] 
 
rt = r*  + kπ( Π
f
t ) + ky( Y
f
t ) + kFMSS(FMSS) +  
kFMSS_US(FMSS_US) + kEX(EX)      [ 4.11 ] 
 
where the variables included in both equations are the same as the one include in equations 




82 The FMSS variable for the US is built following the same logic as the FMSS variable employed for both 
the ECB and BOE. Specifically, the deviation FMSS is computed as the deviation of the current financial 
markets condition (σt) and their long-run “stability state” (Σ) as presented in euqation [4.4]. Where the Σ is 
computed as the average level of the VIX index in the pre-crisis period (2000-2007) and σt as the current 
level of the VIX index. 
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the exchange rate between either EURO and USD (for the ECB) or GBP and USD (for the 
BOE). The results for equations [4.10] and [4.11] are presented in Table 4.3. 
Consistent with my previous results, when forecasts are added to the regression models 
explanatory power of ex–post data changes when analysing the whole sample or regime 
samples. Again, this result could be explained by a small sample bias which originates 
from the low frequency of the forecast data. Regression models in Table 4.3 highlight the 
significant impact of the exchange rates market in monetary policy decisions. As Ball 
(1999) proposes, in small open economies, adding exchange rate dynamics in central 
banking decisions, could help improve macroeconomic performances.  
On the other hand, Taylor (1999b) has found that in the case of ECB adding exchange rates 
in the multi-country model doesn’t dominate the baseline model. Consistent with Taylor’s 
(1999b) findings, although the exchange rate (Euro-US Dollar Exchange Rate) is 
statistically significant and the coefficient is the greatest in magnitude, the results related 
to the inflation and output gaps (ex-post and forecasted) remain robust. Differently, in the 
case of the BOE, when adding the exchange rate as a control variable the coefficient related 
to the forecasted inflation gap remains robust, whereas the forecasted output slack is not 
statistically significant. A possible explanation for such a result can be the additional 
protection that the BOE had to dispose for the British Pound, particularly during the recent 
events regarding Brexit. 
The coefficients of the “FMSS_US” variable represent an important and interesting result. 
The FMSS_US variable is statistically significant for the ECB, both when analyzing ex-
post and forecasted macroeconomic variables. The financial market stability variable of 
the EU becomes statistically insignificant when combined with the US variable. On the 
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other hand, in the case of the BOE, when considering forecasted variables, the US financial 
market stability is not statistically significant. This result can be interpreted as a greater 
concern of the ECB for the US financial markets compared to the BOE  
Table 4.3  : Dissecting Financial Market Stability - 1:2003–12:2018 
  Panel A: ECB Panel B: BOE 
  EP (1) F (2) EP (3) F (4) 
r* 
0.685***                               1.238*** 1.496*** 1.397*** 
(0.077) (0.073) (0.061) -0.11 
kπ 
0.678*** 2.226*** 0.112 1.159** 
(0.092) (0.207) (0.096) -0.495 
ky 
0.239*** 1.266*** 0.047 -0.249 
(0.053) (0.155) (0.053) -0.308 
kEX 
-4.262*** -5.096*** -8.325*** -9.215*** 
(0.793) (0.593) (0.420) (0.600) 
kFMSS 
0.044 0.253 1.423** 1.196* 
(0.612) (0.466) (0.705) (0.710) 
kFMSS_US 
1.099* 1.189*** -1.294* -0.982 
(0.599) (0.451) (0.722) (0.713) 
R2 0.733 0.845 0.867 0.878 
MAPE 2.675 2.34 1.134 1.123 
RMSE 1.079 0.821 1.211 1.168 
Observations 192 
Note: The table presents the results for both hypotheses, across the whole sample 
period. Panel A presents the results related to the ECB and Panel B presents the results 
related to the BOE. The dependent variable (r*) is represented by the monthly time 
series of the EURIBOR and LIBOR for the ECB and BOE respectively. Estimates for 
the inflation gap (kπ) are presented for both institutions, computed with both ex-post 
and forecasted data. Similarly estimates for the economic slack (ky), the exchange rate 
slack (kER), financial market stability slack (kFMSS) and the US financial market stability 
slack (kFMSS_US). Panel A presents the results for the ECB, Panel B presents the results 
for the BOE. In Panel A, columns 1 presents the results of equation [4.10] (ex-post 
data), whereas column (2) presents the results of equation [4.11] (forecast data). In 
Panel B, column (3) presents the results of equation [4.10] (ex-post data), whereas 
column (4) presents the results of equation [4.11] (forecast data). Standard errors for 
the estimates are presented in brackets. For each regression, the R2, the Mean Absolute 
Percentage Error (MAPE) and the Residual Mean Square Error (RMSE) are presented. 
Signif. codes:   ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1  
Source:  ECB website (www.ecb.europa.eu), ECB statistical Data Warehouse 
(sdw.ecb.europa.eu), BOE website (www.bankofengland.co.uk), The Office for 
National Statistics Website (www.ons.gov.uk), the OECD Website (www.oecd.org) 




Overall, regression models which include forecasts dominate models that rely on historical 
data, which further confirms empirical results of the previous section. The evidence is 
particularly stronger in the case of the ECB when focusing on the two models different R2: 
0.73 when using ex-post data and 0.85 when including forecasts. In the case of the BOE, 
that difference is smaller although even for the BOE the forecasted inflation rate remains 
highly significant. Lastly, financial market stability remains a matter of concern for the two 
central banks, although in a different way. The ECB and BOE are certainly keen to manage 
their currencies and maintain financial market stability. Moreover, “international” financial 
market stability also plays a role in interest rates’ setting, particularly at the ECB. This 
result can be reconciled with the willingness of the institutions, in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, to re-establish trust among investors and financial institutions.  
4.6 Limitations 
 
This chapter suffers from three important limitations. First, it doesn’t address two 
important elements of the conduct of the ECB monetary policy: first, no measure of 
unconventional monetary policy has been taken into account in my empirical design. 
Follow-up research could focus on identifying high-quality variables that may well depict 
the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy measures adopted in the last decade. Second, 
another factor that added to Eurozone financial market instability has been the sovereign 
debt crisis of 2010–2011. That event requires that appropriate proxies of European fixed 
income market dynamics be identified. Carrying out that research could help shed some 
light on the factors that affected Eurozone financial market volatility in 2011, and what 
role the ECB played in heavy market intervention.  
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Furthermore, the analysis of the present chapter is run by adapting quarterly and monthly 
data, with a potential bias arising from the different sample data frequencies. Recently, 
other monthly forecasted data have become available. Datasets such as the “Consensus 
Economic Forecasts” from Bloomberg are forecasts data from professional forecasters and 
market participants and are available at a monthly frequency. These data could help 
enhance the precisions of the estimates. Even though the OLS methodology has proven to 
be adequate for the investigation of this research question, perhaps additional estimation 
with a more complete dataset would further corroborate the findings of this chapter. 
Last but not least, the FMSS variable only considers a source of financial instability. It 
would, however, be beneficial for the relevance of the research to further expand the 
definition to financial stability. Oet & Lyytinen (2017) include several measures of 
financial stability, including all those discussed in the minutes of the FOMC. The same 
sources of financial stability could be retrieved for both the ECB and BOE, validating the 
results and deepening the analysis. 
4.7 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I contribute to the debate on central banking by proposing a forward-
looking Augmented Taylor (1993) Rule to investigate the conduct of monetary policy for 
the ECB and BOE. My study covers a long time series, 2003–2018, which encompasses 
both the US financial crisis of 2008 and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis of 2011. The 
question on whether financial market stability, as a subset of financial stability, should be 
included in the mandate of central banks, has been largely discussed among academics and 
practitioners ever since the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Many studies have argued 
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theoretically and empirically on this matter, although no definitive consensus has been 
reached. Furthermore, monetary policy makers have put a great deal of efforts in the last 
decade into producing and communicating macroeconomic forecasts to clarify the conduct 
of monetary policy. My results highlight two important findings, first, the Augmented 
Taylor (1993) Rule dominates the traditional version of the Taylor (1993) Rule. 
Furthermore, a forward-looking version of the Taylor (1993) Rule also better explains the 
monetary policy conduct of both institutions across the whole sample period (2003–2018). 
The Augmented version of the Taylor (1993) Rule dominates the traditional version of the 
rule across regime samples, particularly after the 2008 financial crisis, confirming for both 
ECB and BOE the available evidence for the FED as in Oet & Lyytinen (2017). Thus, also 
in the case of the ECB and BOE, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, financial stability 
variable explains the deviations of the realised interest rates from the interest rates implied 
by the traditional Taylor (1993) Rule. The case of ECB is particularly interesting, where I 
find that not only the EU financial market stability matter but also the US financial market 
stability. This may also be an indication of both the large openness of Eurozone economies 
compared to the US economy but also of its dependence on the US economy. Bekaert, 
Hoerova, & Lo Duca (2013) have hinted that such a relation is showing up in the data: they 
found that the US stock market volatility co-moves with the measure of US monetary 
policy. Furthermore, Caputo & Herrera (2017) found that IT central banks respond to the 
movement of the FED interest rate. My results reconcile that evidence when I find that the 
US financial market stability variable, proxied by the deviation of the VIX Index from its 
long-term pre-crisis mean, mattered in the ECB monetary policy decisions. 
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My results are in line with those of Gorter, Jacobs, & De Haan (2008), showing that an 
extended forward-looking Taylor (1993) Rule dominates the traditional version of the 
Taylor (1993) Rule. These findings are also consistent with Svensson’s (2003, 2010, 2019) 
critiques, who has been arguing for more forward-looking macroeconomic variables in 
assisting central bank decisions. However, when I subject my regression models to 
different regime samples, forward-looking regression models do not supersede models that 
rely on ex-post data. A possible explanation for this result is a small sample bias and the 























5.1 Summary and Implications 
 
This thesis deals with three issues related to the reciprocal influence between monetary 
policy and financial markets. The first chapter introduces the motivation to my study and 
gives and overview of my research questions and contributions to the literature. The second 
chapter analyses the expectations of investors with regards to FOMC monetary policy 
announcements and how these expectations influence their reaction once the 
announcements reach the equity market. To infer the expectations of market participants I 
extended the pioneer methodology of Kuttner (2001) and computed the daily probabilities, 
assigned by market participants, of interest rate changes. Further, I combined these 
probabilities with the outcome of the announcements, to investigate whether the outcome 
was in line with the expectations of market participants.  
The analysis suggests that financial market participants react strongly to FOMC 
announcements that are not in line with their expectations, whereas the reaction to expected 
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outcomes is already embedded in equity prices. In addition, the empirical analysis focuses 
on specific FOMC announcements where no interest rate change is voted by the committee, 
to corroborate the previous results, by showing that the expectations of investors on the 
outcome are the drivers of their reactions and not the outcome itself. Equity investors 
display, in fact, an even strong reaction when they disagree with neutral monetary policy 
outcomes, which can be explained by the additional uncertainty that arises when the FOMC 
decides to leave the level of interest rates unchanged.  
These findings offer significant implications for a broad range of financial applications and 
policy makers’ guidance. My results provide an alternative explanation to the equity 
premium, documented by the literature around macroeconomic announcements. Monetary 
economists attribute the premium to the unexpected component of interest rate changes, 
which, however, doesn’t entirely explain the reaction to the announcement, where no 
interest rate is voted. My results provide an explanation that satisfies both the monetary 
economist and macroeconomic announcements literature streams, by attributing the equity 
effect to the expectations of investors, postulated prior to the announcement and realised 
on the announcement day. Furthermore, although central banks and monetary policy 
institutions’ communication has largely improved in the past two decades, the fact that 
investors still strongly react to monetary policy and macroeconomic announcements shows 
that the alignment of investors’ expectations with monetary policy conduct can be 
improved. Lastly, my results provide evidence that the response of equity to the 
announcement is in line with the CAPM predictions.  
The third chapter investigates the effect of the ECB monetary policy shocks on Eurozone 
macroeconomic variables. Earlier studies failed to correctly investigate the effect of 
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monetary policy on the economy, because of the concurrence of effects. Monetary policy 
is affected by the economy, as macroeconomic variables are the main drivers of policy 
makers’ decisions. At the same time, the conduct of monetary policy conduct affects the 
economy. Researchers face two econometric challenges when investigating the effects of 
monetary policy on the economy: endogeneity and anticipatory effects.  
I overcome these issues by applying the narrative methodology of Romer & Romer (2004) 
and providing a new series of monetary shocks for the ECB. I depart from their 
methodology by adding an unconventional monetary policy control variable to take into 
account the unconventional monetary policies put in place by the ECB in the past two 
decades. The monetary shocks series is estimated by identifying the unexpected component 
of the main refinancing operations’ (MRO) interest rate changes. To do so, I collect a novel 
database of forecasts and real-time variables to disentangle the expected component, 
represented by the information set of policy makers at the meeting date, and the unexpected 
component. The unexpected component is extracted with a first-stage VAR regression.  
I also estimate the effects on Eurozone inflation and industrial production and I find that 
industrial production is more responsive then inflation and displays an overall decline of 
almost 1% 24 months after the shock. The response of inflation is weaker with an overall 
decline of 0.05%. The effects are estimated with a second-stage VAR, to make my results 
as comparable as possible to the literature, and with linear local projections (LPs) to 
overcome the data constraints of my small sample. I further estimate the effects of the 
shocks on the inflation and industrial production of single members of the Eurozone: 
Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal. Overall the results on single countries 
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inflation and industrial production are rather heterogeneous, which is relevant for policy 
makers, as they aim to affect the Eurozone economy homogenously. 
These results offer a direct implication for the Eurozone economy and show the potential 
medium-term effects of a contractionary monetary policy. Although the response of 
inflation is close to 0, the heterogeneity of the effects among the countries, offers an 
important implication. Heterogeneous effects show that monetary policy makers should 
acknowledge countries' differences when deciding towards a monetary policy innovation 
and that single country data should be taken into consideration along with whole union 
data. 
The fourth chapter takes the opposite angle from the second and the third chapters, and 
analyses the influence of financial markets on monetary policy makers’ decisions. In 
particular, I investigate whether financial market stability has been a source of concern for 
both the ECB and BOE. To do so, I show that the Augmented Taylor (1993) Rule, which 
includes a financial markets’ stability variable, better explains the path followed by the 
ECB and BOE interest rate across the 2003–2018 sample period. The question as to 
whether financial markets stability should be a source of concern has been long debated 
among both academics and practitioners. This chapter doesn’t aim to assess whether it is 
efficient for monetary institutions to include financial markets’ stability. On the contrary, 
it aims to assess whether it has already entered their discussions. 
The Taylor (1993) Rule framework represented the first computationally “easy” Rule that 
directly linked the value of inflation and economic growth to the interest rate level. The 
Taylor (1993) Rule has been unofficially used by many institutions worldwide, although 
largely criticised for the limited amount of information that is included in its formula. 
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Taylor (1999b) provided a revised version of his formula, extending it to include exchange 
rates, which are also included in my empirical analysis. I estimate the predicted values of 
interest rates for both the ECB and BOE according to the Taylor (1993) Rule, showing 
descriptively that the deviations from realised interest rates can be explained by including 
a financial market stability slack (FMSS) variable. Additionally, following the critiques 
raised by Svensson (2003, 2010, 2019) I provide descriptive and empirical evidence that 
monetary policy makers are driven by forecasts when deciding about monetary policy 
innovations.  
The results show a direct implication on the influence that financial markets stability can 
have on the decision of policy makers. As can be inferred from the predicted values of the 
Taylor (1993) Rules, interest rate, particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, 
could have been maintained fairly higher in the case of both the ECB and BOE. In fact, the 
overall turmoil of international financial markets convinced monetary policy makers 
worldwide to make a joint effort in re-establishing trust in the institutions and boosting the 
economy with both conventional and unconventional monetary policies. Overall, this leads 
to the conclusion that despite the lack of “official recognition” financial market stability 
has already entered the discussion of monetary policy makers. 
5.2 Directions for Future Research 
 
All three chapters deal with the mutual influence between financial markets and monetary 
policy. The empirical findings and limitations reported in each chapter identify areas for 
future research and extension. The second chapter infers the expectations of investors 
extending the methodology of Kuttner (2001) that computes the difference between the 
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FED Funds Futures and the Effective Federal Funds rate. This analysis yields efficient 
results to investigate the expectations about future interest rate changes, although is 
inefficient in providing information on the “expected direction” of interest rate changes. A 
more complete analysis of market expectations would be subject to the availability of high- 
frequency and option metrics’ data.  
An additional source of concern is the additional macroeconomic announcements that arise 
in the closed time-window around the announcement and can potentially bias market 
expectations. My methodology extends Kuttner’s (2001) work by including the whole 
week of data before the announcement to infer investors’ expectations. Although this 
presents a contribution to the methodology, it could also raise potential doubts on the 
information that reaches investors throughout the week. On the positive side, investors’ 
expectations are more representative by including more data, as the set of information of 
investors is obviously larger. It would be interesting, however, to investigate further the set 
of information available to investors during the week that precedes the announcement. 
Furthermore, my analysis is limited to the US financial market and the FOMC 
announcements. Further research might wish to explore similarities in results in other 
countries. 
The third chapter also offers different angles for future research. The main limitation of 
this chapter is the lack of data given the “young age” of the ECB. Future research can 
overcome these data constraints and provide a more complete and precise analysis on the 
long-term effects of monetary shocks on macroeconomic variable. A further limitation of 
my study is the use of Survey of Professional Forecasters data, which are only available 
quarterly. Recently, other source of forecasts data have become available at a monthly 
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frequency, which could increase the precision in estimating the information set available 
to policy makers at the meeting date. The analysis could be executed by accessing the 
Economic Consensus Data available on Bloomberg.  
The fourth and final chapter also offers several opportunities for future research. Similarly 
to the third chapter, this research suffers from data availability limitations, which are more 
compelling when comparing forecasts with ex-post data. Also, in this case, Consensus 
Economic data will largely improve the precision of the empirical analysis along with the 
inclusion of a variable that represents unconventional monetary policies in the Taylor 
(1993) Rule framework.  
A further important limitation of this chapter that I plan to tackle in the future is extending 
the research to “financial stability”, instead of financial markets stability and provide a 
more comprehensive analysis of the sources of financial stability, that affect the decisions 
of the ECB and BOE monetary policy makers. Oet & Lyytinen (2017) include several 
variables in their analysis. The definition of “financial stability” is rather broad, although 









































Appendix A – Chapter 2  
 
Table A.1 – Macroeconomic Variables Summary Statistics 
The table presents the summary statistics for the macroeconomic variables included in the 
empirical analysis section 2.6.2. The variables included are the unemployment rate, the 12-
months change in the industrial production index and the 12-month change in the CPI. The 
summary statistics presented for each sample of equity returns are the number of days 
considered (“N”), the simple average (“µ”), the variance (“Σ”), the median (“median”), the 
minimum value (“min) and the maximum value (“max”). Values are presented in 
percentage( %). 
Sources: FRED Economic Data, fred.stlouisfed.org. 
 
 N μ median max min Σ 
Unemployment rate 161 6.253 5.700 9.900 3.900 3.061 
Unemployment rate (Δ) 161 0.134 0.000 12.308 -7.463 9.948 
Industrial Production index 
(12-months log change) 
161 0.172 0.929 3.292 -7.161 4.206 


















Table A.2 –NBER Dummy Variable 
The table presents the time series of the “NBER dummy variable” included in my analysis, 
across the 2000–2016 sample period. This time series is an interpretation of US Business 
Cycle Expansions and Contractions data provided by The National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER). The NBER identifies months and quarters of turning points without 
designating a date within the period that the turning points occurred. A value of 1 is a 
recessionary period, while a value of 0 is an expansionary period.  
Sources: FRED Economic Data, fred.stlouisfed.org  
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
2000  0 0  0 0  0  0 0 0 
2001 0  0 1 1 1  1  1 1 0 
2002 0  0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
2003 0  0 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 
2004 0  0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
2005  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
2006 0  0  0 0  0 0 0  0 
2007 0  0  0 0  0 0 0  0 
2008 1  1 1  1 1 1 1 1  1 
2009 1 1 1 1  1  0 0  0 0 
2010 0  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
2011 0  0 0  0  0 0  0 0 
2012 0  0 0  0  0 0 0  0 
2013 0  0  0 0 0  0 0  0 
2014 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 
2015 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 












Table A.3 – Tight Cycle Dummy Variable 
The table presents the time series of the “Tight Cycle Dummy Variable” employed in my 
analysis across the 2000–2016 sample period. This time series is a dummy variable, similar 
to the one employed by Lucca & Moench (2015), constructed on the basis of the average 
level of the Federal Funds Target Rate. The variable takes value 1, on the months where 
the average level of Federal Funds Target Rate is above 2%. The 2% threshold is based on 
the assumption of Taylor (1993), who stated that 2% is the equilibrium interest rate level 
for the United States.  
Sources: Federal Reserve website (www.federalreserve.gov)   
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
2000  1 1  1 1  1  1 1 1 
2001 1  1 1 1 1  1  0 0 0 
2002 0  0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
2003 0  0 0 0 0  0 0 0  1 
2004 1  1  1 1  1 1  1 1 
2005  1 1  1 1  1 1  1 1 
2006 1  1  1 1  1 1 1  1 
2007 1  1  0 0  0 0 0  0 
2008 0  0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 
2009 0 0 0 0  0  0 0  0 0 
2010 0  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
2011 0  0 0  0  0 0  0 0 
2012 0  0 0  0  0 0 0  0 
2013 0  0  0 0 0  0 0  0 
2014 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 
2015 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 













Table A.4 – Easy Cycle Dummy Variable 
The table presents the time series of the “Easy Cycle Dummy Variable” employed in my 
analysis across the 2000–2016 sample period. This time series is a dummy variable, similar 
to the one employed by Lucca & Moench (2015), constructed on the basis of the average 
level of the Federal Funds Target rate. The variable takes the value 1, in the months where 
the average level of the Federal Funds Target rate is below 2%. The 2% threshold is based 
on the assumption of Taylor (1993), who stated that 2% is the equilibrium interest rate 
level for the United States.  
Sources: Federal Reserve website (www.federalreserve.gov)   
 
  Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
2000  0 0  0 0  0  0 0 0 
2001 0  0 0 0 0  0  1 1 1 
2002 1  1  1 1  1 1  1 1 
2003 1  1 1 1 1  1 1 1  0 
2004 0  0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
2005  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
2006 0  0  0 0  0 0 0  0 
2007 0  0  1 1  1 1 1  1 
2008 1  1 1  1 1 1 1 1  1 
2009 1 1 1 1  1  1 1  1 1 
2010 1  1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 
2011 1  1 1  1  1 1  1 1 
2012 1  1 1  1  1 1 1  1 
2013 1  1  1 1 1  1 1  1 
2014 1  1 1  1 1  1 1  1 
2015 1  1 1  1 1  1 1  1 













Table A.5 – Kuttner Surprise 
The table presents the Kuttner (2001) surprises across the whole sample period (2000–
2016) and for each of the 161 FOMC announcements included in my analysis. The 
surprises are computed following the pioneer methodology of Kuttner (2001) and further 
employed by Bernanke & Kuttner (2005).  
Sources: Federal Reserve website (www.federalreserve.gov)  and Quandl Database. 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 
2000  -0.054 -0.031  0.052 0.075 
2001 -5.347  0.060 -0.205 -0.078 0.072 
2002 0.000  -0.031  0.000 0.000 
2003 -0.077  0.063 0.128 0.075 -0.180 
2004 0.375  0.093  0.012 3.300 
2005  -0.108 0.327  -0.022 5.115 
2006 6.200  1.912  -0.266 1.500 
2007 -0.465  0.033  -0.049 0.290 
2008 -4.482  0.448 -1.500  -0.450 
2009 0.209 -0.013 -0.012 0.300  0.054 
2010 0.073  0.057 0.000 -0.018 -0.021 
2011 0.000  -0.005 -0.145  -0.037 
2012 0.052  0.018 0.000  0.000 
2013 -0.620  0.000  -0.008 0.086 
2014 -0.039  0.006 0.037  0.013 
2015 -0.150  0.000 0.225  0.023 
2016 0.580  0.005 0.109 0.018  
 Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
2000  -0.017  0.000 0.000 0.058 
2001  0.015  -0.069 -0.100 0.000 
2002  0.035 0.025  -0.195 0.000 
2003  0.034 0.225 0.155  -0.021 
2004  -0.103 0.183  -0.202 0.064 
2005  0.049 0.045  0.253 0.141 
2006  -0.067 -0.129 -0.052  0.026 
2007  -0.068 0.952 0.930  0.209 
2008 0.199 -0.054 -2.941 -2.453  -0.093 
2009  -0.020 -0.032  -0.017 -0.010 
2010  0.000 0.058 -0.005 0.017 -0.009 
2011  0.037 0.025  -0.108 -0.018 
2012  -0.028 0.023 -0.022  0.020 
2013 -0.155  -0.006 -0.155  0.012 
2014 -0.078  0.000 0.039  0.022 
2015 0.155  -0.058 -0.075  -0.150 
2016 0.073  -0.033  0.015 -0.234 
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Table A.6 – “Beta-Sorted” Portfolios Summary Statistics 
The table presents the summary statistics for the daily equity returns of the portfolios sorted 
according to their market beta. The daily equity returns considered are the ones around the 
161 FOMC announcements included in my sample period (2000-2016). The portfolios 
were directly sourced from the CRSP Wharton dataset. Panel A presents the summary 
statistics for the whole FOMC announcements sample. Panel B presents the summary 
statistics for the NMP FOMC announcements subsample. The summary statistics presented 
for each sample of equity returns are the number of days considered (“N”), the simple 
average (“µ”), the standard deviation (“σ”), the median (“median”), the minimum value 
(“min”), the maximum value (“max”), the skewness (“Sk”) and the kurtosis (“K”). 
Sources: CRSP- Wharton Database. 
Panel A: FOMC Whole Sample (2000-2016) 
 N μ σ median min max Sk K 
port1 161 0.744 2.784 0.590 -7.000 13.945 0.856 3.306 
port2 161 0.611 2.218 0.503 -5.594 11.666 1.007 4.427 
port3 161 0.470 1.905 0.293 -4.905 10.322 1.129 5.340 
port4 161 0.433 1.747 0.296 -3.946 10.115 1.410 6.410 
port5 161 0.353 1.573 0.251 -3.890 9.009 1.254 6.136 
port6 161 0.320 1.388 0.197 -3.519 8.196 1.381 6.954 
port7 161 0.279 1.259 0.212 -2.816 7.904 1.648 8.650 
port8 161 0.215 1.054 0.155 -2.695 6.871 1.706 10.079 
port9 161 0.147 0.713 0.063 -1.168 5.408 2.876 17.728 
port10 161 0.144 0.537 0.062 -1.236 3.067 1.326 5.391 
Panel B: FOMC NMP Subsample (2000-2016) 
 N μ σ Median min max Sk K 
port1 118 0.720 2.698 0.643 -7.000 13.945 0.914 4.349 
port2 118 0.550 2.148 0.556 -5.594 11.666 1.034 5.635 
port3 118 0.448 1.835 0.353 -4.309 10.322 1.226 6.351 
port4 118 0.404 1.691 0.331 -3.946 10.115 1.572 8.272 
port5 118 0.348 1.512 0.334 -3.306 9.009 1.545 7.999 
port6 118 0.335 1.316 0.301 -2.928 8.196 1.756 9.693 
port7 118 0.281 1.210 0.279 -2.624 7.904 2.008 11.971 
port8 118 0.213 1.034 0.172 -2.218 6.871 2.140 13.157 
port9 118 0.138 0.738 0.095 -1.168 5.408 3.233 20.456 







Table A.7 – Fama & French 10- Industries Portfolios Summary 
Statistics 
The table presents the summary statistics for the daily equity returns of Fama & French 10 
Industries Portfolios. The daily equity returns considered are the ones around the 161 
FOMC announcements included in my sample period (2000-2016). Panel A presents the 
summary statistics for the whole FOMC announcements sample. Panel B presents the 
summary statistics for the NMP FOMC announcements subsample. The summary statistics 
presented for each sample of equity returns are the number of days considered (“N”), the 
simple average (“µ”), the standard deviation (“σ”), the median (“median”), the minimum 
value (“min”), the maximum value (“max”), the skewness (“Sk”) and the kurtosis (“K”). 
Source: Kenneth French’s webpage (mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/) 
 
Panel A: FOMC Whole Sample (2000-2016) 
 N μ Σ Median min max Sk K 
Non-Durables 161 0.096 1.017 0.110 -3.120 2.900 -0.111 0.622 
Durables 161 0.412 1.920 0.300 -6.360 6.430 0.106 1.973 
Manufacturing 161 0.342 1.390 0.290 -5.050 5.160 0.147 2.401 
Energy 161 0.282 1.657 0.150 -5.640 4.730 -0.187 1.013 
High – Tech 161 0.504 2.168 0.380 -5.960 16.040 2.498 17.099 
Telecommunications 161 0.216 1.556 0.180 -5.230 8.050 0.501 4.858 
Wholesale / Retail 161 0.357 1.459 0.280 -5.100 5.280 0.408 1.955 
Health Care 161 0.209 1.183 0.120 -3.340 3.910 -0.106 0.985 
Utilities 161 0.123 1.321 0.170 -4.300 4.530 -0.214 1.108 
Other 161 0.462 1.971 0.270 -8.330 8.030 0.450 4.372 
Panel B: FOMC NMP Subsample (2000-2016) 
  N μ Σ Median min max Sk K 
Non-Durables 118 0.146 0.918 0.175 -2.390 2.740 -0.080 -0.003 
Durables 118 0.358 1.800 0.190 -5.620 6.430 0.271 2.291 
Manufacturing 118 0.294 1.264 0.255 -3.670 5.140 0.295 1.873 
Energy 118 0.345 1.522 0.165 -4.040 4.730 0.110 0.887 
High – Tech 118 0.436 1.406 0.500 -3.990 4.690 -0.117 0.907 
Telecommunications 118 0.204 1.342 0.185 -5.230 4.620 -0.311 2.238 
Wholesale / Retail 118 0.277 1.214 0.245 -2.620 4.840 0.416 1.251 
Health Care 118 0.259 1.085 0.170 -3.280 3.780 -0.142 1.148 
Utilities 118 0.230 1.173 0.210 -2.630 4.530 0.276 0.859 







Table A.8 – Robustness Check: Alternative Equity Indexes in the Main 
Specification and in the NMP subsample. 
The table presents the results for the main analysis and the robustness check on different 
equity indexes. The main analysis refers to the empirical analysis presented in section 
2.6.1.The analysis is conducted on the SP500 index daily returns and the CRSP Equally- 
Weighted Index daily returns. Panel A presents the analysis considering the whole sample 
of FOMC meetings across (2000–2016), which accounts for 161 meetings. Panel B only 
considers the FOMC meetings where no interest rate change has occurred in the NMP 
analysis, which accounts for 118 meetings across the (2000–2016) period. 
 
Panel A: Whole Sample (2000 -2016) 
  SPX Returns 
CRSP Equally- 
Weighted Index 
ItD 0.092 0.463** 
  (0.089) (0.205) 
Const. 0.056 0.346** 
  (0.067) (0.156) 
R2 0.000 0.058 
Obsv. 161 
Panel B: Neutral Monetary Policy - Whole Sample (2000 -2016) 
  SPX Returns 
CRSP Equally- 
Weighted Index 
ItD 0.258 0.399** 
  (0.166) (0.214) 
Const. 0.191 0.219 
  (0.224) (0.166) 
R2 0.026 0.061 
Obsv 118 
Signif. codes:  ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Source:  Federal Reserve website, www.federalreserve.gov, Quandl dataset, 










Table A.9 –  Persistency Analysis on Neutral Monetary Policy 
The table presents a robustness test for the “persistency analysis” across the NMP FOMC 
announcements. By “persistency analysis” I intend the effect of disagreement, represented 
by the dummy It
D variable. The results presented in section 2.7.2 show that the effect of 
disagreement towards the FOMC decision is not reversed to statistically significant 
negative returns the day after or before the FOMC meeting day. The dependent variable is 
presented by the CRSP Value-Weighted Index daily returns, computed the day before (-1), 
the day after (+1), two days after (+2) and three days after (+3) the FOMC announcement 
date. Consistent with past results neither the variables are statistically significant, in line 
with past findings on the FOMC announcements. The additional return observed on the 
market is not reversed on the subsequent days, nor on the day before. 
 
  -1 1 2 3 
It
D -0.124 0.058 0.147 0.021 
  (0.228) (0.269) (0.194) (0.237) 
Const. -0.032 -0.125 -0.050 0.166 
  (0.166) (0.196) (0.142) (0.173) 
Obsv.       118 
Signif. codes:  ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1. 
Source:  Federal Reserve website, www.federalreserve.gov, Quandl 















Appendix B – Chapter 3 
  
B. 1 Dataset Description for the second stage analysis – (VARs and 
Local Projections) 
Monthly Variables: 
• The Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices (HICP) – The Harmonised Indices 
of Consumer Prices measures the changes over time in the prices of consumer 
goods and services acquired by households.  
The countries’ specifications are the HICP Index for single Eurozone countries. 
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=9691135 
• Industrial production (Excluding Construction) - Industrial production refers to 
the output of industrial establishments. It is expressed as a seasonally adjusted 
index based on 2015=100. 
The countries’ specifications are the Industrial Production Index for single Eurozone 
countries. 
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=9691135 
• Commodity Index – ECB Commodity Price index Euro-denominated, import 
weighted, Total non-energy commodity; European Central Ban; It is expressed as 
a seasonally adjusted index based on 2015=100. 
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=9691135 
• Unemployment Rate – The Unemployment rate is the number of unemployed 
people as a percentage of the labour force, where the latter consists of the 
unemployed plus those in paid or self-employment. Unemployed people are those 
who report that they are without work, that they are available for work and that they 
have taken active steps to find work in the last four weeks. 
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=9691135 
• Exchange Rate - EURUSD 




• Producer price index (PPI) - Producer price index in manufacturing measures the 
rate of change in prices of products sold as they leave the producer. It excludes any 
taxes, transport and trade margins that the purchaser may have to pay.  
Source: OECD (2019), Producer price index (PPI) (indicator).  
doi: 10.1787/a24f6fa9-en. 
 
• Import price Index - The industrial import prices index shows the development of 
prices of goods imported by enterprises which are used as intermediate products in 
their production process, as capital goods or as goods to be resold to consumers. 
This index excludes construction. It is expressed as a seasonally adjusted index 
based on 2015=100. 
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=9691135 
• Export price Index - The industrial import prices index shows the development of 
prices of goods imported by enterprises which are used as intermediate products in 
their production process, as capital goods or as goods to be resold to consumers. 
This index excludes construction. It is expressed as a seasonally adjusted index 
based on 2015=100. 
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=9691135 
Quarterly Variables: 
• Gross Domestic Product (GDP) - Gross domestic product (GDP) is the standard 
measure of the value-added created through the production of goods and services 
in a country during a certain period. GDP is expressed as a change from the 
previous period. 
 












B.2 VAR – Eurozone Analysis 
The figure shows the impulse response functions of the endogenous variables retrieved 
from the VAR presented in section 3.3.3, equation [3.4]. The impulse responses are also 
presented in section 3.4.1. The paths correspond to the impulse response of output to a 100 
bps contractionary monetary policy shock, plotted along with 95% bootstrapped 
confidence bands. The VAR includes 5 lags and the impulse responses are computed with 
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B.3 VAR – Eurozone Analysis – Excluding Trend and Constant 
The figure shows the impulse response functions of the endogenous variables retrieved 
from the VAR presented in 3.3.3, equation [3.4]. The impulse responses are also presented 
in section 3.4.1. The paths correspond to the impulse response of output to a 100 bps 
contractionary monetary policy shock, plotted along with 95% bootstrapped confidence 
bands, excluding the trend and the constant. The VAR includes 5 lags and the impulse 
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B.4 VAR – Eurozone Analysis –Additional Macroeconomic Variables 
The figure shows the impulse response for all the variables included in the VAR presented 
in 3.3.3, equation [3.4], when adding additional macroeconomic variables. The additional 
macroeconomic variables included in the analysis are the PPI index and the unemployment 
rate for the Eurozone. The paths correspond to the impulse response of output to a 100 bps 
contractionary monetary policy shock, plotted along with 95% bootstrapped confidence 
bands. The VAR includes 7 lags and the impulse responses are computed with 2000 
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B.5 VAR – Eurozone Analysis –Additional Macroeconomic Variables –
Trade Variables 
 
The figure shows the impulse response for all the variables included in the VAR presented 
in section 3.3.3 equation [3.4], when adding additional macroeconomic trade variables. 
The additional macroeconomic variables included in the analysis are the Import and Export 
Indexes and the EURUSD exchange rate for the Eurozone. The paths correspond to the 
impulse response of output to a 100 bps contractionary monetary policy shock, plotted 
along with 95% bootstrapped confidence bands. The VAR includes 7 lags and the impulse 
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B.6 VAR – Eurozone Analysis – MPS ordered first in VAR 
The figure shows the impulse response functions of the endogenous variables retrieved 
from the VAR presented in section 3.3.3, equation [3.4], when the monetary shocks series 
is ordered first in the VAR. The impulse responses are also presented in section 3.4.1. The 
paths correspond to the impulse response of output to a 100 bps contractionary monetary 
policy shock, plotted along with 95% bootstrapped confidence bands, The VAR includes 
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B.7 VAR – Eurozone Analysis – R&R (2004) Shocks Series 
The figure shows the impulse response functions of the endogenous variables retrieved 
from the VAR presented in section 3.3.3, equation [3.4]. The monetary shocks series was 
computed following the methodology of Romer & Romer (2004) in the first-stage analysis, 
excluding the logarithm of the total assets. The impulse responses are also presented in 
section 3.4.1. The paths correspond to the impulse response of output to a 100 bps 
contractionary monetary policy shock, plotted along with 95% bootstrapped confidence 
bands. The VAR includes 5 lags and the impulse responses are computed with 2000 
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B.8 Local Projections – Eurozone Analysis 
The figure presents the impulse responses for the local linear projection model, estimated following Jordà (2005) and presented in 
section 3.3.3, equation [3.5]. The variables included with the analysis are the inflation rate, the industrial production index, the ECB 
commodity index and my monetary shocks series ordered last in the model. The impulse responses are estimated with 5 lags and plotted 





B.9 Local Projections – Eurozone Countries Specification – Germany 
The figure presents the impulse responses for the local linear projection model, estimated following Jordà (2005) and presented in 
section 3.3.3, equation [3.5]. This specification specifically investigates the effects of the monetary shocks series on the German inflation 
and industrial production. The variables included in this analysis are the inflation rate and industrial production index of Germany, the 
ECB commodity index and my monetary shocks series ordered last in the model. The impulse responses are estimated with 5 lags and 




B.10 Local Projections – Eurozone Countries Specification – France 
The figure presents the impulse responses for the local linear projection model, estimated following  Jordà (2005) and presented in 
section 3.3.3, equation [3.5]. This specification specifically investigates the effects of the monetary shocks series on the French inflation 
and industrial production. The variables included in this analysis are the inflation rate and industrial production index of France, the 
ECB commodity index and my monetary shocks series ordered last in the model. The impulse responses are estimated with 5 lags and 




B.11 Local Projections – Eurozone Countries Specification – Spain 
The figure presents the impulse responses for the local linear projection model, estimated following  Jordà (2005) and presented in 
section 3.3.3, equation [3.5]. This specification specifically investigates the effects of the monetary shocks series on the Spanish inflation 
and industrial production. The variables included in this analysis are the inflation rate and industrial production index of Spain, the ECB 
commodity index and my monetary shocks series ordered last in the model. The impulse responses are estimated with 5 lags and plotted 




B.12 Local Projections – Eurozone Countries Specification – Italy 
The figure presents the impulse responses for the local linear projection model, estimated following Jordà (2005) and presented in 
section 3.3.3, equation [3.5]. This specification specifically investigates the effects of the monetary shocks series on Italian inflation and 
industrial production. The variables included in this analysis are the inflation rate and industrial production index of Italy, the ECB 
commodity index and my monetary shocks series ordered last in the model. The impulse responses are estimated with 5 lags and plotted 





B.13 Local Projections – Eurozone Countries Specification – Greece 
The figure presents the impulse responses for the local linear projection model, estimated following Jordà (2005) and presented in 
section 3.3.3, equation [3.5]. This specification specifically investigates the effects of the monetary shocks series on Greek inflation and 
industrial production. The variables included in this analysis are the inflation rate and industrial production index of Greece, the ECB 
commodity index and my monetary shocks series ordered last in the model. The impulse responses are estimated with 5 lags and plotted 




B.14 Local Projections – Eurozone Countries Specification – Portugal 
The figure presents the impulse responses for the local linear projection model, estimated following Jordà (2005) and presented in 
section 3.3.3, equation [3.5]. This specification specifically investigates the effects of the monetary shocks series on the Portuguese 
inflation and industrial production. The variables included in this analysis are the inflation rate and industrial production index of 
Portugal, the ECB commodity index and my monetary shocks series ordered last in the model. The impulse responses are estimated 




B.15 Local Projections – Quarterly GDP Analysis 
The figure presents the impulse responses for the local linear projection model, estimated following Jordà (2005) and presented in 
section 3.3.3, equation [3.5], at a quarterly frequency. The variables included with the analysis are the inflation rate (HICP), the log of 
real GDP, the ECB commodity index and my monetary shocks series ordered last in the model. The impulse responses are estimated 




B.16 Local Projections – MPS Ordered First  
The figure presents the impulse responses for the local linear projection model, estimated following Jordà (2005) and presented in 
section 3.3.3, equation [3.5] when the monetary policy shock series is ordered first in the model. The variables included with the analysis 
are the inflation rate, the industrial production index, the ECB commodity index and my monetary shocks series ordered last in the 
model. This test is a robustness check to additionally ensure the orthogonality of the shocks series.  The impulse responses are estimated 




B.17 VAR – Eurozone Countries Specification – Germany 
The figure shows the impulse response functions of the endogenous variables retrieved 
from the VAR presented in section 3.3.3, equation [3.4], conducted on data from Germany. 
The paths correspond to the impulse response of output to a 100 bps contractionary 
monetary policy shock, plotted along with 95% confidence bands. The VAR includes 5 
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B.18 VAR – Eurozone Countries Specification – France 
The figure shows the impulse response functions of the endogenous variables retrieved 
from the VAR presented in section 3.3.3, equation [3.4] conducted on data from France. 
The paths correspond to the impulse response of output to a 100 bps contractionary 
monetary policy shock, plotted along with 95% bootstrapped confidence bands. The VAR 
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B.19 VAR – Eurozone Countries Specification – Spain 
The figure shows the impulse response functions of the endogenous variables retrieved 
from the VAR presented in section 3.3.3, equation [3.4] conducted on data from Spain.  
The paths correspond to the impulse response of output to a 100 bps contractionary 
monetary policy shock, plotted along with 95% bootstrapped confidence bands. The VAR 
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B.20 VAR – Eurozone Countries Specification – Italy 
The figure shows the impulse response functions of the endogenous variables retrieved 
from the VAR presented in section 3.3.3, equation [3.4] conducted on data from Italy. The 
paths correspond to the impulse response of output to a 100 bps contractionary monetary 
policy shock, plotted along with 95% bootstrapped confidence bands. The VAR includes 
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B.21 VAR – Eurozone Countries Specification – Greece 
The figure shows the impulse response functions of the endogenous variables retrieved 
from the VAR presented in section 3.3.3, equation [3.4] conducted on data from Greece. 
The paths correspond to the impulse response of output to a 100 bps contractionary 
monetary policy shock, plotted along with 95% bootstrapped confidence bands. The VAR 
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B.22 VAR – Eurozone Countries Specification – Portugal 
The figure shows the impulse response functions of the endogenous variables retrieved 
from the VAR presented in section 3.3.3, equation [3.4] conducted on data from Portugal. 
The paths correspond to the impulse response of output to a 100 bps contractionary 
monetary policy shock, plotted along with 95% bootstrapped confidence bands. The VAR 
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Appendix C – Chapter 4 
 
 
Table C.1 – Data Sources 
Table C.1. Data Sources 
Variable Name Geo* Source Websites 
INTEREST 
RATES 
   
Nominal Interest Rate 
EU European Central Bank www.ecb.europa.eu  
UK Bank of England www.bankofengland.co.uk 
Overnight Interest 
Rate 
EU European Central Bank www.ecb.europa.eu  
UK Bank of England www.bankofengland.co.uk 
MACRO VARIABLES FORECASTS 
Inflation (1Y - 2Y)  
EU 




Inflation Report - Bank of 
England 
www.bankofengland.co.uk 
GDP Growth (1Y - 
2Y) 
EU 









EU OECD www.oecd.org 
UK Office for National Statistics www.ons.gov.uk 
Inflation Rate 
EU 
ECB Statistical Data 
Warehouse 
sdw.ecb.europa.eu 
UK Office for National Statistics www.ons.gov.uk 
GDP Rate 
EU 
ECB Statistical Data 
Warehouse 
sdw.ecb.europa.eu 
UK Office for National Statistics www.ons.gov.uk 
FINANCIAL MARKETS VARIABLES 
Volatility    
VSTOXX EU Bloomberg Bloomberg Terminal 
VFTSE UK Bloomberg Bloomberg Terminal 
Currencies    
Euro Dollar  EU Bloomberg Bloomberg Terminal 
British Pound Dollar  UK Bloomberg Bloomberg Terminal 









Table C.2 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table C.2: Descriptive Statistics – monthly data (192 obs) - Whole Sample (2003 - 2018) - 
% 
 AVG MED MAX MIN STDEV 
Panel A : ECB           
Nominal Rate 1.378 1.000 4.250 0.000 1.314 
Overnight Rate 1.376 0.895 5.277 -0.331 1.573 
Inflation Rate 1.669 1.900 4.100 -0.600 0.988 
Industrial Production (log) 1.202 1.819 3.780 -5.519 1.926 
Unemployment Rate 9.640 9.345 12.090 7.270 1.352 
Inflation Rate Forecast 1.632 1.600 2.600 1.000 0.338 
GDP Growth Forecast 1.586 1.700 2.400 0.000 0.496 
Unemployment Rate Forecast 9.130 9.050 12.000 6.600 1.440 
Financial Market Volatility 22.857 20.950 60.677 11.986 8.512 
EURUSD Ex Rate 1.270 1.274 1.579 1.049 0.123 
Panel B: BOE           
Nominal Rate 2.026 0.500 5.750 0.250 2.036 
Overnight Rate 2.267 0.820 6.693 0.277 2.136 
Inflation Rate 2.130 2.250 4.800 0.200 0.922 
Industrial Production (log) 1.668 1.960 4.809 -6.083 1.992 
Unemployment Rate 5.954 5.400 8.500 4.000 1.380 
Inflation Rate Forecast 2.028 2.000 2.500 1.500 0.197 
GDP Growth Forecast 2.257 2.400 2.900 1.500 0.377 
Unemployment Rate Forecast 5.913 5.400 8.600 3.900 1.339 
Financial Market Volatility 18.220 16.429 54.149 9.549 7.449 
GBPUSD Ex Rate 1.629 1.606 2.080 1.224 0.209 
Note: Table C.2 presents descriptive statistics of variables included in the empirical analysis. 
Panel A presents statistics for the ECB and Panel B for BOE. Each variable is shown distribution 
simple average, median, maximum, minimum and standard deviation.  
Data Source:  ECB website (www.ecb.europa.eu), ECB statistical Data Warehouse 
(sdw.ecb.europa.eu), BOE website (www.bankofengland.co.uk), The Office for National 









Appendix C.1 – The Output Gap 
 
Figure C.1 presents the output gap (Panel A the ECB and Panel B BOE) computed as the 
difference between the long-run normal unemployment rate (u*) and the current 
unemployment rate (ut) as shown in equation [C.1]: 
Ut = u* - ut      [C.1] 
Clark (2012) and Oet & Lyytinen (2017) adopt the version of the Taylor (1999a) the 
employs as a measure of economic slack the deviation between the long-run unemployment 
rate and the current unemployment rate. The challenge is represented by the estimation of 
the long-run unemployment rate (u* in equation [C.1]). Clark (2012) set this value at 6%, 
whereas Oet & Lyytinen (2017) use the available estimate of the CBO. In my analysis I 
employ a rudimental measure of the long-run unemployment rate, based on the average 
unemployment rate in the pre-crisis period (2000-2007) for both the ECB and BOE. The 


















Figure C.1: Output Gap 
The figure presents the time series for the output gap, in Panel A for the ECB and in Panel B for the BOE. 
The output gap is computed as in equation [C.1], and it is the difference between the ex-post (green line) 
or forecast (red line) of the long-run unemployment rate and the current unemployment rate. Sample 
period is (2003–2018) and includes192 monthly observations. 
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Appendix C.2 – The Overnight Interest Rate 
 
When estimating the Taylor (1993, 1999a) Rules for the FED, Oet & Lyytinen (2017) 
recognized the importance of addressing the zero-lower bound and what happens when the 
rule suggests negative rates. For this reason they suggest they used of using alternative 
shadow rates in their framework following Wu & Xia (2016). In section 4.4.4 the Taylor 
Rules, estimated for both the ECB and BOE, were computed with the Nominal Interest 
rates, which represent an appropriate tool for the BOE. However, the zero-lower bound 
needs to be addressed for the ECB and therefore, I have conducted the analysis, presented 
in section 4.4.4., with Overnight Interest rates. The Overnight Interest rates employed for 
the institutions are the Euribor for the ECB and the Libor for the BOE, respectively. This 
additional analysis confirms the conclusions of section 4.4.4, improving the estimates of 
the Taylor (1993) Rule with forecasts data and the Augmented Taylor Rule for the ECB. 
The descriptive analysis for the BOE remains very close to the analysis performed in 
section 4.4.4. 
Figure C.2 shows the Taylor Rules computed with ex-post data for both the ECB (Panel 
A) and the BOE (Panel B). The paths are very similar to the one shown in  Figure 4.5, 
however, during the last regime of the ECB the Taylor (1993) Rule suggests for a brief 
period a negative interest rate, whereas in Figure 4.5 the Taylor (1993) Rule has always 
remained above the zero-lower bound.  The difference between the Taylor (1993) Rule and 
the Taylor (1999a) Rule remains analogous to analysis shown in section 4.4.4. The Taylor 
(1999a) Rule largely overestimates the interest rate paths (Nominal Interest rate) from the 
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third regime for both institutions. In the case of the BOE the analysis remains virtually 
similar to the one shown in section 4.4.4. 
Figure C.3. shows two interesting results in the case of the ECB: first, it confirms the 
descriptive analysis of section 4.4.4, in which the Taylor (1993) Rule computed with 
forecasts “beats” the Taylor (1993) Rule computed with ex-post. Second, the Taylor (1993) 
Rule with forecasts offers an even more precise estimates of the interest rates path in the 
4th and 5th regime. The two Taylor (1993, 1999a) Rules with forecasts tend to actually 
converge in the latest periods of the 5th regime, showing perhaps that by employing 
forecasts data the forecasted output gap, computed either with the output growth or with 
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Nominal IR Taylor_1993 Taylor_1999
Panel B: Bank of England
Sources: European Central Bank Website,Bank of England Website,ECB Statistical Data Warehouse,Office for National Statistics,Bloomberg.
Figure C.2: Ex-Post Data Taylor Rule 
The figure presents the Taylor Rule for the ECB (Panel A) and BOE (Panel B) computed using ex-post 
data. The estimation of the Taylor (1993, 1999a) Rules, following Oet and Lyytinen (2017), is conducted 
as Taylor-type Rule, as suggested by Clarke (2012) and as described by equation [4.5]. The Taylor rule 
are computed with Overnight Interest rate: the Euribor for the ECB and Libor for the BOE, respectively. 
The Nominal Interest rates are plotted along to the ex-post data Taylor (1993, 1999a) Rules. The regime 
samples computed with Bai-Perron (1998) are also plotted for both institutions. Sample period is (2003–






the unemployment rate, might have become both two analogously important elements of 
the conduct of monetary policy of the ECB. In the case of the BOE the Taylor (1993) Rule 
with forecasted data remains closer to the Nominal Interest rate, compared to the Taylor 
(1999a) Rule confirming the analysis of section 4.4.4. 
 
Lastly, Figure C.4 shows the Augmented Taylor Rules for the ECB (Panel A) and the BOE 
(Panel B), respectively. The Augmented Taylor Rule for the ECB shows interestingly that 
the implied interest rate is below the zero-lower bound from the beginning of the 4th regime 
(October, 2012). The path “recovers” at the end of the regime to fell back further under the 
zero-lower bound in the 5th regime. Compared to the analysis shown in section 4.4.4, the 
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Nominal IR Taylor_1993 Taylor_1993_forecasted Taylor_1999 Taylor_1999_forecasted
Panel B: Bank of England
Sources: European Central Bank Website,Bank of England Website,ECB Statistical Data Warehouse,Office for National Statistics,Bloomberg.
Figure C.3: Forecasted Data Taylor Rule 
The figure presents the Taylor Rule for the ECB (Panel A) and BOE (Panel B) computed using forecasts. 
The estimation of the Taylor (1993, 1999a) Rules, following Oet and Lyytinen (2017), is conducted as 
Taylor-type Rule, as suggested by Clarke (2012) and as described in equation [4.5]. ]. The Taylor rule 
are computed with Overnight Interest rate: the Euribor for the ECB and Libor for the BOE, respectively.  
The Nominal Interest Rate series is plotted along both for the ECB and BOE. The regime samples 
computed with Bai-Perron (1998) are also displayed for both institutions. Sample period is (2003–2018) 






ECB Augmented Taylor Rule fells beyond the zero-lower bound also at the beginning of 
the 3rd regime (April, 2009).  
 
This additional analysis points out the importance of addressing the zero-lower bound (Wu 
& Xia, 2016) in the case of the ECB. An additional important aspect that hasn’t yet been 
discussed and perhaps not entirely reflected in the Overnight Interest rate is the set of 
unconventional monetary policy tools used by the ECB and how they have affected the 
path of the interest rate. A further version of this research will tackle this aspect and aim to 
include the unconventional monetary policy tools within the Taylor Rule framework 
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Nominal IR Taylor_1993_forecasted Trimandate Taylor - Type Rule
Panel B: Bank of England 
Sources: European Central Bank Website,Bank of England Website,ECB Statistical Data Warehouse,Office for National Statistics,Bloomberg.
Figure C.4: The Augmented Taylor Rule 
The figure presents the Augmented Taylor Rule for the ECB (Panel A) and BOE (Panel B) computed 
using forecasts. The Augmented Taylor Rule is computed following the Taylor (1993) Rule and adding 
the FMSS variable (computed as shown in equation [4.4]). The Augmented Taylor Rule is computed with 
a Taylor-type Rule, as suggested by Clarke (2012) and as shown in equation [4.5]. The coefficient for the 
FMSS variables is equal to the coefficient of the output gap. The Augmented Taylor Rules are computed 
with forecasts. The Nominal Interest Rates is plotted along both for the ECB and BOE. The regime 
samples computed with Bai-Perron (1998) are also displayed for both institutions. Sample period is 
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